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1. SUMMARY: Is prayer in the public schools, or a 
minute of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer," a viola-
----------------'---· - ,_, -tion of the Establishment Clause? 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Jaffree, the resp and 
applee here, is the father of three children in the Mobile County 
public schools. He brought suit against the school board seeking 
a declaration and injunction barring the daily recitation of cer-
tain prayers in each of his three children's classes. The three 
prayers (one per class) were: 
God is great, God is good, and we thank Him for our 
food. By His hands we all are fed, Give us Lord our 
daily bread. Amen. 
God is great, God is good Let us thank Him for our 
food. 
For health and strength and daily food we praise Thy 
name, oh Lord. 
Jaffree also sought damages. Jaffree later amended his complaint 
to include as defendants the Governor of Alabama and other state 
authorities, and to add a constitutional challenge to two state 
statutes. The first, Ala. Code §16-1-20.1, provides: 
~
At the commencement of the first class of each day 
in all grades in all public schools, the teacher in 
charge of the room in which each such class is held may ~ 
announce that a Eer ~d of silence not to exceed one _ . , r. 
minute in duration shall be observed for meditation or 
voluntary prayer, and during an y suc fi per i od no othe r 
actlvl t1es- s hall be engaged in. 
The second statute, Ala. Code §16-1-20.2, reads: 
From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any 
public educational institution within the State of Ala-
bama, recognizing that the Lord God is one, at the be-
ginning of any homeroom or any clas·s, may pray, may 
lead the willing st~nts in prayer, or may lead the 
willing students in the following prayer to God: 
Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge 
You as the Creator and Supreme Judge of the world. May 
Your justice, Your truth, and Your peace abound this 
day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the counsels of 
our government, in the sanctity of our homes and in the 
classrooms of our schools in the name of our Lord. 
Amen. 
Petrs in No. 83-929 are 624 individuals--evidently local citizens 
and parents--who intervened as defendants in the DC. 
The DC (SD Ala, Hand, C.J.) first issued a preliminary in- L} C:. 
junction barring the implementation of the statutes. In its ~-
opinion on the merits, however, it dismissed the complaint. ~ 
DC thoroughly canvassed the historical evidence and concluded 
that (1) the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to incorporate 
the Establishment Clause, and ( 2) the Establishment Clause was 
not intended to bar prayer in the public schools. JUSTICE POWELL 
stayed the DC's judgment and reinstated the preliminary injunc-
tion, noting that the case appeared to be controlled by this 
Court's precedents. 103 S.Ct. 842, 843 (1983). 
CAll reversed. It said this Court had rejected the interpre-
tat ion of history advanced by the DC, and by appts and petrs, 
citing, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 u.s. 203 
(1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 u.s. 421 (1962); Everson v. Board of 
Educ., 330 u.s. 1 (1946). As for the individual classroom pray-
ers, it rejected the argument that since the teachers' prayer 
activities were not motivated by school board policy or state 
statute--the teachers testified they were not aware of the chal-
lenged statutes--there was no state action. The court held 




no efforts to stop it, thereby ratifying their conduct. The 
court then found the activities to have a religious purpose and 
effect. As for the statute containing the sample prayer, the --- ..._ ------court held that the law amounted to the establishment of a state 
religion, quoting Engel, supra, at 425 ("it is no part of the 
business of government to compose official prayers for any group -
to recite as part of a religious 
ment"). Finally, with respect to th 
the court noted the DC's finding in 
tion that the statute was intended "to return prayer to the pub- c::' IJ !/ 
lie schools," (citing testimony of law's sponsor). It held 
the statute lacked a secular legislative purpose. It also 
that the statute had the primary effect of advancing religion. 
Four CAll judges dissented from denial of rehearing en bane 
as to the moment-of-silence _:..tatute (Roney, Tjoflat, Hill, Fay).~ 
They said that 18 states have adopted similar statutes, that this~ 
Court has never ruled on their constitutionality, that the DCs 
are split on the question, and that the statute may be constitu-
tional, citing Schempp, supra, at 281, and n. 57 (BRENNAN, J., 
concurring) (suggesting such a statute might be constitutional); 
Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976) (upholding 
statute). The dissenters also said that the testimony of the 
sponsor the Alabama law should not be used to invalidate "a neu-
tral statute which is both facially and operationally constitu-
tional." 
3. CONTENTIONS: No. 83-804 attacks only the prayers 
conducted by the individual teachers in Mobile. It says the 
Board did not advocate the prayer activities, but was neutral, 
' . 
and that the teachers were merely exercising their free speech 
and free exercise rights. They repeat the arguments made before 
the DC that the First Amendment was not intended to prohibit 
prayer in the schools, and that the Fourteenth Amendment was not 
intended to incorporate the Establishment Clause. 
No. 83-812 is addressed to the constitutionality of the two 
~~atutes. As to the~en~f-silence s~a~ they repeat the 
ments of the CAll dissenters. Appts urge a decreased empha-
sis on the purpose of a statute, and an increased emphasis on the 
free exercise issues in prayer-statute challenges than they say 
this Court or the lower courts have shown. As to the statute 
containing the prayer, appts urge that the question of the basic 
meaning of the religion clauses be reopened, especially on the 
issue of school prayer. They say history--particularly Justice 
Story's commentaries--does not support this Court's position. 
They also make the incorporation argument. Finally, they say 
that the Court's rulings have "fanned the flames of religious 
factionalism," and suggest that this case offers a rare opportu-
nity to reconsider those rulings because of the record created in 
the DC. 
The SG has filed an amicus brief supporting appts in No. 83-
812. Without intending to "minimize" the "broader issues raised 
by the appellants here," he presents only the quest ion of the s;-0: 
constitutionality of the moment-of-silence statute. He repeats 
the arguments of the CAll dissenters. ~~lso says that this 
case would be an appropriate vehicle for addressing the moment-
of-silence statute; he does not think whether a statute contains 
the word "prayer," as this one does, is of constitutional signif-
icance, citing DC cases (p. 9, n. 9). The SG also says this case 
offers the opportunity to evaluate government efforts to accommo-
date interests of religious individuals in the public schools. 
He says he thinks the lower courts have been applying the three-
part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 (1971), too rigidly. 
No. 83-929 repeats the arguments contained in No. 83-812, 
adding additional historical evidence. In addition appts argue 
that because incorporation was not intended, CAll's decision vio-
lates the Tenth Amendment. 
4. DISCUSSION: The Court has shown no inclination to 
overrule either its early prayer cases or its incorporation deci-
/(. \.. { 
sions. Two Terms ago, the Court affirmed a CAS opinion invali-
dating a voluntary prayer statute less suspect than the statute 
~~ "'--- '--
here that contains the suggested prayer. See Karen B. v. Treen, 
--~,-- '-" 
653 F.2d 897 (CAS 1981) (statute provided for voiced, voluntary 
prayer by student or teacher for up to five minutes, with oppor-
tunity for excusing objecting students), aff'd, 4SS u.s. 913 
(1982). The circulating majority and concurring opinions in 
Lynch v. Donnelly (No. 82-12S6) reaffirm the basic propositions 
attacked by petrs and appts here. Thus, unless the Court has 
changed its mind, ' those of the questions presented in No. 83-812 
(question 2) and No. 83-929 (questions 2-S) that address the con-
stitutionality of Ala. Code §16-1-20.2 should be DFWSFQ'ed or 
summarily affirmed. Also, there is no reason to review the es-
sentially factual holding that there was state action in the 
,. 
prayers conducted in the three classrooms that were originally 
challenged, so cert. should be denied in No. 83-804. 
As the SG recognizes, the challenge to 
statute stands on different ground. The 
'-------· ---
that does appear to be a question of first 
the moment-of-silence (_~ 
constitutionality of J 4J 
impression. It seems 
to me that such statutes are religious both in purpose and prima-
ry effect, but with four CAll judges, many commentators, and nu--------merous states disagreeing, the question appears to be worthy of 
plenary review. The fact that so many state statutes would be ) 
affected further suggests the appropriateness of noting probable/~ 
jurisdiction. I am not sure that the SG is right that the inclu-
sion of the word "prayer" in the statute makes no difference, but ~ 
that is a question that can be left for the next case, if neces-
sary. Also, the finding of religious purpose below probably will 
not make a good deal of difference, since it is based on ambigu-
50 No. 83-804--DENY. 
No. to Question 1 with an eye to NOTING 
probable jurisdiction on that question. DFWSFQ or SUMMARILY AF-
FIRM as to Question 2 0 
No. 83-929--CFR as to Question 1 with an eye to NOTING 
probable jurisdiction on that question. DFWSFQ or SUMMARILY AF-
FIRM as to Questions 2-5. 
Response waived in 83-804 & 83-812. There is no 
response in 83-929. The SG has filed an amicus brief supporting 
appts in No. 83-812. 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
..JUSTICE: SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
March 26, 1984 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
There are at least two principle variations on an 
appropriate order noting jurisdiction in these cases. 
83-812 and 83-929 - In these cases probable 
jurisdiction is noted limited to Question 1 
in the jurisdictional statements. The cases 
are consolidated and a total of one hour is 
allotted for oral argument. The judgment 
with respect to the other issues presented by ___ ~ 
the appeals is affirmed. (72c.. ..... -~~ ~
83-804 - The petition for a writ of ~f ~~~ 
certiorari is denied. -~~ 
~~~ 
83-812 and 83-929 - In these cases probable 
JUrisdiction is noted limited to Question 1 
in the jurisdictional statements. The cases 
are consolidated and a total of one hour is 
allotted for oral argument. 
83-804 - The petition for a writ of 
certiorari is denied. 
If we adopt the second approach we would presumably 
affirm as to the other questions when we announce our 
decision on the moment of silence. I am inclined to prefer 
the first option disposing of the remaining questions 









Just ice Blackmun 
J usti ce Po·Nell 
,T n.~ tj ce Reh!:quist 
Justice O'Connor 
;;'ro!:l : J ustice Stevens 
'Circul.a;t&tl: --......:=------~--
~~~=~---------
83-812 - Wallace v. Jaffree: 83-929 - Smith v. Jaffree 
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. 
In his amended complaint in this case, appellee sought (1) 
a judgment holding two statutory provisions, Ala. Code § 16-1-
20.1, Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2, and certain allegedly State 
sanctioned, though not statutorily sanctioned, school prayer 
practices invalid under the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment, applicable to the States under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and (2) an injunction against the enforcement of these 
statutory provisions and non-statutory practices. The District 
Court dismissed the amended complaint. The Court of Appeals 
reversed the District Court's judgment in relevant part. It held 
the challenged statutory provisions and non-statutory practices 
unconstitutional and ordered the District Court to enter an 
injunction. Appellants invoke this Court's appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1254(2) regarding the Court of 
Appeals' judgments on the statutory provisions. 
As I understand it, the order this Court enters today is a 
holding that Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 is invalid as repugnant to the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the 
fh,-, O; r'r'e.t- f- /J inf-e/f r'eA-r ti-t.. Ccu~t- 1f (1.,-cfe,.,: {I. J.;J. .. u+ r..eAt if v.,~, · / 
-1-~ir 1!4/~'Yt~"'.l-rt..ll... o~ (A.Jq,.,.3 wirl.. fht'r 7,-~<icn-r,~ ha¥e. irrvJ) ~ 
-2-
States under the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the Court's 
order also affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar 
as it directed the District Court to enjoin the appellants from 
enforcing Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2. The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals concerning the non-statutory school prayer practices is 
not within the appellate jurisdiction of this Court and is 
challenged in a petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 83-804. 
The Court denies that petition. 
The Court's order noting probable jurisdiction is thus 
limited to the judgment of the Court of Appeals concerning the 
constitutionality of Ala. Code §16-1-20.1 (1982). Appellants 
frame the constitutional questions presented by that provision as 
follows: 
"Whether a state statute which permits, but does 
not require, teachers in public schools to observe up 
to a minute of non-activity for meditation or silent 
prayer has the predominant effect of advancing 
students' liberty of religion and of mind rather than 
any effect of establishing a religion." Juris. 
Statement, No. 83-812 i. 
"Does a moment of silence for individual silent 
'prayer or meditation' at the beginning of each school 
day in a public school classroom violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as 
interpreted by its language, framers' intent, and 
history?" Juris. Statement, No. 83-929 i. 
On the understanding that the Court has limited argument to 
the question whether Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 is invalid as 
repugnant to the Establishment Clause, applicable to the States 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, I join the Court's order. 
,·· . 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
Tb: Mr. Justice Powell November 30, 1984 
From: Lee 
No. 83-812 and 83-929, Wallace v. Jaffree, Smith v. 
Jaffree. 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
~~ Does the Alabama Moment-of-Silence Statute Constitute an 
~ Establishment 
~ .~~endment? 
(;TV'- ~:=:n .... 
·~~ w-<-w BACKGROUND 
;;;~~ 
elf 11 pA/ rrl/ 
~~~~'­
~··~~ 
of Religion in Violation of the First 
'•, 
2. 
Ishmael Jaffree, an agnostic, is the father of 
three children who are enrolled in the Mobile County, 
Alabama public schools. Jaffree filed a complaint in the 
.OC for the SD of Ala. claiming that the two "Alabama school 
prayer statutes" and other non-statutory practices of 
Mbbile County schoolteachers violate the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. Ala. Code §16-1-20.1 
provides: 
At the commencement of the first class of 
each day in all grades in all public schools, the 
reacher in charge of the room in which each such 
c~ass is held max announce that a ~eriod of 
Silence not to exceed one minute in duration 
Shall be observed for meditation or voluntary 
praYer, ana dUring any such periOd no other 
actfvities shall be engaged in. 
The second statute challenged by Jaffree provides that a 
teacher may lead "willing students in •.. [a specified non- . 
r- ..; 
denominational prayer] to God." Ala. Code §16-1-20.2. 
Jaffree also alleged that some teachers in the Mobile 
County public schools lead their students in prayers other 
than the one set forth in the Alabama Code. Jaffree named 
as defendants in this action the Board of School 
Commissioners of Mobile County, the Governor of Alabama, 
the attorney general, and other education authorities. A 
group of parents who favored the Alabama prayer statutes 
mtervened as defendants in the action. 
The DC granted a prelimary injunction against the 
enforcement of the Alabama school prayer statutes. 
Following a trial on the merits, the DC dismissed Jaffree's 
3. 
action and dissolved the prelimary injunction. After 
considering the "historical evidence" presented at trial, 
the DC found that the First Amendment did not apply to the 
~ates through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
DC, 
According to the 
has erred in its the "United States Supreme Court 
-------------------~-'-------------~---------mading of history." 
CAll refused to grant an emergency stay of the 
DC's judgment and to reinstate the preliminary injunction. 
In your capacity as Circuit Justice, you granted the stay L JC tJ 
and reinstated the injunction pending the CA's disposition 
of the case. In a memorandum opinion, you stated that 
~fugel v. Vitale, 370 u.s. 421 (1962) and the other school 
prayer cases appeared to be controlling. 
CAll subsequently reversed the judgment of the DC. 
CAll rejected the argument that the First Amendment 
prohibits only the establishment of a national religion. 
It also refused to credit the School Board's argument that 
the First Amendment does not apply to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court has long recognized 
that the Clause proscribes both state and federal laws 
which "aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one 
religion over anoth~r." Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
u.s. 1 (1946). The CA stated that this Court, in its 
earlier decisions, considered the "historical arguments" 
advanced by the School Board. The CA concluded that it was 
powerless to reevaluate these arguments, as they had 
already been rejected by this Court. 
4. 
.According 
---- - ----::::::=--..:--~ 
to the CA, the ~e-par t Lemon 
determine the co~l!..!; ionali t should be used to 
challenged conduct. Under that test, a state's action is 
unconstitutional unless :c:§)i t has a ~ecular ~E._p~se; €) 
its principal or primary effect is one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; and @ it does not foster 
"an excessive governmental entanglement with religion." 
~mon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602, 612-613. The CA applied 
the Lemon test to invalidate the state statute providing 
for teacher-led prayer. It also relied upon the three-
prong analysis in holding that the non-statutory actions of 
the Mobile County school teachers violated the First 
Amendment. 
The CA dealt with the moment-of-silence statute in 
was to 
The court stated that the ~ 
advance religion. It note
passing the statute the legislature must have 
intended to return prayer to the public schools, since the 
statute had no secular purpose. Moreover, the court held 
~ 
that the statute had the primary effect of advancing 
religion. Because the moment-of-silence statute failed two 
of the three prongs of the Lemon test, the CA concluded 
that Section 16-1-20.1 constituted an establishment of 
religion in violation of the First Amendment. 
The Governor of Alabama and the intervenors filed 
jurisdictional statements with this Court. The appellants 
challenged both the CA' s holding that the prayer statute 
5. 
was unconstitutional, and its holding that the moment-of-
silence statute violated the First Amendment. The Court 
was careful to §ii} ~ 
~spect to the latter holding. The Court's order summarily 
affirmed the CA's judgment that the the statute permitting 
~al prayer was unconstitutional. 
DISCUSSION 
The appellants argue that the Framers intended the 
Establishment Clause to prohibit only the creation of a 
national church. Moreover, they contend that the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the Clause. I 
~ink that the Court should simply ignore these arguments, 
because they have already b~n cons ide red and rejected. 
~erson v. Board of Education, 330 u.s. 1 (1946). The 
"new" historical evidence in the appellants' briefs did not 
convince me that / his Court 
prior decisions 1 ealing with 
should overturn all of its 
the Establishment Clause. 
Moreover, the Court • s order noting probable jur isidiction 
indicates that it did not want to consider these arguments • ... 
The Court summarily affirmed that part of the CA's decision 
that held the vocal prayer statute unconstitutional. If 
the Court had found any merit to the position advanced by 
appellants, it would have noted probable jurisdiction on 
this issue as well. 
The appellants do point to historical evidence 
that the Framers approved of prayer in the public schools. 
. ..... .... 
6. 
~~ 
The Northwest Ordinance, passed by the First Congress just 
58 days prior to the Establishment Clause, provided federal 
land for schools, which were encouraged to teach "religion 
and morality." Moreover, the practice of prayer in the 
public schools continued uninterrupted in this country 
until the Court's decision in Engel v. Vitale, 370 u.s. 421 
(1962). (In fact, there was teacher-led vocal prayer in the 
Birmingham public schools long after Engel.) The 
appellants argue that the Court cannot ignore all of this 
history in interpreting the Establishment Clause. The 
Cburt relied on similar historical arguments in Marsh v. 
Chambers, 51 USLW 5162 (1983), where it held that the 
Nebraska legislature's practice of opening each day with a 
prayer by a state-paid chaplain did not violate the First 
Amendment. The Marsh Court did not even mention the three-
prong Lemon test. 
The appellants' historical arguments prove too 
much, for the Court summarily affirmed CAll's holding that 
teacher-led prayer violated the Establishment Clause. It 
would be ridiculous to hold that tradition and history 
justify a moment of silence, but do not justify spoken 
~ayer. Prior to the Engel decision in 1962, not a single 
state had a moment-of-silence statute. Unless the Court 
decides to hold that vocal, teacher-led prayer is 
constitutional, the historical arguments should not carry 
the day • 
1461-
7. 
The Court should not rely on Marsh-type historical 
arguments to hold that all prayer, both spoken and silent, 
is permissible in the public schools. The purely 
historical arguments should prevail only when there is no 
real danger that the challenged state practice constitutes 
m establishment of religion. The Marsh Court recognized 
as much when it quoted Justice Goldberg's concurring 
cpinion in Abington School District v. Schmepp, 374 u.s. 
203 {1963) : 
It is of course true that great consequences can 
grow from small beg innings, but the measure of 
constitutional adjudication is the ability and 
willingness to distinguish between real threat 
and mere shadow. 
The prayer involved in the Marsh case was no more than a 
"shadow." After all, the individuals claiming injury were 
adults, "not readily susceptible to religious 
indoctrination." Marsh, 51 USLW at 5164. In contrast, the 
children in the public schools are easily influenced, 
particularly by their teachers. There would be a serious 
danger of religious indoctrination were public 
schoolteachers permitted to lead their students in vocal 
prayer. If the Court does not limit its use of historical 
tests to those cases in which the challenged action poses 
an insignificant threat, there will be very little left of 
the Establishment Clause. 
If the Court decides that the historical 
acceptance of prayer in the public schools is not relevant, 






If one applies this three-prong test in a straightforward 
-------------------·~ ·-
be held unconstitutional. The appellees appear to be 
correct that the statute had both the ~rpose and the -
There is no question that 
the state legislature intended to make prayer a part of the 
daily classroom activity. 
Nevertheless, I think that the mechanical ~~ 
 ~plication of the Lemon test urged by appellees is 
~ mconsistent with the result~of the Court's earlier 
~~ _ -~~~~tablishment Clause cases. In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 
· u.s. 664 (1970), for example, the Court upheld a tax 
statute l 
creating the tax exemption clearly had both the purpose and 
exemption for The 
effect of advancing religion. Similarly, in Ever son v. 
Board of Education, 330 u.s. 1 (1947), the Court held that 
the First Amendment permitted the reimbursement of parents 
for cost of transporting their children to parochial 
schools. Again, the expenditure of public funds in this 
manner had the purpose and effect of advancing religion. 
These cases illustrate that the Lemon test, if applied in 
the manner suggested by CAll, is not of much help. 
The CAll's interpretation of the Lemon test also 
fails to account for the fact that a state is allowed to 
accomodate the religious beliefs of its citizens. In 
~rach v. Clausen, the Court upheld a program under which 
public schools released students during the day so that 
0. 
8. 
If one applies this three-prong test in a straightforward 
"""'---- . 
be held unconstitutional. The appellees appear to be 
correct that the statute had both the ~rpose and - the 
There is no question that 
the state legislature intended to make prayer a part of the 
daily classroom activity. 
Nevertheless, I think that the mechanical ~~ 
 ~plication of the Lemon test urged by appellees is 
~ mconsistent with the result~of the Court's earlier 
~' _ -~~~~tablishment Clause cases. In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 
~· u.s. 664 (1970), for example, the Court upheld a tax 
statute 1 
creating the tax exemption clearly had both the purpose and 
exemption for The 
effect of advancing religion. Similarly, in Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 u.s. 1 (1947), the Court held that 
the First Amendment permitted the reimbursement of parents 
for cost of transporting their children to parochial 
schools. Again, the expenditure of public funds in this 
manner had the purpose and effect of advancing religion. 
These cases illustrate that the Lemon test, if applied in 
the manner suggested by CAll, is not of much help. 
The CAll's interpretation of the Lemon test also 
fails to account for the fact that a state is allowed to 
accomodate the religious beliefs of its citizens. In 
~rach v. Clausen, the Court upheld a program under which 
public schools released students during the day so that 
9. 
they could go to religious centers for instruction and 
devotional exercises. This practice certainly had both the 
purpose and effect of advancing religion. Nevertheless, 
the Court held that the practice did not violate the 
EStablishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Zorach 
Court recognized that it was desirable for the government 
to accommodate the exercise of religion; ~;tic-e Dougla1 
wrote that such accommodation "respects the religious ----------nature of our people." In other cases, the Court has 
recognized that the "limits of permissible accommodation to 
religion are by no means co-extensive with the 
noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause." 
Walz, at 673. Zorach illustrates that the 
Court has sanctioned a broad range of state action that 
accommodates religious beliefs and practices. Under the 
CAll's interpretation of Lemon, however, no accommodation 
would be permissible under the First Amendment. This is 
because a statute that accommodates religious beliefs, by 
definition, has the purpose and effect of advancing 
religion. In this case, the appellants argue that the 
moment-of-silence statute was designed to accommodate the 
religious practices of schoolchildren. Although this is a 
plausible argument, it is foreclosed if Lemon means what 
the CAll says it means. If the statute was intended to 
accommodate the religious beliefs of schoolschildren, it 
clearly has the purpose of advancing religion. I do not 
think, however, that the prior cases permit this Court to 
10. 
dispose of the accommodation argument with the simplistic 
application of the Lemon test adopted by the court of 
appeals. -- --·-----._ 
~tice O'-~onn_o<)has suggested an interpretation 5~ 
c£ the Lemon ·· ·· test that seems to explain most of this 
Cburt's prior Establishment Clause opinions. Lynch v. 
Ibnnelley, 52 USLW 4317, 4322 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
Moreover, the test that she proposes allows the state to 
accommodate religious beliefs without automatically running 
afoul of the Establishment Clause. Justice O'Connor has 
stated that the Court should focus ~lY on insti tutiQ_nal 
entanglement and endorsement of religion. The -
institutional entanglement inquiry she suggests is similar 
to the "excessive entanglement" test of Lemon, as it is now 
interpreted by the lower courts. Justice 0 'Connor's only 
modification of this prong of the test is to state that 
political divisiveness is irrelevant to the inquiry. 
Unlike the "excessive entanglement" factor, the 
first and second prongs of the Lemon test are modified 
substantially under the O'Connor approach. Justice 
{ O'Connor would decide whether the statute had the purpose 
l or e~~~n. To her~ it is irrelevant 
whether the state action was intended to advance religion, 
or if it had that effect. As long as the state's action: 
(1) was not intended to endorse religion; and ( 2) did not 
have the effect of advancing religion, it is is permissible 
under the First Amendment. 
s~~~Jc~ 
~~~~UA-/~ 
- ~1-8 ~r.r-~~ 
If the~Connor interpretation is adopted, I think 
that the judgment of the CA should be reversed. It appears 
that the moment-of-silence statute was not intended to 
~ ------------------
endorse religion. - _____....... ..... The remarks of the bill's sponsor and 
the Governor simply suggest that the state wanted to return 
voluntar rayer to the public schools. This does not mean 
that they wanted to give the state's imprimatur of approval 
to school prayer; they wanted only to make accomodation for 
those schoolchildren who wanted to pray at the ~ tart of the 
day. Similarly, while the challenged statute may have had 
the effect of advancing religion, I do not think that it 
had the effect of placing the state's stamp of approval 
upon it. If the statute is fairly implemented, all 
religions will be treated equally, and religion will not be 
prefer red over non-religion. our ing a one minute period, 
every student will have an opportunity to pray in the 
manner in which he chooses, or not to pray at all. This 
statute therefore is far different from one providing for 
vocal, teacher-led prayer. Teacher-led prayer would 
"communicate a message that the government intends to 
endorse" the prayer's message. Lynch, at 4324 (O'Connor, 
J. , concurring) . 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION 
The Court should reject appellants' arguments: (1) 
that the First Amendment prohibits only the establishment 
of a national church, and (2) that the Establishment Clause 
5b't. 
12. 
is not incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. These 
issues were decided by the Court long ago, and the order 
noting probable jurisdiction clearly indicated that the 
Court did not want to reconsider its position. The Court 
likewise should not hold that the Alabama statute is valid 
simply because of the historical acceptance of prayer in 
the public schools. This argument proves too much, for if 
history justifies a moment-of-silence, it should also 
justify vocal prayer. More importantly, I think that this 
Court should limit the use of the purely historical test to 
those cases where the challenged state action poses only an 
insignificant danger, such as in Marsh, the Nebraska 
chaplain case. 
If the Court refuses to rely on historical 
arguments, the three-prong Lemon test probably should be 
used to analyze the statute. The provision for a moment-
of-silence will be found unconstitutional if Lemon is 
applied in the simplistic manner suggested by CAlL The 
CA's interpretation of Lemon, however, is inconsistent with 
fue results in prior cases and does not allow the state to 
make accommodations for religious beliefs and practices. 
1 
Therefore, the interpretation of Lemon proposed by Justice 
O'Connor is preferable. Under her approach, a statute does --oot violate the Establishment Clause unless it has the 
purpose or the 
Alabama law does not have such a purpose or effect, it does 
not run afoul of the First Amendment. 
13. 
I recommend that the judgment of CAll be reversed. 
·.• 
'· .,
83-812 WALLACE v. JAFFREE 
83-929 SMITH v. JAFFREE Argued 12/4/84 
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TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Lee 
RE: Nos. 83-812 and 83-929, Wallace v. Jaffree and Smith v. 
Jaffree - Articles by Prof. Paul Freund 
I read the two pieces by Paul Freund that you mentioned 
yesterday. Both were interesting, but had little to say about 
the moment-of-silence. In Storms over the Supreme Court, 69 
A.B.A. Journal 1474 (1983), Professor Freund discussed various 
controversies in the Court's history (e.g., the Dred Scott 
decision and the Court-packing plan). At the end of his short 
piece, Professor Freund stated that the current Court, unlike its 
IDchnerizing predecessor, was concerned with areas that are fit 
for judicial resolution. Nevertheless, he argued that the Court 
is sometimes like the little boy who knows how to spell banana, 
but does not know when to stop. According to Freund, the 
ultimate test of whether the Court knows "when to stop" will come 
when it considers a moment-of-silence statute. Freund stated 
that if the Court regards this as an establishment issue, it will 
&rike down the stautute. On the other hand, if it is viewed as 
a free exercise problem, "silent prayer not in unison, 
w~....., 
accompanied by other forms of private meditation, would not 
offend the Constitution." 
--------------------
In a short book, Religion in the Public Schools, Freund 
does not even mention a moment-of-silence. Nevertheless, he does 
address the reasons that he thinks vocal prayer should be 
unconstitutional. First, he states that a truly non-sectarian 
prayer might not offend the First Amendment. But he argues that: 
(1) there may be no such thing; and (2) more importantly, the 
~preme Court is a secular institution incapable of deciding 
whether a prayer is truly non-sectarian. Freund also contends 
that vocal prayer would never be truly voluntary because young 
children would feel psychological coercion to participate from 
their teacher and peers. Freund's analysis certainly suggests 
that a moment-of-silence statute is distinguishable. 






CH .. MBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
,Altqn"lttU Of&tttrl 4tf !41 :JlniUb ~tab.8' 
:.u.l{itt:gton. ~. <!f:. 2ll.?,.~ 
December 6, 1984 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 83-812 - Wallace v. Jaffree 
At oral argument the question whether the as peal 
i~,~?r is almost, ~o~t arose. In t r y1ng to answer that 
questio~, I have d1pped into the record and found the 
following chronology which may be of interest to you: 
1. On April 29, 1981, the statute that is at 
issue now (§16-1-20.1) became effective. (SG's Brief 
p.3, n.l). 
2. On January 30, 1982, plaintiffs filed their 
second amended complaint, containing the following 
allegation: 
"32. (f) Pursuant to the grant of authority 
contained in Section 16-1-20.1, Defendants GREEN, 
BOYD and PIXIE ALEXANDER, have led their classes 
in religiously based prayer activities." Joint 
App. 21, 25. 
3. The District Court's findings of fact state, 
in part: 
"Defendant Boyd, as early as September 16, 
1981, led her class at E.R. Dickson in singing the 
following phrase: 
"'God is great, God is good, 
Let us thank him for our food, 
bow our heads we all are fed, 
Give us Lord our daily bread. 
Amen!' 
-2-
"The recitation of this phrase continued on a 
daily basis throughout the 1981-82 school year." 
App. to Juris. Statement 4d. 
4. On July 8, 1982, the statute which prescribes 
a form of spoken prayer (§16-1-20.2) became effective. 
(SG's Brief p.3, n.l). 
It seems rather clear from the foregoing that the 
District Court's findings of fact concerning the 1981-
1982 school year explain how §16-1-20.1 was applied 
before the 1982 statute was passed, and that those 
findings establish the accuracy of the allegation in 
paragraph 32(f) of the second amended complaint. 
Respectfully, 
alb 12/06/84 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Lee 
RE: No. 83-812, Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice Stevens' memo to the 
Conference 
It seems to me that Justice Stevens is trying to turn 
this facial challenge to the moment-of-silence statute into an 
"as applied" challenge. The DC found that the defendant teacher 
was leading her class in vocal prayer ("God is great, God is 
good, etc.) during the 1981-1982 school year. The moment-of-
silence statute was in effect during this time period. The 
statutory provision for vocal prayer was not enacted until after 
fue 1981-1982 school year. Therefore, according to Justice 
Stevens, the vocal prayer during this school year was conducted 
pursuant to the moment-of-silence statute. He concludes that the 
quoted provision from the complaint is a challenge to the moment-
of-silence statute "as applied." 
I disagree with Justice Stevens' approach. The vocal 
prayers discussed above were not conducted pursuant to the 
moment-of-silence statute. That statute certainly did not 
provide for teacher led prayer. Instead, the teachers in Mobile 
were ignoring both the federal constitution and the state 
statute. 
If one decides that the actions of the teachers during 
the 1981-1982 school year were not conducted pursuant to the 
moment-of-silence statute, then there is possibly a ripeness 
problem. The moment-of-silence statute apparently has never been 
enforced. Nevertheless, the threat of enforcement probably makes 
this a justiciable controversy. See United Public workers v. 
Mitchell, 330 u.s. 75 (1947). After vocal prayer was enjoined, 
it was certainly reasonable to believe that the moment-of-silence 
statute would be implemented immediately. This is not a statute 
that has been on the books for a hundred years and ignored by 
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CHAMISERS 01" 
.JUSTICE WM • ..J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
\ , ,_.... I 
.hvrtmt Qinrt gf flrt 'Jnittb •tatt• 
-a#~~. Of. 21lc?'l' 
December 7, 1984 
~~ 
Dear Chief, ~ 
John has agreed~try his hand at 
an opinion for the C rt in No. 83-812, 
Wallace v. Jaffree, and No. 83~929, 
Smith v. Jaffree. I'll undertake to 
so 1n No. 83-5954, Lindahl v. OPM. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
C HAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
Re: No. 83-812) 
83-929) 
Dear John, 
~u.prtmt <!Jttttrl ttf tqt ~tb .Statts 
~ht.sJringbnt. ~. OJ. 2ll.;t'!.;l 
January 29, 1985 
Wallace v. Jaffree 
Smith v. Jaffree 
I will shortly circulate a combined d~nt covering t~case, 




cc: The Conference 
·' 
CHAMI!IERS Or 
..JUSTICE w ... ..J . BRENNAN, ..JR. 
No. 
No. 
February 1, 1985 
83-812) Wallace, et al. 
) v. Jaffree, -
) et al. --) 
) Smith, et al. 





Copies to the Conference 
CHAMISERS OP' 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
,jnprtnu Ofoud of tlft ~~ .itafte 
'Ill as Jringhtn. ~. Of. 2D.;t'l~ 
February 4, 1985 
Re: Nos. 83-812 and 929-Wallace and Smith v. Jaffree 
Dear John: 





cc: The Conference 
CHAMI!IERS OF" 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~tm.t "Jouri &tf tift ~b .. tatt • 
... Jrittghnt. ~. "+· 2llc?'l~ 
Re: No. 83-812) Wallace v. Jaffree 
No. 83-929) Smith v. Jaffree 
Dear John: 
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February 19, 1985 
Lee Bentley 
LFP, JR. 
83-812 Wallace v. Jaffree 
83-929 Smith v. Jaffree 
As you know, I see nothing unconstitutional in 
the "moment of silence" provided by Alabama. 
Justice Rehnquist's dissent is wide-ranging and 
scholarly. I agree with much of what he has said. But we 
have the New York and Michigan cases involving the federal 
statute, and I voted the "other way" in those cases. As 
much as I would like to uphold the federal statute, for 
the reasons that Lynda has set forth persuasively I find 
it difficult to reconcile the rendering of direct federal 
aid to parochial schools with the prior decisions of this 
Court. Judge Friendly's opinion is highly persuasive in 
this respect. 
When I refer to the "federal" statute, I appreciate 
that the Michigan case involves a comparable state statute 
that authorizes similar direct assistance to non-pulbic 
schools. 
As nothing has been circulated - so far as I know -
on the New York and Michigan cases, what I need to know at 
this time is what to do in the Alabama case. Justice 
Rehnquist•s opinion is written so broadly that it is clear 
he also had the New York and Michigan cases in mind. Is 
anyone else writing on the Alabama case? If not, perhaps 





THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
Re: 
Dear John, 
i'ttFtntt Clfomi af tltt ~b !ltatt• 
Jlasltinght~ ~. <!f. 2Dt?,.~ 
February 28, 1985 
No. 83-812 - Wallace v. Jaffree 
83-929 - Smith v. Jaffree 
In due course, assuming you get a Court, I will be 
adding a few dissenting observations. 
Justice Stevens 





r.ee DATE: ApriJ 11, 1985 
Lewis ~. Powell, Jr. 
83-812 ~allace v. Jaffree 
83-q29 Smith v. Jaffree 
Until today, t ~ad not rea~ Justice St~vens' opin-
ion circulated in January but had understood that tt invali-
dated the "moment of si1ence" statute, ~16-l-20. r-tis opin-
ion states, however, that ap9ellees have aban~oned any claim 
that ~16-1-20 is unconstitutional, and on p. 20 Justice Ste-
vens indicates that he would approve such a statute. 
His opinion lnvalidates ~16-1-20.1, enacted in 
1981 three years after the earlier statute, authorizinq 
aperiod of silence "for meditation of voluntary prayer". 
Section 16-1-20.2 enacted in 1982 authorized teachers to 
lead "willinq students" in a prescribed prayer. 
I have not reread your bench memo, hut have been 
un~er the imPression that the principal. question before us 
~as the "moment of silence" statute. I do not think I have 
focused on the other two statutes. 
T alc;o have read Bill Rehnquist's dissent, and 
while it refl@cts a vast aMount of interestinq history, it 
does not specifically ad~ress the statutes at all. 
I wou1d aPPreciate beinq enliahtened as to the 
status of this case. I have doubts as to the vAliditv of 





l _______________ ..._..._,F>i&IDIIil,_a~...--"'". .-o:k~ 
.. 
2. 
presents a closer question - authorizing a period of silence 
"for me~itation or voluntary praver". I would like vour 
tl-touqht~ on the c;tatus of the currPnt situation, an~ your 
'I, advice. 
J 
r ... F.: • p • , ,J r • , j 
ss 
. ~ ., 
·~:~t';.'-{' ~' ~ 
.•. 
alb 04/11/85 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Lee 
RE: Nos. 83-812 and 
v. Jaffree 
83-929, Wallace v. Jaffree, et al., and Smith 
(?-tu-r~r~· :h-eJ ~
~~~~~-f-2..-l:J(L) ~.?D(2-) ~ 
After .. ~~f A '111 I .t . d receiVIng your memo o pri , reexamine 
Justice Stevens' opinion. He does suggest that the 1978 moment-
of-silence statute (§16-1-20) was constitutional. Therefore, his 
opinion can be read narrowly, so as to invalidate only the 1981 
moment-of-silence statute (§16-1-20.1). Nevertheless, Justice 
Stevens' draft has a problem that should keep you in the dissent. 
Justice Stevens assumes that a State cannot accomodate 
the religious beliefs of its citizens unless a failure to take 
such action would violate the Free Exercise Clause. See footnote 
45, pp. 18-19. This assumption is inconsistent with the Court's 
prior decisions. In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 u.s. 664 (1970), 
the Court held that a tax exemption for religious organizations 
did not violate the Establishment Clause. In reaching that 
conclusion, the Court said that "[t]he limits of permissible 
state accomodation are by no means co-extensive with the 
noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause." !d., at 
673. Similarly, in Zorach v. Clausen, 343 u.s. 306 (1952), the 
~ 
Court upheld a program under which public schools were release! 
students during the day so that they could go to religious 
centers for instruction and devotional exercises. There is no 
reason to believe that the students in Zorach would have been 
~ . "'/ ... 
able to prevail on a Free Exercise claim if the schools had 
refused to release them early. 
It is not surprising that Justice Stevens has "gutted" 
the accomodation doctrine. He surely realizes that if the 1981 ___ ...;..-
statute (§16-1-20.1) is viewed as an accomodation to those 
students who wish to pray silently, it can be upheld. A State ~ ......,. __ _ 
should be allowed to establish a moment-of-silence so that 
students, who are required by law to attend school, can exercise 
their religious beliefs. There must, of course, be some limits 
on permissible accomodation. A State, for example, should be 
~ecluded from "accomodating" religious students by instituting 
vocal prayer, which might tend to coerce non-religious students. 
A moment-of-silence, however, accomodates those students who wish 
to pray without abridging the rights of non-participating 
students. 
( 
If the moment-of-silence is analyzed as an 
"accomodation," it should not matter that the statute has the 
purpose of advancing religion. All statutes designed to 
accomodate religion have this purpose. The sponsors of 1981 
moment-of-silence bill clearly wanted to give students the opti~ 
e--
of praying silently in school. Although the 1978 statute (§16-1-
20) already set aside a moment-of-silence for "meditation," 
state legislators may have feared that teachers and students 
would be unaware that it was permissible to pray during this 
time. The 1981 statute simply made it clear that students can 
pray to themselves during this silent period. 
1\ 
The Chief currently is working on a dissent, which 
analyzes the 1981 moment-of-silence statute as an "accomodation." 
Because that is how I believe the case should be approached, I 
recommend waiting for the Chief's opinion. I am, of course, 
ready to take any other course that you may suggest. 
alb 04/13/85 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Lee 
RE: Nos. 83-812 and 83-929, Wallace v. Jaffree, et al., and Smith 
v. Jaffree 
The moment-of-silence statute, Ala. Code Ann. §16-1-
20.1, should not be held unconstitutional. This 1981 legislation 
simply "accomodates" those students who wish to pray silently in 
the public schools. If the statute is analyzed in this manner, 
however, two limitations on the ability of States to advance 
religion by making accomodations for believers must be 
recognized. First, if the legislation does not lift a 
1 governmental burden on religious practices, it cannot be 
characterized as an accomodation. Second, accomodation 
legislation cannot coerce non-believers into supporting either 
one particular faith or religion in general. 
The Alabama statute can be treated as an accomodation, 
notwithstanding these two limitations. Section 16-1-20.1 eases a 
governmental restriction on the right to practice religion. 
Children in Alabama are required to attend school until they 
reach the age of 16, and their school day is scheduled fully. 
Without a moment of silence, these captive students would be 
unable to pray unless they were willing to sacrifice the benefits 
of scheduled activities. A student is free to pray silently 
during his Math Class, for example, only if he is willing to 
forego learning long division. Moreover, the moment of silence 
does not coerce non-believers into supporting either one 
- .... 
particular faith or religion in general. Each student remains 
free to reflect on whatever he chooses during the quiet period. 
Neither the student's teacher nor his peers will know whether he 
is praying or thinking about the afternoon baseball game. 
Because the Alabama statute is an "accomodation," it is 
clear that the Lemon test cannot be applied in a straight-forward 
manner. Accomodation legislation, by definition, is intended to 
make it easier for believers to engage in religious activities. 
Therefore, all accomodation statutes have the "purpose of 
advancing religion," within the meaning of Lemon's first prong. 
It is irrelevant that the state legislator sponsoring the moment-
of-silence bill wanted to "return voluntary prayer to the public 
schools." There is no indication that this legislator thought 
the statute would be used to coerce non-believing students into 
prayer. The quoted remark simply suggests that the legislator's 
purpose in proposing the bill was to "advance religion" by giving 
faithful students an opportunity to pray silently. 
Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor both assert that 
the Alabama statute cannot be analyzed as an accomodation to 
religious students. Their arguments, however, are seriously 
flawed. Justice Stevens assumes that a State cannot accomodate 
the religious beliefs of its citizens unless a failure to take 
such action would violate the Free Exercise Clause. See footnote 
45, pp. 18-19. This assumption is inconsistent with many of the 
Court's prior decisions. In upholding the validity of property 
tax examptions for churches, the Court has stated that "[t)he 
limits of permissible state accomodation are by no means co-
extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise 
Qause." Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 u.s. 664 (1970). 
Similarly, in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 u.s: 1 (1947), 
the Court held that the state could pay the bus fares of 
parochial school students, even though it was not contended that 
the failure to take such action would violate the Free Exercise 
Clause. See also Zorach v. Clausen, 343 u.s. 306 (1952). 
Justice O'Connor recognizes that the government may 
enact an accomodation statute, even when such legislation is not 
compelled by the Free Exercise Clause. See page 15 of concurring 
opinion. Despite this moderate approach, she goes on to state 
that the Alabama statute does not constitute an accomodation. 
Unfortunately, Justice O'Connor does not explain adequately why 
§16-1-20.1 cannot be characterized as an accomodation to 
believers. She first states that "[n]o law prevents a student 
~o is so inclined from praying in the public schools." See page 
17. This argument, however, fails to recognize that, without a 
moment of silence, students will be unable to pray without 
foregoing the benefits of scheduled activities. Even "stu~ 
halls" are designed for study, not silent prayer. 
Justice O'Connor's second reason for refusing to treat 
the Alabama statute as an accomodation is even less persuasive. 
It relies on the fact that "state law already provided a moment 
of silence •••• " See page 17. The 1978 statute to which she 
refers provided a moment of silence "for meditation." Ala. Code 
§16-1-20. This 1978 statute apparantly was superseded by the 
statute at issue here, which provides a moment of silence for 
I ' 
"meditation or voluntary prayer." Ala. Code §16-1-20.1 (emphasis 
added) • There is no reason to hold that the second statute is 
not "accomodation legislation" simply because it superseded a 
similar statute. The 1981 statute had the limited purpose of 
making clear to students and teachers that the quiet period couM 
be used for voluntary silent prayer, as well as for reflection on 
~cular subjects. Justice O'Connor's reasoning suggests that 
States often will be precluded from modifying permissible 
accomodation legislation. 
m summary, I believe that Alabama's moment-of-silence 
statute should be upheld as a permissible accomodation to those 
students who wish to pray silently in school. Neither Justice 
Stevens nor Justice O'Connor has explained adequately why the 
statute cannot be characterized as accomodation legislation. 
April 15, 1985 
CJ8 GINA-POW 
PERSONAL 
83-812 and 83-929 Wallace Cases 
Dear Chief: 
Now that Sandra's opinion joining in the judgment has 
been circulated, there is a Court to invalidate §16-1-20.1 
of the Alabama Code that provides for a moment of 
medication or prayer ... Bill Rehnquist has circulated a 
scholarly review of the history of the Establishment 
Clause, and the meandering of this Court over the years. 
As your notes will show, although you and 1 were 
together in the Wallace cases, we differ in our views as 
to Fort Wayne and Aguliar. As 1 read our prior decisions, 
including what 1 wrote in Nyquist, they strongly support 
the way I voted. Henry Friendly's opinion in Aguliar is 
particularly persausive in light of our authorities. 
I have been waiting until all of the writing in these 
religious cases is in hand, and am particularly interested 
in what you may say in your dissent in the Wallace cases. 
1 cannot join WHR because his opinion broadly disagrees 
with the majority in all of the pending religious cases. 
•; 
2. 
I have what perhaps is a simplicity view of the 
Alabama Statute at issue. It trivializes the Constitution 
to hold it invalid. Much if not most of Sandra's opinion 
recognizes that moment of silence statutes including 
even the Alabama one - would be valid except she thinks it 
was intended to promote religion. She thus relies on the 
first of the three Lemon tests, although she criticizes 
~mon and substitutes an "endorsement" test that I do not 
understand. 
In your opinion in the Connecticut case involving the 
right of employees to a day off for worship, you 
emphasized that the Lemon test is flexible and not always 
applied according 
generally along 
to its terms. 
these lines in 
We have said something 
other cases. I am 
reluctant, however, to downgrade Lemon even as much as 
you do in the Connecticut case. After all, it is the only 
coherent test the Court has ever adopted, we generally 
have fought it for 
lower courts. If 
a number of years, 
we abandon Lemon 
Sandra's opinion), the Court will 




so have the 
evidence by 
even more 
I have never understood that a state statute is 
invalid if it "flunks" one of the three Lemon tests. 
3. 
(Note to Lee: Cite authorities). Whatever the purpose of 
fue Alabama Statute may be, I would sustain it because its 
effect on religion generally is too remote and tangential 
(if at all). Children are not required to pray, teachers 
are not authorized to lead them in prayer, the statue 
provides for medication or prayer, and the truth is that 
children will use the moment to think of whatever they 
please. Nor will there be any entanglement with the 
state. Accordingly, the Alabama Statute, as I view it, 
meets two of the Lemon tests and this is sufficient. I 
would cite the views of Professor Ely, Freund, and others. 
It is possible, I believe, also to sustain this 
statute on the authority of our "accommodation cases". 
Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 u.s. 664, and Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 u.s. 1. I would prefer, however, 
not to apply the "accommodation" analysis - though it can 
be mentioned as in a note as a supportive alternative. 
This may be important because both John and Sandra reject 
the accommodation rationale in spite of the Court's 
decisions in Walz and Everson. 
I am passing these views on to you to indicate 
generally my position. I would prefer not to write 
4. 
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I have what perhaps is a simplicity view of the 
Alabama Statute at issue. It trivializes the Constitution 
to hold it invalid. Much if not most of Sandra's opinion 
recognizes that moment of silence statutes including 
even the Alabama one - would be valid except she thinks it 
was intended to promote religion. She thus relies on the 
first of the three Lemon tests, although she criticizes 
~mon and substitutes an "endorsement" test that I do not 
understand. 
In your opinion in the Connecticut case involving the 
right of employees to a day off for worship, you 
emphasized that the Lemon test is flexible and not always 
applied according 
generally along 
to its terms. 
these lines in 
We have said something 
other cases. I am 
reluctant, however, to downgrade Lemon even as much as 
you do in the Connecticut case. After all, it is the only 
ooherent test the Court has ever adopted, we generally 
have fought it for a number of years, and so have the 
lower courts. If we abandon Lemon (as evidence by 
Sandra's opinion), the Court will be even more 
fractionated than it is at present. 
I have never understood that a state statute is 




(Note to Lee: Cite authorities). Whatever the purpose of 
~e Alabama Statute may be, I would sustain it because its 
effect on religion generally is too remote and tangential 
(if at all). Children are not required to pray, teachers 
are not authorized to lead them in prayer, the statue 
provides for medication or prayer, and the truth is that 
children will use the moment to think of whatever they 
please. Nor will there be any entanglement with the 
state. Accordingly, the Alabama Statute, as I view it, 
meets two of the Lemon tests and this is sufficient. I 
would cite the views of Professor Ely, Freund, and others. 
It is possible, I believe, also to sustain this 
statute on the authority of our "accommodation cases". 
Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 u.s. 664, and Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 u.s. 1. I would prefer, however, 
not to apply the "accommodation" analysis - though it can 
be mentioned as in a note as a supportive alternative. 
This may be important because both John and Sandra reject 
the accommodation rationale in spite of the Court's 
decisions in Walz and Everson. 
I am passing these views on to you to indicate 
generally my position . I would prefer not to write 
4. 




TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Lee 
RE: Nos. 83-812 and 83-929, Wallace v. Jaffree and Smith v. 
Jaffree 
1 believe that your changes have greatly improved the 
First Chambers Draft. Almost all of your changes are 
incorporated in the most recent typewritten draft, which is 
attached. ~\did not include the footnote you suggested in Rider 
A, p.4. Given our decision yesterday to delete the requirement 
that the statute's "predominant" purpose be secular, 1 felt that 
a.-~L£..4-Lr ~hL ~ ~ <.~)" ~. 
this footnote should be left out. 1 consolidated the discussion 
of the lower courts' opinions, which you discussed in Rider A, 
p.3 and Rider A, p.4. The remainder of the Riders have been 
incorporated, although 1 did make some minor language changes for 
your consideration. 
1 am very happy that you decided to eliminate the 
statement that the Court should look to the statute's 
"predominant" purpose. 1 believe that such a standard would 
invite lower courts to engage in ad hoc balancing whenever there 
is a statute with dual purposes. 
I am referring to the Conference Michael Lindsey's 
'f?...L~ 
application for a stay of his death sentenceA ~ expect to 
~ / 
be ~~~th the Court later this afternoon if a stay is not 
entered below. Lindsey is scheduled to be executed at 12:01 
a.m., tomorrow morning. He was convicted of the 1981 murder of 
an elderly woman during the course of a burglary in Mobile, 
Alabama. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and 
sentence, and we denied certiorari. u.s. ( 19 8 5) (No • 8 4-
5969). Lindsey filed his first federal habeas petition in DC for 
the S.D. of Ala. (Cox, J.) this morning. As yet, we have no word 
from the DC. 
The Clerk's office expects to have by early afternoon 
the papers filed in the DC. I have instructed the Clerk's office 
to circulate these and any other papers made available to the 




TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Lee 
RE: Nos. 83-812 and 83-929, Wallace v. Jaffree and Smith v. 
Jaffree, suggestions for Justice Stevens 
I believe that nothing in Justice Stevens' opinion is 
necessarily inconsistent with your view that a statute can have 
dual purposes. He repeatedly states that Alabama's moment-of-
silence statute violates the Establishment Clause because it has 
no secular purpose. Therefore, Justice Stevens has not 
explicitly ruled out the possiblity that a statute is 
constitutional if it has ~secular purpose. 
Justice Stevens does suggest, however, that~ secular 
purpose may not be enough to satisfy the first prong of the Lemon 
test. On page 17, he says, "[A]t the very least, the First 
Amendment requires that a statute be invalidated if ' it is 
entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion." Page 17. 
This sentence could be paraphrased as follows: "At the very 
least, the First Amendment requires that a statute be invalidated 
if it has no secular purpose." Justice Stevens' use of the 
phrase, "at the very least," suggests that more than the 
existence of a secular purpose may be required to satisfy the 
purpose prong of Lemon. 
As you suggested, it might be a good idea to ask Justice 
Stevens to modify his opinion slightly to make clear that a 
statute with dual purposes does not violate the first prong of 
Lemon. This might be done simply by deleting four words--"at the 
very least"--on page 17 (see preceding paragraph). 
As an alternative, you could suggest that Justice 
Stevens add a sentence on page 17, in addition to modifying the 
objectionable sentence. If this change were made, the first 
paragraph on page 17 would end as follows: . ~-~ / 
"A statute does not viola{e the Establishment Cla~se 
simply because it is motiJated in part by a religious 
purpose. The First Amendm nt, however, requires that a 
statute be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a 
purpose to advance religion." 
Although these changes would be helpful, I doubt that 
you should make your "join" contingent upon their being made. 
Jl..c, ~~ ~4Lj--"1 q~ 
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please in the 
vote, aq you will recall, was to reverse in 
I still am inclined to think that whatever the 
~labama statute will have little or no effect 
School agP children are going to do as they 
minute for meditation or prayer. 
;~ut tlie case is here. ~.vhile our F.stablishment 
Clauses cases have nnt been entirely consistent, the three-
cart Lemon test has not been abandoned and - desnite criti-
~ism -hAs been rather consistently applied. This case in-
volves only the "purpose" prong, and you conclude in a per-
su.=tsive opinion that in the absence of anv secular purpose 
the statute flunk!? the te ~t. 'T'hu:; you r~o not reach the oth-
er two comoonents. Despite my vote to the contrary, I am 
giving serious consideration to joining your opinion or at 
least the iudgment in a seoarate concurring opinion. 
t write to inquire whether you would strengthen 
one aspect of your opinion. After emphasizing the absence 
of any evidence of a secular purpose, on oaqe 17 you say, 
"[c.tl the verv lt:?ast, t'!-te First Amendment requires that , 
statute be invali~ated if it is entirely motivated by a pur-
pose to advance religion". This imPlies that if there were 
both a religious and a secular purpo~e, this would be suf~i­
cient to satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test. This 
has been my understanding of that test. 
r-vould you be willing to clarify your page 17 sen-
tence as follows: {i) omit the phrase "at the very least", 
and {ii) add a sentence along the following lines: 
.. 
'. 
"A statute does not violate the Establishment 
Clause simply because it may be motivated in 
part by a religious purpose. The First 
Amen~ment, ho~ever, requires that a statute 
be invalidate~ if - as in thi s casP - it is 
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
-
~tqn"tmt C!Jo-url d tltt ~nittb .i>hrlts 
~as.lfittghtn. ~. C!J. 21l~~~ 
May 7, 1985 
Re: 83-812 - Wallace v. Jaffree 
Dear Lewis: 
Instead of the statement that you propose in your 
letter, I wonder if this modification would be 
sufficient. Rewrite the "At the very least" sentence 
to read this way: 
"Even though a statute that is motivated in part 
by a religious purpose may satisfy the first 
criterion, see e.g., Abington School Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-303 (BRENNAN, J., 
concurring), the First Amendment requires that a 
statute must be invalidated if it is entirely 




JUSTICE w .. . J . SRENNAN, JR. 
Dear John, 
May 8, 1985 
No. 83-812 
Wallace v. Jaffree 
I agree with Lewis's proposed 
sentence at the middle of page 17, as 
indicated in your note to Thurgood, 
Harry and me of May 8. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
cc: Justice Marshall 
Justice Blackmun 
Justice Powell 
83-812 Wallace v . Jaffree 
Dear John: 
Please join me i.n yonr opinion for tha r.ourt cir-
culate(! today. 
I am circulatinq a concurring opinion that 
expresses ad~itional views . 
Sincerely, 
,Just ice StevE.~ns 
lfp/ss 
cc : The Conference 
-. 
- -
May 9, lQ85 
83-812 Wallace v. JAffree 
Dear John: 
Please ioin me. 
I am circulating a concurring opinion that 













Mav 9 , 1gss 
83-812 and 83-929 Wallace ~ase 
Dear Chief: 
Following our telephone discussion of this case, I 
spent most of a week on this case and reluctantly have con-
cluaed that under Lemon and its progeny , the Alabama Statute 
is invalid . I therefore am joining John , and circulating a 
concurrjng opinion . 
~e have three religion cases pendinq (in addition to 
your Connecticut case of Thornton v . Calrlor) . At ~onfer­
ence , my vote ,,,as to affirm in both Ral1 and Aguilar as 1 
thought then - an~ still do - that Benry Friendlv was cor-
rect in his careful review of our decisions, and conclusion 
that thP type of aid to parochial schools in these cases is 
invalid . Bill Br~nnan has applie~ thP Lemon three part test 
affirming both cases. Tam ioininq Bill with a concurrinq 
o::;>inion . 
In the Alabama cases (Wallace}, I voted to reverse be-
cause - as you do - I think a straight forwar~ "moment of 
silence" statute \,1ould be perfectly valid . But I am now 
persuaded, havinq gone back over the record before us with 
somA care, that !)16-1-/0 . 1 was enacted solely for religious 
purposes . There is no showing of any secular purpose. Both 
the DC and CAll agreed as to its reliqious purpose and the 
absence of a secular purpose . I find no basis for disagree-
ing with thes~ findinqs . 
As I inaicated in my letter to you of April 22 in 
Thornton v . Calder , Inc ., I think it would be a mistake for 
the Court to weaken or fail to follow Lemon . The three part 
test that you articulated in that case has provided the only 
analytical framework for the deciding of reliqious cases 
since Lemon was decided in 1972 . If a majority of the Court 
wishes to overrule Lemon, of course it can be done . 
In any event , so long as Lemon - that I followed soe-
cifically in my necision tn Nyquist - remains the law , I 
feel obligated to follot¥ it . The Alabama Legislature , in 
the enactment of the three statutes dealing with school 
prayer, was motivated solely ~y a religious ourpose (as the 
------~------~-----------------------~------~~-----~,-,..,-----~ 1 .. .. 
' 
·~ 
DC found in its first opinion) and therefore this statut~ 
flunked the "purposP prongu of your test. 
2. 
I have maae clear in my concurring opinion, however, 
that J\labam;'i can make a fresh start and adopt a simple "mo-
ment nf silence for meditation" type statute that many 
states have adopted. In doing so, it can articulate secular 
purposes, and the statute would be valid. 
I know my aecision will disaPpoint you. We are usually 
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THECHIEFJUSTICE May 31, 1985 
Re: No. 83-812 - Wallace v. Jaffree 
No. 83-929 - Smith v. Jaffree 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
The final draft of my dissent is enclosed with minor 
changes as marked and footnotes 3 and 4 added. 
If anyone wants to delay announcement, I have no 
objections. 
Regards, 
83-812 Wallace v. Jaffree (Lee) 
_,-
JPS for the Court 12/10/84 
1st draft 1/29/85 
2nd draft 2/1/85 
3rd draft 5/9/85 




WHR will dissent 1/29/85 
1st draft 1/30/85 
2nd draft 2/4/85 
3rd draft 2/25/85 
4th draft 4/10/85 
5th draft 5/15/85 
SOC concurring in the judgment 
1st draft 4/12/85 
2nd draft 5/10/85 
3rd draft 5j29j85 
LFP concurring 
1st draft 5/9/85 
2nd draft 5/17/85 
CJ dissent 
1st draft 5j20j85 
2nd draft 5/28/85 
BRW dissenting 
1st draft 5/29/85 
CJ will dissent 2/28/85 
83-812 Wallace v. Jaffree (LeeL 
JPS for the Court 12/10/84 
1st draft 1/29/85 
2nd draft 2/1/85 
3rd draft 5/9/85 
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1st draft 1/30/85 
2nd draft 2/4/85 
3rd draft 2/25/85 
4th draft 4/10/85 
5th draft 5/15/85 
soc concurring in the judgment 
1st draft 4/12/85 
2nd draft 5/10/85 
LFP 
3rd draft 5j29j85 
concurring 
1st draft 5!9/85 
2nd draft 5/17/85 
CJ dissent 
1st draft 5j20j85 
2nd draft 5/28/85 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 83-812 AND 83-929 
GEORGE C. WALLACE, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE 
OF ALABAMA, ET AL., APPELLANTS 
83-812 v. 
ISHMAEL JAFFREE ET AL. 
DOUGLAS T. SMITH, ET AL., APPELLANTS 
83-929 v. 
ISHMAEL JAFFREE ET AL. 
ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1985] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting. 
Some who trouble to read the opinions in this case will find 
it ironic-perhaps even bizarre-that on the very day we 
heard arguments in this case, the Court's session opened 
with an invocation for Divine protection. Across the park a 
few hundred yards away, at noon, the House of Represent-
atives and the Senate each opened with a prayer. These leg-
islative prayers were not just one minute in duration, but 
were extended, thoughtful invocations and prayers for Di-
vine guidance. They were given, as they have been since 
1789, by clergy appointed as official Chaplains and paid from 
the Treasury of the United States. Congress has also pro-
vided chapels in the Capitol, at public expense, where Mem-
bers and others may pause for prayer, meditation, or a mo-
ment of silence. 
Inevitaply some wag is bound to say that the Court's hold-
ing today reflects a belief that members of the Judiciary and 
Congress are more in need of Divine guidance than our 
schoolchildren are. Still others will say that all this contro-
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versy is "much ado about nothing," since no power on earth-
including this Court and Congress-can stop any teacher 
from opening the school day with a moment of silence for pu-
pils to meditate, to plan their day, or to pray. I have only 
several points to make about this case. 
1. It makes no sense to say that Alabama has "endorsed 
prayer" by merely enacting a new statute "to specify ex-
pressly that voluntary prayer is one of the authorized activi-
ties during a moment of silence," ante, at 12 (O'CONNOR, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). Nor does it 
make any sense to imply that, although a moment-of-silence 
statute that includes the word "prayer" unconstitutionally 
endorses religion, one that simply provides for a moment of 
silence would not. To invalidate a statute that contains the 
word "prayer" but to suggest that one omitting the word is 
constitutional exhibits a blatant, undisguised hostility toward 
religion. For decades our opinions have stated that hostility 
toward any religion or toward all religions is as much forbid-
den by the Constitution as is an official establishment of reli-
gion. The Alabama legislature has no more "endorsed" reli-
gion than a state or the Congress does when it provides for 
legislative chaplains, or than this Court does when it opens 
each session with a religious invocation. 
2. The inexplicable aspect of the foregoing opinions, how-
ever, is what is advanced as support for the holding on the 
purpose of the Alabama legislature. Rather than determin-
ing legislative purpose from the face of the statute as a 
whole, 1 the opinions rely on three factors in concluding that 
the Alabama legislature had a "wholly religious" purpose for 
enacting the statute under review, Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 
1 The foregoing opinions likewise completely ignore the statement of 
purpose that accompanied the moment-of-silence bill throughout the legis-
lative process: "To permit a period of silence to be observed/or the purpose 
of meditation or voluntary prayer at the commencement of the first class of 
each day in all public schools." 1981 Ala. Sen. J. 14 (emphasis added). 
See also id., at 150, 307, 410, 535, 938, 967. 
• 
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(Supp. 1984): (a) statements of the statute's sponsor, (b) ad-
missions in Governor James' Answer to the Second Amended 
Complaint, and (c) the difference between§ 16-1-20.1 and its 
predecessor statute. 
(a) Curiously, the opinions do not mention that all of the 
sponsor's statements relied upon-including the statement 
"inserted" into the Senate Journal-were made after the leg-
islature had passed the statute; indeed, the testimony that 
the Court finds critical was given well over a year after the 
statute was enacted. There is not a shred of evidence that 
the legislature as a whole shared the sponsor's motive or that 
a majority in either house was even aware of the sponsor's 
view of the bill when it was passed. The sole relevance of 
the sponsor's statements, therefore, is that they reflect the 
personal, subjective motives of a single legislator. No case 
in the 195-year history of this Court supports the disconcert-
ing idea that post-enactment statements by individual legisla-
tors are relevant in determining the constitutionality of 
legislation. · 
Even if an individual legislator's after-the-fact statements 
could rationally be considered relevant, all of the opinions fail 
to mention that the sponsor also testified that one of his pur-
poses in drafting and sponsoring the moment-of-silence bill 
was to clear up a misunderstanding among his constituents 
that a schoolchild is legally prohibited from engaging in si-
lent, individual prayer once he steps inside a public school 
building. See App. 53-54. That testimony is at least as im-
portant as the statements the Court relies upon, and surely 
that testimony manifests a permissible purpose. 
(b) The Court also relies on the admissions of Governor 
James' Answer to the Second Amended Complaint. 
Strangely, however, the Court neglects to mention that there 
was no trial bearing on the constitutionality of the Alabama 
statutes; trial became unnecessary when the District Court 
held that the Establishment Clause does not apply to the 
83-812 & 83-929--DISSENT 
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states. 2 The absence of a trial on the issue of the constitu-
tionality of § 16-20.1 is significant because the Answer filed 
by the State Board and Superintendent of Education did not 
make the same admissions that the Governor's Answer made. 
See 1 Record 187. The Court cannot know whether, if this 
case had been tried, those State officials would have offered 
evidence to contravene appellees' allegations concerning leg-
islative purpose. Thus, it is completely inappropriate to ac-
cord any relevance to the admissions in the Governor's 
Answer. 
(c) The preceding opinions conclude that the principal dif-
ference between § 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor statute 
proves that the sole purpose behind the inclusion of the 
phrase "or voluntary prayer" in § 16-1-20.1 was to endorse 
and promote prayer. Such logic-if it can be called that-
would lead the Court to hold, for example, that a state may 
enact a statute that provides reimbursement for bus trans-
portation to the parents of all schoolchildren, but that the 
state may not add parents of parochial school students to an 
existing program providing reimbursement for · parents of 
public school students. Further, Congress amended the 
statutory Pledge of Allegiance 31 years ago to add the words 
"under God." Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 
Stat. 249. Do the Court's several opinions today render the 
Pledge unconstitutional? That would be the consequence of 
their method of focusing on the difference between 
§ 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor statute rather than examin-
ing the challenged statute as a whole. Any such holding 
would of course make a mockery of our decisionmaking in 
Establishment Clause cases. And even were the Court's 
method correct, the inclusion of the words "or voluntary 
prayer" in § 16-1-20.1 is wholly consistent with the clearly 
permissible purpose of clarifying that silent, voluntary 
prayer is not forbidden in the public school building. 
2 The four days of trial to which the Court refers concerned only the 
alleged practices of vocal, group prayer in the classroom. 
• 
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3. The Court's extended treatment of the "test" of Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), suggests a naive preoccu-
pation with an easy, bright-line approach for addressing con-
stitutional issues. We have repeatedly cautioned that 
Lemon did not establish a rigid caliper capable of resolving 
every Establishment Clause issue, but that it sought only to 
provide "signposts." "In each [Establishment Clause] case, 
the inquiry calls for line drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be 
framed." Lynch v. Donnelly,-- U.S. --,-- (1984). 
In any event, our responsibility is not to apply tidy formulas 
by rote; our duty is to determine whether the statute or prac-
tice at issue is a step toward establishing a state religion. 
Given today's decision, however, perhaps it is understand-
able that the opinions in support of the judgment all but ig-
nore the Establishment Clause itself and the concerns that 
underlie it. 
4 . . The notion that the Alabama statute is a step toward 
creating an established church borders on, if it does not tres-
pass into, the ridiculous. ~he statute does not remotely 
threaten religious liberty; it affirmatively furthers the values 
of religious freedom and tolerance that the Establishment 
Clause was designed to protect. Without pressuring those 
who do not wish to pray, the statute simply creates an oppor-
tunity to think, to plan, or to pray if one wishes-as Congress 
does by providing chaplains and chapels. It accommodates 
the purely private, voluntary religious choices of the individ-
ual pupils who wish to pray while at the same time creating a 
time for reflection for those who do not choose to pray. The 
statute also provides a meaningful opportunity for schoolchil-
dren to appreciate the absolute constitutional right of each in-
dividual to worship and believe as the individual wishes. 
The statute "endorses" only the view that the religious obser-
vances of others should be tolerated and, where possible, 
accommodated. 
The Court today has ignored the wise admonition of Justice 
Goldberg that "the measure of constitutional adjudication is 
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the ability and willingness to distinguish between real threat 
and mere shadow." School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 
203, 308 (1963) (concurring opinion). The innocuous statute 
that the Court strikes down does not even rise to the level of 
a shadow. As JuSTICE O'CONNOR paradoxically acknowl-
edges, "It is difficult to discern a serious threat to religious 
liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren." 
Ante, at 7. 3 
It is suggested that the public likely will "misperceive" to-
day's holding because the line drawn by the Court is such a 
fine one. See id., at 18. The suggestion is well taken; I 
must be included with those who "misperceive." 
The mountains have labored and brought forth a mouse. 4 
8 The principal plaintiff in this action has stated: "'I probably wouldn't 
have brought the suit just on the silent meditation or prayer statute .... 
If that's all that existed, that wouldn't have caused me much concern, un-
less it was implemented in a way that suggested prayer was the preferred 
activity."' Malone, Prayers for Relief, ABAJ., Apr. 1985, at 61, 62, col. 1 
(quoting Ishmael Jaffree). 
'Horace, Odes, bk. III, line 139. 
•.. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
NOS. 83-812 AND 83-929 
GEORGE C. WALLACE, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE 
OF ALABAMA, ET AL., APPELLANTS 
83-812 v. 
ISHMAEL JAFFREE ET AL. 
DOUGLAS T. SMITH, ET AL., APPELLANTS 
~-~9 a ·· 
ISHMAEL JAFFREE ET AL. 
ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS· 
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1985] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, 'dissenting. 
Some who trouble to read the opinions in this case will find 
it ironic-perhaps even bizarre-that on the very day we 
heard arguments in this case, the Court's session opened 
with an invocation for Divine protection. Across the park a 
few hundred yards away, the House of Representatives and 
the Senate regularly open each session with a prayer. These 
legislative prayers are not just one minute in duration, but 
are extended, thoughtful invocations and prayers for Divine 
guidance. They are given, as they have been since 1789, by 
clergy appointed as official Chaplains and paid from the 
Treasury of the United States. Congress has also provided 
chapels in the Capitol, at public expense, where Members 
and others may pause for prayer, meditation, or a moment of 
silence. 
Inevitably some wag is bound to say that the Court's hold-
ing today reflects a belief that the historic practice of the 
Congress and this Court is justified because members of the 
Judiciary and Congress are more in need of Divine guidance 
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than schoolchildren are. Still others will say that all this 
controversy is "much ado about nothing," since no power on 
earth-including this Court and Congress-can stop any 
teacher from opening the school day with a moment of silence 
for pupils to meditate, to plan their day-or to pray if they 
voluntarily elect to do so. 
I wish to make several points about this case. 
1. It makes no sense to say that Alabama has "endorsed 
prayer" by merely enacting a new statute "to specify ex-
pressly that voluntary prayer is one of the authorized activi-
ties during a moment of silence," ante, at 12 (O'CONNOR, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). And to 
imply that, although a moment-of-silence statute that in-
cludes the word "prayer" unconstitutionally endorses reli-
gion, one that simply provides for a moment of silence would 
not, is to exhibit a blatant, undisguised hostility toward reli-
gion. For decades our opinions have stated that hostility to-
ward any religion or toward all religions is as much forbidden 
by the Constitution as is an official establishment of religion. 
The Alabama legislature has no more "endorsed" religion 
than a state or the Congress does when it provides for legisla-
tive chaplains, or than this , Court does when it opens each 
session with a religious invocation. Today's decision recalls 
the observations of Justice Goldberg: 
"[U]ntutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can 
lead to invocation or approval of results which partake 
not simply of that noninterference and noninvolvement 
with the religious which the Constitution commands, but 
of a brooding and pervasive dedication to the secular and 
a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious. 
Such results are not only not compelled by the Constitu-
tion, but, it seems to me, are prohibited by it." 
School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 306 (1963) 
(concurring opinion). 
. '. 
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2. The inexplicable aspect of the foregoing opinions, how-
ever, is what they advance as support for the holding con-
cerning the purpose of the Alabama legislature. Rather 
than determining legislative purpose from the face of the 
statute as a whole, 1 the opinions rely on three factors in 
concluding that the Alabama legislature had a "wholly reli-
gious" purpose for enacting the statute under review, Ala. 
Code§ 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984): (a) statements of the statute's 
sponsor, (b) admissions in Governor James' Answer to the 
Second Amended Complaint, and (c) the difference between 
§ 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor statute. 
(a) Curiously, the opinions do not mention that all of the 
sponsor's statements relied upon-including the statement 
"inserted" into the Senate Journal-were made after the leg-
islature had passed the statute; indeed, the testimony that 
the Court finds critical was given well over a year after the 
I · statute was enacted. As even the appellees concede, see Brief for Appellees 18, there is not a shred of evidence that 
the legislature as a whole shared the sponsor's motive or that 
a majority in either house was even aware of the sponsor's 
·view of the bill when it was passed. The sole relevance of 
the sponsor's statements, therefore, is that they reflect the 
personal, subjective motives ·of a single legislator. No case 
in the 195-year history of this Court supports the disconcert-
ing idea that post-enactment statements by individual legis-
lators are relevant in determining the constitutionality of 
legislation. 
Even if an individual legislator's after-the-fact statements 
could rationally be considered relevant, all of the opinions fail 
to mention that the sponsor also testified that one of his pur-
1 The foregoing opinions likewise completely ignore the statement of 
purpose that accompanied the moment-of-silence bill throughout the legis-
lative process: "To permit a period of silence to be observed/or the purpose 
of meditation or voluntary prayer at the commencement of the first class of 
each day in all public schools." 1981 Ala. Sen. J. 14 (emphasis added). 
See also id., at 150, 307, 410, 535, 938, 967 . 
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poses in drafting and sponsoring the moment-of-silence bill 
was to clear up a widespread misunderstanding that a school-
child is legally prohibited from engaging in silent, individual 
prayer once he steps inside a public school building. See 
App. 53-54. That testimony is at least as important as the 
statements the Court relies upon, and surely that testimony 
manifests a permissible purpose. 
(b) The Court also relies on the admissions of Governor 
James' Answer to the Second Amended Complaint. 
Strangely, however, the Court neglects to mention that there 
was no trial bearing on the constitutionality of the Alabama 
statutes; trial became unnecessary when the District Court 
held that the Establishment Clause does not apply to the 
states. 2 The absence of a trial on the issue of the constitu-
tionality of§ 16-1-20.1 is significant because the Answer filed 
by the State Board and Superintendent of Education did not 
make the same admissions that the Governor's Answer made. 
See 1 Record 187. The Court cannot know whether, if this 
case had been tried, those State officials would have offered 
evidence to contravene appellees' allegations concerning leg-
islative purpose. Thus, it is completely inappropriate to 
accord any relevance to the admissions in the Governor's 
Answer. , 
(c) The several preceding opinions conclude that the prin-
cipal difference between§ 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor stat-
ute proves that the sole purpose behind the inclusion of the 
phrase "or voluntary prayer" in § 16-1-20.1 was to endorse 
I and promote prayer. This reasoning is simply a subtle way of focusing exclusively on the religious component of the statute rather than examining the statute as a whole. Such 
logic-if it can be called that-would lead the Court to hold, 
for example, that a state may enact a statute that provides 
reimbursement for bus transportation to the parents of all 
schoolchildren, but may not add parents of parochial school 
2 The four days of trial to which the Court refers concerned only the 
alleged practices of vocal, group prayer in the classroom. 
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students to an existing program providing reimbursement for 
parents of public school students. Congress amended the 
statutory Pledge of Allegiance 31 years ago to add the words 
"under God." Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 
Stat. 249. Do the several opinions in support of the judg-
ment today render the Pledge unconstitutional? That would 
be the consequence of their method of focusing on the differ-
ence between § 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor statute rather 
than examining § 16-1-20.1 as a whole. Any such holding 
would of course make a mockery of our decisionmaking in 
Establishment Clause cases. And even were the Court's 
method correct, the inclusion of the words "or voluntary 
prayer" in § 16-1-20.1 is wholly consistent with the clearly 
permissible purpose of clarifying that silent, voluntary 
prayer is not forbidden in the public school building. 
3. The Court's extended treatment of the "test" of Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), suggests a naive pre-
occupation with an easy, bright-line approach for addressing 
constitutional issues. We have repeatedly cautioned that 
Lemon did not establish a rigid caliper capable of resolving 
every Establishment Clause issue, but that it sought only to 
provide "signposts." "In each [Establishment Clause] case, 
the inquiry calls for line drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be 
framed." Lynch v. Donnelly,-- U. S. --, -- (1984). 
In any event, our responsibility is not to apply tidy formulas 
by rote; our duty is to determine whether the statute or prac-
tice at issue is a step toward establishing a state religion. 
Given today's decision, however, perhaps it is understand-
able that the opinions in support of the judgment all but 
ignore the Establishment Clause itself and the concerns that 
underlie it. 
4. The notion that the Ala2_ama statute is a step toward 
creati an ' :stablished church borders on, if it does not tres-
pass into, the r1 ICulous. The statute does not remotely 
threaten religious liOerty; it affirmatively furthers the values 
of religious freedom and tolerance that the Establishment 
--
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Clause was designed to protect. Without pressuring those 
who do not wish to pray, the statute simply creates an oppor-
tunity to think, to plan, or to pray if one wishes-as Congress 
does by providing chaplains and chapels. It accommodates 
the purely private, voluntary religious choices of the individ-
ual pupils who wish to pray while at the same time creating a 
time for nonreligious reflection for those who do not choose to 
pray. The statute also provides a meaningful opportunity 
for schoolchildren to appreciate the absolute constitutional 
right of each individual to worship and believe as the individ-
ual wishes. The statute "endorses" only the view that the 
religious observances of others should be tolerated and, 
where possible, accommodated. If the government may not 
accommodate religious needs when it does so in a wholly 
neutral and noncoercive manner, the "benevolent neutrality'' 
that we have long considered the correct constitutional stand-
ard will quickly translate into the "callous indifference" that 
the Court has consistently held the Establishment Clause 
does not require. 
The Court today has ignored the wise admonition of Justice 
Goldberg that "the measure of constitutional adjudication is 
the ability and willingness to distinguish between real threat 
and mere shadow." School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 
203, 308 (1963) (concurring opinion). The innocuous statute 
that the Court strikes down does not even rise to the level of 
a shadow. As JusTICE O'CONNOR paradoxically acknowl-
edges, "It is difficult to discern a serious threat to religious 
liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren." 
I Ante, at 7. 3 I would add to that, "even if they choose to pray." 
3 The principal plaintiff in this action has stated: "'I probably wouldn't 
have brought the suit just on the silent meditation or prayer statute . . .. 
If that's all that existed, that wouldn't have caused me much concern, un-
less it was implemented in a way that suggested prayer was the preferred 
activity.'" Malone, Prayers for Relief, ABA J ., Apr. 1985, at 61, 62, col. 1 
(quoting Ishmael Jaffree). 
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It is suggested that the public likely will "misperceive" to-
day's holding because the line drawn by the Court is such a 
fine one. See id., at 18. The suggestion is well taken; I 
must be included with those who "misperceive." 
The mountains have labored and brought forth a mouse. 4 
4 Horace, Odes, bk. III, line 139. 
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303 (1940). Although a distinct jurisprudence has enveloped 
each of these clauses, their common purpose is to secure reli-
gious liberty. See Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430 (1962). 
On these principles the Court has been and remains 
unanimous. 
As this case once again demonstrates, however, "it is far 
easier to agree on the purpose that underlies the First 
Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses 
than to obtain agreement on the standards that should gov-
ern their application." Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 
664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). It once appeared 
that the Court had developed a workable standard by which 
to identify impermissible government establishments of reli-
gion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1970). 
Under the now familiar Lemon test, statutes must have both 
a secular legislative purpose and a principal or primary effect 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and in addition 
they must not foster excessive government entanglement 
with religion. I d., at 612-613. Despite its initial promise, 
the Lemon test has proven problematic. ':fhe required in-
quiry into "entanglement" has been modified and questioned, 
see Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, -- n. 11 (1983), and in 
one case we have upheld state action against an Establish-
ment Clause challenge without applying the Lemon test at 
all. Marsh v. Chambers,-- U.S.-- (1983). The au-
thor of Lemon himself apparently questions the test's general 
applicabilty. See Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,-- U. S. --
(1985), Lynch v. Donnelly, -U.S. -, - (1984). 
JusTICE REHNQUIST toda suggests that we ab ndon emon 
en~, an m the process hmi e reac oft e stablish-
ment Clause to state discrimination between sects and gov-
ernment designation of a particular church as a "state" or 
"national" one. Post, at --. 
Perhaps because I am new to the struggle, I am not ready· 1 
to abandon all aspects of the Lemon test. I do believe, how-
ever, that the standards announced in Lemon should be re-
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examined and refined in order to make them more useful in 
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment. 
We must strive to do more than erect a constitutional "sign-
post," Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 741 (1973), to be fol-
lowed or ignored in a particular case as our predilections may 
dictate. Instead, our goal should b~ "to~ame a pri,!l~i~le {or 
constitutional adjudiCation that ffinot on y grounde m he 
hist~ the first amendment, but one that is 
also capable of consistent application to the relevant prob-
lems." '-Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed 
Constitutional Standard, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 332-333 (1963) 
(footnotes ommitted). Last Term, I proposed a refinement 
of the Lemon test with this goal in mind. Lynch v. Don-
nelly,-- U. S. --, -- (1984) (concurring opinion). 
The Lynch concurrence suggested that the religious liberty 
protected by the Establishment Clause is infringed when the 
government makes adherence to religion relevant to a per-
son's standing in the political community. Direct govern- ~ 
ment action endorsing reli~on or a particular religious prac-
tice is invalid under this approach because it "sends a 
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored mem-
bers of the political community." !d., at--. Under this 
view, Lemon's inquiry as to the purpose and effect of a stat-
ute requires to examine he er ove~ur­
pose is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually 
conve s a message of enaorsemen . 
he n orsemen es 1s useful because of the analytic~n­
t&nt it gives to t e emon-mandated in ui into Ie 'slative 
p~ect. In th1s country, church and state must 
necessarily operate within the same community. Because of 
this coexistence, it is inevitable that the secular interests of 
Government and the religious interests of various sects and 
their adherents will frequently intersect, conflict, and com-
bine. A statute that ostensibly promotes a secular interest 
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often has an incidental or even a primary effect of helping or 
hindering a sectarian belief. Chaos would ensue if every 
such statute were invalid under the Establishment Clause. 
For example, the State could not criminalize murder for fear 
that it would thereby promote the Biblical command against 
killing. The task for the Court is to sort out those statutes 
and government practices whose purpose and effect go 
against the grain of religious liberty protected by the First 
Amend~m~e~n~t~· --~----~ 
The ndorsement test oes not preclude government from 
acknowle ging religion or from taking religion into account in 
making law and policy. It does preclude government from 
conveying or attem tin to conve a messa e that -religion or 
a particular re 1gious belief is favored or referred. Such an 
endorsemen 1 mges the religious liberty of the non-
adherent, for "[w]hen the power, prestige, and financial sup-
port of government is placed behind a particular religious be-
lief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities 
to conform to the prevailing officially approved reli ·on is 
plain." Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S., at 431. At ssue to is -1 ..9 ~ 
whether st~nt of silence statutes in general, and Ala-
bama's moment of silence statute in particular, embody an 
impermissible endorsement of prayer in public schools. 
A 
Tw~nty-five_stat~permit or require public school teachers 
to have-stuaeiitsOl{serve a moment of silence in their class-
rooms. 1 A few statutes provide that the moment of silence 
1 See Ala. Code §§ 16-1-20, 16~0.1 (Supp. 1984): Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 15-522 (1984); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1607.1 (1980); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§ 10-16a (Supp. 1984); 61 Del. Laws, Ch. 547 (1978) (as interpreted in Op. 
Att'y Gen 79-I 011 (1979)); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 233.062 (West Supp. 1985); 
Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-1050 (1982); Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 122, ~ 771 (1984); 
Ind. Code § 20-10.1-7-11 (1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72.5308a (1980); La. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:2115A (West 1982); ·Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20-A, 
§ 4805 (1983); Md. Educ. Code Ann. § 7-104 (1985); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., 
Ch. 71, § 1A (1982); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 380.1565 (Supp. 1984); N. J. 
-1-
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is for the purpose of meditation alone. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 15-522 (1984); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-16a (Supp. 1984 · 
R. I. Gen. Laws § 16-12-3.1 (1981). The p1ca statute ; 
however, calls for a moment of silence at the beginning o the 
school day during which students riiay meditate, pray, or re- ~ 
fleet on the activities oftheaay. 8ee,e. g., Ark. Stat. Ann. 
§ 80-1607.1 (19 ); a. ode Ann. § 20-2-1050 (1982); Ill. 
Rev. Stat. ch. 122, § 771 (1984); Ind. Code § 20-10.1-7-11 
(1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-5308a (1980); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 
24, § 15-1516.1 (Purdon Supp. 1984). Federal trial courts 
have divided on the constitutionality of these moment of si-
lence laws. Compare Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 
(D. Mass. 1976) (upholding statute) with May v. Cooperman, 
572 F. Supp. 1561 (D.N. J. 1983) (striking down statute); 
Duffy v. Las Cruces Public Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013 
(D. N. M. 1983) (same); and Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 
1161 (M. D.Tenn. 1982) (same). See also Walter v. West 
Virginia Board of Education, Civ. Action No. 84-5366 (SD 
W. Va. March 14, 1985) (striking down state constitutional 
amendment). Relying on this Court's decisions disapprov-
ing vocal prayer and Bible reading in the public schools, see 
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963), 
Engle v. Vitale 370 U. S. 421 (1962), the courts that have J 
struck down the moment of silence statutes generall con-
clude that their purpose and effect is to encourage prayer in 
public c oo s. 
TneFingle and Abington decisions are not dispositive on 
the constitutionality of moment of silence laws. In those 
Rev. Stat. § 18A:36-4 (West Supp. 1984); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-4.1 
(1981); N. Y. Educ. Law § 3029-a (McKinney 1981); N. D. Cent. Code 
§ 15-47-30.1 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.60.1 (1980); Pa. Stat. 
Ann., Tit. 24, § 15.1516.1 (Purdon Supp. 1984); R. I. Gen. Laws 
§ 16-12-3.1 (1981); Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-1004 (1983); Va. Code 
§ 22.1-203 (1980); W. Va. Canst. Art. III,§ 15-a. For a useful comparison 
of the provisions of many of these statutes, see Note, Daily Moments of 
Silence in Public Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, 58 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 
364, 407-408 (1983). 
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cases, public schoo~ and students led their classes in 
devotional exercik__In/Engle, a New~e re-
quir~ to lead their classes in a vocal prayer. The 
Court concluded that "it is no part of the business of govern-
ment to compose official prayers for any group of the Ameri-
can people~ religious program carried on 
by the government." 370 U. S., at 424. In Abington, the 
Court addressed Pennsylvania and Maryland statutes that 
authorized morning B~s in public schools. The 
Court reviewed the purpose and effect of the statutes, con-
cluded that they required religious exercises, and therefore 
found them to violate the Establishment Clause. 374 U. S., 
at 223-224. Under all of these statutes, a student who did 
not share the religious beliefs expressed in the course of the 
exercise was left with the choice of participating, thereby 
compromising the nonadherent's beliefs, or withdrawing, 
thereby calling attention to his or her non-conformity. The 
decisions acknowledged the coercion implicit under the statu-
tory schemes, see Engle, 370 U. S., at 431, but they ex-
pressly turned only on the fact that the government was 
sponsoring a manifestly religious exercise. 
A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is 
different from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. 
First, a moment of silence is not inh e eli · s. Si-
lence, unli e prayer or Bib e rea ing, nf:!e~~ted 
with ~e. Second, a pUpJIWl1o participates 
in a momentOrsil~ need not compromise his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer 
is left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to lis-
ten to the prayers or thoughts of others. For these simple 
reasons, a moment of silence statute does ~ fall 
un- en a use ~_ccor m o ow the Court 
re~er Or1ffi>Iereading. Scholars and at least 
one member of this ourt have recognized the distinction and 
suggested that a moment of silence in public schools uld~ 
constitutional. See Abington, 374 U. S., at 281 
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J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of reverent 
silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular 
purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing 
either the religious liberties of any members of the commu-
nity or the proper degree of separation between the spheres 
of religion and goverment"); L. Tribe, American Constitu-
tional Law, § 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal 
Issue," in Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, 
supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public 
Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1031, 1041 
(1963). A~~ general matter, I agree. It is difficul to dis- j 
cern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, 
thoug sc oo c 'l<lre . 
y man ating a moment of silence, a State does not neces-
sarily endorse any activity that might occur during the 
period. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 272 n. 11 
(1981) ("by creating a forum the [State] does not thereby 
endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there"). , 
Even if a .§tatute SJ>ecifies .. that ]- student may choose to w:ay 
silw~j~ ggiet moment, the..State has not .tQ.ereby 
en~ed .E_r l:!-ye.r over o.t.~r. sJ2ecit.led alterl!atives. None-
theless, iris also possible that a moment of silence statute, 
either as drafted or as actually implemented, could effec-
tively favor the child who prays over the child who does not. 
For example, the message of endorsement would seem ines-
capable if the teacher exhorts children to use the designated 
time to pray. Si~ly, the face of the statute or ~sla­
tive history may clearl establish t a 1t seeks to encoJJrage 
or promot vo un ary praE r over other alternatives, rather 
than merely p roVide a quiet moment that may be dedicated to 
prayer by those so inclined. The crucial question is whether J 
the State has conveyed or at e te vey the message 
that ch1 n sliou use e moment of silence for prayer. 2 
2 Appellants argue that Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 313-314 
(1952) suggests there is no constitutional infirmity in a State's encouraging 
a child to pray during a moment of silence. The cited dicta from Zorach, 
,. 
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This question cannot be answered in the abstract, but instead 
requires courts to exa ·net e · age, and admin-
istration of a particular statute to determine whether it oper-
ates as an endorsement of religion. Lynch, -- U. S., at 
--(concurring opinion) ("Every government practice must 
be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether 
it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion"). 
Before reviewin Alabama's momen o ·1 law --.19 
determme whether it endorses rayer, some general ob-
~ations on e proper scope of the inquiry are in order. 
~' the inquiry into the purposEl.Q.f the ~gislfl_ture in enact-
mg a moment of silence law SFiOuid l:)edeferelltial and limited. 
See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 6 (1947) 
(courts must exercise "the most extreme caution" in assess-
ing whether a state statute has a proper public purpose). In 
determining whether the government intends a moment of 
silence statute to convey a message of endorsement or disap-
proval of religion, a court has no license to psychoanalyze the 
legislators. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 466 
(1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). If a legislature ex-~ 
presses a plausible secular purpose for a moment of silence 
statute in either the text or the legislative history, 3 or if the 
statute di~s an intent to encourage prayer oveu lterna-
tives during a moment-of silence,l then courts should gener-






~~ however, is inapposite. There the Court stated that "When the state en-
courages religious instruction . . . by adjusting the schedule of public 
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions." Id. (em-
phasis added). When the State provides a moment of silence during which 
prayer may occur at the election of the student, it can be said to be adjust-
ing the schedule of public events to sectarian needs. But when the State 
also encourages the student to pray during a moment of silence, it converts 
an otherwise inoffensive moment of silence into an effort by the majority to 
use the machinery of the State to encourage the minority to participate in a 
religious exercise. See Abington, supra, 374 U. S., at 226. 
~~ 
~~--
3 See, e. g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-1004 (1983). 
'See, e. g., W.Va. Const. Art. III, §15-a. 
~ 
. ,. 
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Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
773 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 678-679 
(1971). It is particularly troublesome to denigrate an ex-
pressed secular purpose due to p~ony by 
particular legislators or by interested persons who Witnessed 
the drafting of the statute. Eyen if the text and offici.2:! his-
tory of a statute express no secular ur ose, the statute 
shou e o ave an improper ur ose onlYifit is 
beyond purview tha en orsemen o reli ·on or a religious 
belie was a 1 w s reason for exist nee." Epperson 
v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 10 (1968). Since there is argu-
ably a secular pedagogical value to a moment of silence in 
public schools, courts should find an improper purpose behind 
such a statute only if the statute on its face, in its official leg-
islative history, or in its interpretation by a responsible 
administrative agency suggests it has the primary purpose of 
endorsin£:.-l)~R-e.r:---,.....,... 
STICE REHNQUIST s gests that this sort of deferential i 
i uiry into le · · e purpose "means little," because "it --onl mres the le · slature to ex ress an secular ur ose 
an omit all sectarian references." Post, at--. It is not a 
triVI~, to require that the legislature mani-
fest a secular purpose and omit all sectarian endorsements 
from its laws. That requirement is precisely tailored to the 
Establishment Clause's purpose of assuring that Government 
not intentionally endorse religion or a religious practice. It 
is of course possible that a legislature will enunciate a sham 
secular purpose for a statute. I have little doubt that our 
courts are capable of distinguishing a sham secular purpose 
from a sincere one, or that the Lemon inquiry into the effect 
of an enactment would help decide those close cases where 
the validity of an expressed secular purpose is in doubt. 
While the secular purpose requirement alone may rarely be 
determinative in striking down a statute, it nevertheless 
serves an important function. It reminds government that 
when it acts it should do so without endorsing a particular 
~ · 
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religious belief or practice that all citizens do not share. In 
this sense the secular purpose requirement is squarely based 
in the text of the Establishment Clause it helps to enforce. 
Second, the Lynch concurrence suggested that the effect 
of a moment of silence law is not entirely a question of fact: 
"[W]hether a government activity communicates 
endorsement of religion is not a question of simple his-
torical fact. Although evidentiary submissions may 
help to answer it, the question is, like the question 
whether racial or sex-based classifications communicate 
an invidious message, in large part a legal question to be 
answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social 
facts." -- U. S., at-- (concurring opinion). 
The relevant issue is whether an 
1
bbjective observer,~ ~c- ) 
quainted Wit111Tie text, legislative history, and implementa-
tion of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement 
of prayer in public schools. Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers 
Union,-- U.S.--,-- n. 1 (REHNQUIST, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that questions whether fighting words are "likely 
to provoke the average person to retaliation," Street v. New 
York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969), and whether allegedly ob-
scene material appeals to "prurient interests," Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973), are mixed questions of law 
and fact that are properly subject to de novo appellate re-
view). A moment of silence law that is clearly drafted and 
implemented so as to ermit ra r, medita ion reflec-
tion within the prescrl ea perio ' without endorsigg one 
alt~s, should pass this test. 
B 
The analysis above suggests that moment of silence laws in 
many States should pass Establishment Clause scrutiny be-
cause they do not favor the child who chooses to pray during 
a moment of silence over the child who chooses to meditate or 
reflect. Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 does not stand on the 
same footing. However deferentially one examines its text 
I 
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room activity, and that both the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals concluded that the law's ~ose was to encourage 
religio~ ~c~ivity. ~ n. (p ura 1 y opinion). 
In light oftfie legislative history, I agree with the plurality 
that the State intended Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 to convey 
a message that prayer was the endorsed activity during the 
state-prescribed moment of silence. While it is therefore 
unnecessary also to determine the effect of the statute, 
Lynch,-- U. S., at-- (concurring opinion), it also seems 
likely that the message actually conveyed to objective ob-
servers by Alabama Code§ 16-1-20.1 is approval of the child 
who selects prayer over other alternatives during a moment 
of silence. 
Given this evidence in the record, candor requires us to 1 
admit that this Alabama statute was intended to convey a 
message of state encouragement and endorsement of reli-
gion. In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 669 
(1970), we stated that the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment are flexible enough to "permit religious exercise 
to exist without sponsorship and without interference." Al-
abama Code § 16-1-20.1 oes more than permit ra er to 
occur~moment of silence "without interf.erence." It 
end  decision to pray during a moment of silence, and 
accordingly/~ a religious exercisJ.' For that reason, I 
concur in the judgment of the Court. 
II 
In his dissenting opinion, post, at --, JusTICE REHN-
QUIST reviews the text and history of the First Amendment 
religion clauses. His opinion suggests that a long line of this 
Court's decisions are inconsistent with the intent of drafters 
of the Bill of Rights. He urges the Court to correct the his-
torical inaccuracies in its past decisions by embracing a far 
more restricted interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 
an interpretation that presumably would permit vocal group 
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prayer in public schools. See generally R. Cord, Separation 
of Church and State (1982). 
The United States, in an amicus brief, suggests a less 
sweeping modification of Establishment Clause principles. 
In the Federal Government's view, a state sponsored mo-
ment of silence is merely an "accommodation" of the desire of 
some public schoolchildren to practice their religion by pray-
ing silently. Such an accommodation is contemplated by the 
First Amendment's guaranty that the Government will not 
prohibit the free exercise of religion. Because the moment 
of silence implicates free exercise values, the United States 
suggests that the Lemon-mandated inquiry into purpose and 
effect should be modified. Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae 22. 
There is an element of truth and much helpful analysis in 
each of these suggestions. Particularly when we are inter-
preting the Constitution, "a page of history is worth a volume 
of logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349 
(1921). Whatever the provision of the Constitution that is at 
issue, I continue to believe that "fidelity to the notion of con-
stitutionalr- as opposed to purely judicial- limits on govern-
mental action requires us to impose a heavy burden on those 
who claim that practices accepted when [the provision] was 
adopted are now constitutionally impermissible." Tennessee 
v. Garner,-- U.S.--,-- (dissenting opinion). The 
Court properly looked to history in upholding legislative 
prayer, Marsh v. Chambers, -- U. S. -- (1983), prop-
erty tax exemptions for houses of worship, Walz v. Tax Com-
mission, 397 U. S. 664 (1970), and Sunday closing laws, 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961). As Justice 
Holmes once observed, "[i]f a thing has been practised for 
two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong 
case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it." Jackman 
v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S. 22, 31 (1922). 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST does not assert, however, that the 
drafters of the First Amendment expressed a preference for 
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prayer in public schools, or that the practice of prayer in pub-
lic schools enjoyed uninterrupted government endorsement 
from the time of enactment of the Bill of Rights to the 
present era. The simple truth is that free public education 
was virtually non-existent in the late eighteenth century. 
See Abington, 374 U. S., at'238 and n. 7 (BRENNAN, J., con-
curring). Since there then existed few government-run 
schools, it is unlikely that the persons who drafted the First 
Amendment, or the state legislators who ratified it, antici-
pated the problems of interaction of church and state in the 
public schools. Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Con-
gress, and the Schools: An Historical Perspective, 52 Va. L. 
Rev. 1395, 1403-1404 (1966). Even at the time of adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, education in Southern States 
was still primarily in private hands, and the movement to-
ward free public schools supported by general taxation had 
not taken hold. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 
483, 489-490 (1954). 
This uncertainty as to the intent of the Framers of the Bill 
of Rights does not mean we should ignore history for guid-
ance on the role of religion in public education. The Court 
has not done so. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 333 U. S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
When the intent of the Framers is unclear, I believe we 
must employ both history and reason in our analysis. The 
primary issue raised by JusTICE REHNQUIST's dissent is 
whether the historical fact that our Presidents have long 
called for public prayers of Thanks should be dispositive on 
the constitutionality of prayer in public schools 5• I think 
not. At the very least, Presidential proclamations are 
distinguishable from school prayer in that they are primarily 
5 Even assuming a taxpayer could establish standing to challenge such 
a practice, see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, 454 U. S. 464 (1982), these Presidential 
proclamations would probably withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny 
given their long history. See Marsh v. Chambers, - U. S.- (1983). 
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directed at adults, who presumably are not readily suscepti-
ble to unwilling religious indoctrination. This Court's deci-
sions have recognized a distinction when government spon-
sored religious exercises are directed at impressionable 
children who are required to attend school, for then govern-
ment endorsement is much more likely to result in coerced 
religious beliefs. See, e. g., Marsh v. Chambers, --
U. S., at --; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 686. Al-
though history provides a touchstone for constitutional· prob-
lems, the Establishment Clause concern for religious liberty 
is dispositive here. 
The element of truth in the United States' arguments, I be-
lieve, lies in the suggestion that Establishment Clause analy-
sis must comport with the mandate of the Free Exercise 
Clause that government make no law prohibiting the- free 
exercise of religion. Our cases have interpreted the Free 
Exercise Clause to compel the Government to exempt per-
sons from some generally applicable government require-
ments so as to permit those persons to freely exercise their 
religion. See, e. g., Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana 
Employment·Secutiy Division, 450 U. S. 707 (1981); Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U. S. 398 (1963). Even where the Free Exercise Clause 
does not compel the Government to grant an exemption, the 
Court has suggested that the Government in some circum-
stances may voluntarily choose to exempt religious observers 
without violating the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., Gil-
lette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437, 453 (1971); Braunfeld v. 
Brown, 366 U. S. 599 (1961). The challenge posed by the 
United States' argument is how to define the proper Estab-
lishment Clause limits on voluntary government efforts to 
facilitate the free exercise of religion. On the one hand, a 
rigid application of the Lemon test would invalidate legisla-
tion exempting religious observers from generally applicable 
government obligations. By· definition, such legislation has 
a religious purpose and effect in promoting the free exercise 
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of religion. On the other hand, judicial deference to all legis-
lation that purports to facilitate the free exercise of religion 
would completely vitiate the Establishment Clause. Any 
statute pertaining to religion can be viewed as an "accommo-
d~tion" of fr~ exercise rights. Indeed, the statute at issue 
in Lemon, wliiCh provided salary supplements, textbooks, 
and instructional materials to Pennsylvania parochial schools, 
can be viewed as an accommodation of the religious beliefs 
of parents who choose to send their children to religious 
schools. 
It is obvious that the either of the two Religion Clauses, "if 
expanded to its logical extreme, would tend to clash with the 
other." Walz, 397 U. S., at 668-669. The Court has long 
exacerbated the conflict by calling for government "neutral-
ity'' toward religion. See, e. g., Committee for Public Edu-
cation v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1973), Board of Education 
v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968). It is difficult to square any 
notion of "complete neutrality," ante, at-- (plurality opin-
ion), with the mandate of the Free Exercise Clause that gov-
ernment must sometimes exempt a religious observer from 
an otherwise generally applicable obligation. A government 
that confers a benefit on an explicitly religious basis is not 
neutral toward religion. See Welsh v. United States, 398 
U. S. 333, 372 (1970) (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
The solution to the conflict between the religion clauses lies 
not in "neutrality," but rather in identifying workable limits 
to the Government's license to promote the Free Exercise of 
religion. The text of the Free Exercise Clause speaks of 
laws that prohibit the free exercise of religion. On its face, 
the Clause is directed at government interference with free 
exercise. Given that concern, one can plausibly assert that 
government pursues free exercise clause values when it lifts 
a government-imposed burden on the free exercise of reli-
gion. If a statute falls within this category, then the stand-
ard Establishment Clause test should be modified accord-
ingly. It is disingenuous to look for a purely secular purpose 
rr 
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when the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate the 
free exercise of religion by lifting a government-imposed bur-
den. Instead, the Court should simply acknowledge that the 
religious purpose of such a statute is legitimated by the Free 
Exercise Clause. I would also go further. In assessing the 
effect of such a statute- that is, in determining whether the 
statute conveys the message of endorsement of religion or a 
particular religious belief- courts should assume that the 
"objective observer," ante, at --, is acquainted with the 
Free Exercise Clause and the values it promotes. Thus indi-
vidual perceptions, or resentment that a religious observer is 
exempted from a particular government requirement, would 
be entitled to little weight if the Free Exercise Clause 
strongly supported the exemption. 
While this "accommodation" analysis would help reconcile 
our Free Exercis e and Establishment Clause standards, it 
would not save Alabama's moment of silence law. If we as-
sumet hat thereligfOOsactivitythat Alabama seeks to pro-
tect is silent prayer, then it is difficult to discern any state-
imposed burden on that activity that is lifted by Alabama 
Code § 16-1-20.1. No law prevents a student who is so in-
clined from praying silently in public schools. Moreover, 
state law already provided a moment of silence to these 
appellees irrespective of Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1. See 
Ala. Code § 16-1-20. Of course, the State might argue that 
§ 16-1-20.1 protects not silent prayer, but rather group silent 
prayer under State sponsorship. Phrased in these terms, 
the burden lifted by the statute is not one imposed by the 
State of Alabama, but by the Establishment Clause as inter-
preted in Engle and Abington. In my view, it is beyond the 
authority of the State of Alabama to remove burdens im-
posed by the Constitution itself. I conclude that the Ala- ) 
bama statute at issue today lifts no state-imposed burden on 
the free exercise of religion, and accordingly cannot properly 
be viewed as an accommodation statute. 
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III 
I agree with JUSTICE REHNQUIST that the "hopelessly: di-
vid~s," post, at--, which characte~
and many of our Establishment Clause decisions are unfortu-
nate. Even more unfortunate is the likelihood the public will 
misperceive today's decision. The Court does not hold that 
the Establishment Clause is so hostile to religion that it pre-
cludes the States from affording schoolchildren an oppor-
tunity for voluntary silent prayer. To the contrary, the 
moment of silence statutes of many States should satisfy the J 
Establishment Clause standard we have here applied. The 
Court holds only that Alabama has intentionall cro ed the 
line between creating a uiet moment durm which thos so 
inc~ay, an affirmative endorsin the articular 
reli r. T ·s line may be a fine one, but 
our precedents and the principles of religious liberty require 
that we draw it. In my view, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals must be affirmed. 
3rd I 
To: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan / -1 _ .4 
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment. 
Nothing in the United States Constitution as interpreted 
by this Court or in the laws of the State of Alabama prohibits 
I public school students from voluntarily praying at any time 
l before, during, or after the school day. Alabama has facili-
tated voluntary silent prayers of students who are so inclined 
by enacting Ala. Code§ 16-1-20, which provides a moment of 
silence in appellees' schools each day. The parties to these 
proceedings concede the validity of this enactment. At issue 
in these appeals is the constitutional validity of an additional 
and subsequent Alabama statute, Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1, 
which both the District Court and the Court of Appeals con-
cluded was enacted solely to officially encourage prayer dur-
ing the moment of silence. I agree with the judgment of the 
Court that, in light of the findings of the Courts below and 
the history of its enactment,§ 16-1-20.1 of the Alabama Code 
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
In my view, there can be little doubt that the purpose and 
likely effect of this subsequent enactment is to endorse and 
83-812 & 83-929--CONCUR 
2 WALLACE v. JAFFREE 
sponsor voluntary prayer in the public schools. I write sepa-
rately to identify the peculiar features of the Alabama law 
that render it invalid, and to explain why moment of silence 
laws in other States do not necessarily manifest the same in-
firmity. I also write to explain why n ., · · · 1.; >tory nor the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Arr. l uuu::m validate the 
Alabama law struck down by the Courc wday. 
I 
The religion clauses of the First Amendment, coupled with 
the Fourteenth Amendment's guaranty of ordered liberty, 
preclude both the Nation and the States from making any law 
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 
303 (1940). Although a distinct jurisprudence has enveloped 
each of these clauses, their common purpose is to secure reli-
gious liberty. See Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430 (1962). 
On these principles the Court has been and remains 
unanimous. 
As this case once again demonstrates, however, "it is far 
easier to agree on the purpose that underlies the First 
Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses 
than to obtain agreement on the standards that should gov-
ern their application." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664, 
694 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.). It once appeared that the 
Court had developed a workable standard by which to iden-
tify impermissible government establishments of religion. 
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971). Under the 
now familiar Lemon test, statutes must have both a secular 
legislative purpose and a principal or primary effect that nei-
ther advances nor inhibits religion, and in addition they must 
not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. 
ld., at 612-613. Despite its initial promise, the Lemon test 
has proven problematic. The required inquiry into "entan-
glement" has been modified and questioned, see Mueller v. 
Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 403 n. 11 (1983), and in one case we 
: 
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have upheld state action against an Establishment Clause 
challenge without applying the Lemon test at all. Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983). The author of Lemon him-
~Plf ~r>oarently questions the test's general applicability. 
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. --, -- C · US-
'TICE REHNQUIST today suggests that we abando .~emon en-
tirely, and in the process limit the reach of the EsLablishment 
Clause to state discrimination between sects and government 
designation of a particular church as a "state" or "national" 
one. Post, at--. 
Perhaps because I am new to the struggle, I am not ready 
to abandon all aspects of the Lemon test. I do believe, how-
ever, that the standards announced in Lemon should be re-
examined and refined in order to make them more useful in 
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment. 
We must strive to do more than erect a constitutional "sign-
post," Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 741 (1973), to be fol-
lowed or ignored in a particular case as our predilections may 
dictate. Instead, our goal should be "to frame a principle for 
constitutional adjudication that is not only grounded in the 
history and language of the first amendment, but one that is 
also capable of consistent application to the relevant prob-
lems." Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed 
Constitutional Standard, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 329, 332-333 
(1963) (footnotes omitted). Last Term, I proposed a refine-
ment of the Lemon test with this goal in mind. Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U. S., at-- (concurring opinion). 
The Lynch concurrence suggested that the religious liberty 
protected by the Establishment Clause is infringed when the 
government makes adherence to religion relevant to a per-
son's standing in the political community. Direct govern-
ment action endorsing religion or a particular religious prac-
tice is invalid under this approach because it "sends a 
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored mem-
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hers of the political community." /d., at--. Under this 
view, Lenwn's inquiry as to the purpose and effect of a stat-
ute requires courts to examine whether government's pur-
pose is to enciorse religion and whether the statute actually 
conveys " ssa~re of endorsement. 
The e1 Jrsement test is useful because of the analytic C< ' 
tent it gives to the Lemon-mandated inquiry into legislati , ! 
purpose and effect. In this country, church and state must 
necessarily operate within the same community. Because of 
this coexistence, it is inevitable that the secular interests of 
Government and the religious interests of various sects and 
their adherents will frequently intersect, conflict, and com-
bine. A statute that ostensibly promotes a secular interest 
often has an incidental or even a primary effect of helping or 
hindering a sectarian belief. Chaos would ensue if every 
such statute were invalid under the Establishment Clause. 
For example , the State could not criminalize murder for fear 
that it would thereby promote the Biblical command against 
killing. The task for the Court is to sort out those statutes 
and government practices whose purpose and effect go 
against the grain of religious liberty protected by the First 
Amendment. 
The endorsement test does not preclude government from 
acknowledging religion or from taking religion into account in 
making law and policy. It does preclude government from 
conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or 
a particular religious belief is favored or preferred. Such an 
endorsement infringes the religious liberty of the non-
adherent, for "( w ]hen the power, prestige and financial sup-
port of government is placed behind a particular religious be-
lief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities 
to confonn to the prevailing officially approved religion is 
plain." Englev. Vitale, 370U. S., at431. Atissuetodayis 
whether state moment of silence statutes in general, and Ala-
bama's moment of silence statute in particular, embody an 
impennissible endorsement of prayer in public schools. 
83-812 & 83-929-CONCUR 
WALLACE v. JAFFREE 5 
A 
Twenty-five states permit or require public school teachers 
to have students observe a moment of silence in their class-
rooms.' A few ~ .. ~ ... ·:t.-- ~rovide that the moment of silence 
is for the purposE: ~. .. · • l..'rli'..ation alone. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 15-522 (l~:RJ); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-16a (1983); R. I. 
Gen. Laws § 16-12-3.1 (1981). The typical statute, how-
ever, calls for a moment of silence at the beginning of the 
school day during which students may meditate, pray, or re-
flect on the activities of the day. See, e. g., Ark. Stat. Ann. 
§ 80-1607.1 (1980); Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-1050 (1982); Ill. 
Rev. Stat. ch. 122, § 771 (1983); Ind. Code § 20-10.1-7-11 
(1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-5308a (1980); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 
24, § 15-1516.1 (Purdon Supp. 1984). Federal trial courts 
have divided on the constitutionality of these moment of si-
lence laws. Compare Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 
(Mass. 1976) (upholding statute) with May v. Cooperman, 
572 F. Supp. 1561 (NJ 1983) (striking down statute); Duffy v. 
Las Cruces Public Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013 (NM 1983) 
(same); and Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161 (MD Tenn. 
'See Ala. Code §§ 16-1-20, 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984): Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 15-522 (1984); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1607.1 (1980); Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§ 10-16a (1983); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 14, § 4101 (1981) (as interpreted in 
Del. Op. Atty. Gen. 79-1011 (1979)); Fla. Stat. § 233.062 (1983); Ga. Code 
Ann. § 20-2-1050 (1982): Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 122, ~ 771 (1983); Ind. Code 
§ 20-10.1-7-11 (1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72.5308a (1980); La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 17:2115(A) (West 1982); Me. ReY. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20-A, § 4805 
(1983); Md. Educ. Code Ann.§ 7-104 (1985); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 71, 
§ 1A (1982); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 380.1565 (Supp. 1984-1985); N. J. 
Stat. Ann. § 18A:36-4 (West Supp. 1984-1985); N. M. Stat. Ann. 
§ 22-5-4.1 (1981); N. Y. Educ. Law§ 3029-a (McKinney 1981); N. D. Cent. 
Code § 15-47-30.1 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3313.60.1 (1980); Pa. 
Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, § 15.1516.1 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985); R. I. Gen. Laws 
§ 16-12-3.1 (1981); Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-1004 (1983); Va. Code 
§ 22.1-203 (1980); W. Va. Const., Art. III, § 15-a. For a useful compari-
son of the provisions of many of these statutes, see Note, Daily Moments of 
Silence in Public Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, 58 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 
364, 407-408 (1983). 
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1982) (same). See also Walter v. West Virginia Board of 
Education, Civ. Action No. 84-5366 (SD W. Va., Mar. 14, 
1985) (striking down state constitutional amendment). Re-
lying on this Court's decisions nisapproving vocal prayer and 
Bible reading in the publk schools, see Abington School Dis-
trict V. Schempp, 374 r. 8. 203 (1963), Engle v. Vitale, 
supra, the courts that have struck down the moment of si-
lence statutes generally conclude that their purpose and ef-
fect is to encourage prayer in public schools. 
The Engle and Abington decisions are not dispositive on 
the constitutionality of moment of silence laws. In those 
cases, public school teachers and students led their classes in 
devotional exercises. In Engle, a New York statute re-
quired teachers to lead their classes in a vocal prayer. The 
Court concluded that "it is no part of the business of govern-
ment to compose official prayers for any group of the Ameri-
can people to recite as part of a religious program carried on 
by the government." 370 U. S., at 425. In Abington, the 
Court addressed Pennsylvania and Maryland statutes that 
authorized morning Bible readings in public schools. The 
Court reviewed the purpose and effect of the statutes, con-
cluded that they required religious exercises, and therefore 
found them to violate the Establishment Clause. 374 U. S., 
at 223-224. Under all of these statutes, a student who did 
not share the religious beliefs expressed in the course of the 
exercise was left with the choice of participating, thereby 
compromising the nonadherent's beliefs, or withdrawing, 
thereby calling attention to his or her non-conformity. The 
decisions acknowledged the coercion implicit under the statu-
tory schemes, see Engle, supra, at 431, but they expressly 
turned only on the fact that the government was sponsoring a 
manifestly religious exercise. 
A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is 
different from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. 
First, a moment of silence is not inherently religious. Si-
lence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, need not be associated 
; 
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with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates 
in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer 
is left to his or her O\Vn thoughts, ann i~ not compelled to lis-
ten to the prayers or thoughts of othe ; For these simple 
reasons, a moment of silence· stat'1t1~ does not stand or fall 
under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court 
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least 
one member of this Court have recognized the distinction and 
suggested that a moment of silence in public schools would be 
constitutional. See Abington, supra, at 281 (BRENNAN, J., 
concurring) ("[T]he observance of a moment of reverent si-
lence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular 
purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing 
either the religious liberties of any members of the commu-
nity or the proper degree of separation between the spheres 
of religion and goverment"); L. Tribe, American Constitu-
tional Law§ 14-6, p. 829 (1978); P. Freund, The Legal Issue, 
in Religion and the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, 47 
Minn. L. Rev., at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and 
the Supreme Court, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As 
a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to discern a serious 
threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful 
schoolchildren. 
By mandating a moment of silence, a State does not neces-
sarily endorse any activity that might occur during the pe-
riod. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 272, n. 11 
(1981) ("by creating a forum the [State] does not thereby en-
dorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there"). 
Even if a statute specifies that a student may choose to pray 
silently during a quiet moment, the State has not thereby en-
couraged prayer over other specified alternatives. None-
theless, it is also possible that a moment of silence statute, 
either as drafted or as actually implemented, could effec-
tively favor the child who prays over the child who does not. 
For example, the message of endorsement would seem ines-
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capable if the teacher exhorts children to use the designated 
time to pray. Similarly, the face of the statute or its legisla-
tive history may clearly establish that it seeks to encourage 
or promote voluntary prayer over other alternatives, rather 
than merely provide a quiet moment that rna: ·dicated to 
prayer by those so inclined. The crucial qm .on is whether 
the State has conveyed or attempted to convey the message 
that children should use the moment of silence for prayer. 2 
This question cannot be answered in the abstract, but instead 
requires courts to examine the history, language, and admin-
istration of a particular statute to determine whether it oper-
ates as an endorsement of religion. Lynch, 465 U. S., at 
--(concurring opinion) ("Every government practice must 
be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether 
it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion"). 
Before reviewing Alabama's moment of silence law to de-
termine whether it endorses prayer, some general observa-
tions on the proper scope of the inquiry are in order. First, 
the inquiry into the purpose of the legislature in enacting a 
moment of silence law should be deferential and limited. 
See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 6 (1947) 
(courts must exercise "the most extreme caution" in assess-
ing whether a state statute has a proper public purpose). In 
2 Appellants argue that Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 313-314 
(1952) suggests there is no constitutional infirmity in a State's encouraging 
a child to pray during a moment of silence. The cited dicta from Zorach , 
however, is inapposite. There the Court stated that "When the state en-
courages religious instruction . . . by adjusting the schedule of public 
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions." Ibid. (em-
phasis added). When the State provides a moment of silence during which 
prayer may occur at the election of the student, it can be said to be adjust-
ing the schedule of public events to sectarian needs. But when the State 
also encourages the student to pray during a moment of silence, it converts 
an otherwise inoffensive moment of silence into an effort by the majority to 
use the machinery of the State to encourage the minority to participate in a 
religious exercise. See Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 
203, 226 (1963). 
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determining whether the government intends a moment of si-
lence statute to convey a message of endorsement or disap-
proval of religion, a court has no license to psychoanalyze the 
legislators. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 466 
(1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). If a legislature ex-
presses a plausible secular purpose for a moment of · ;ilr~nce 
statute in either the text or the legislative history, 3 or if the 
statute disclaims an intent to encourage prayer over alterna-
tives during a moment of silence, • then courts should gener-
ally defer to that stated intent. See Committee for Public 
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
773 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 678-679 
(1971). It is particularly troublesome to denigrate an ex-
pressed secular purpose due to post-enactment testimony by 
particular legislators or by interested persons who witnessed 
the drafting of the statute. Even if the text and official his-
tory of a statute express no secular purpose, the statute 
should be held to have an improper purpose only if it is be-
yond purview that endorsement of religion or a religious be-
lief "was and is the law's reason for existence." Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 108 (1968). Since there is arguably 
a secular pedagogical value to a moment of silence in public 
schools, courts should find an improper purpose behind such 
a statute only if the statute on its face, in its official legisla-
tive history, or in its interpretation by a responsible adminis-
trative agency suggests it has the primary purpose of endors-
ing prayer. 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST suggests that this sort of deferential 
inquiry into legislative purpose "means little," because "it 
only requires the legislature to express any secular purpose 
and omit all sectarian references." Post, at--. It is not a 
trivial matter, however, to require that the legislature mani-
fest a secular purpose and omit all sectarian endorsements 
from its laws. That requirement is precisely tailored to the 
• See, e. g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-1004 (1983). 
• See, e. g., W. Va. Const., Art. III, § 15-a. 
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Establishment Clause's purpose of assuring that Government 
not intentionally endorse religion or a religious practice. It 
is of course possible that a legislature will enunciate a sham 
secular purpose for a statute. I have little doubt that our 
courts are capable of distinguishing a sham secular purpose 
from a sincere one, or that the Lemon inquiry into the effect 
of an enactment would help decide those close cases where 
the validity of an expressed secular purpose is in doubt. 
While the secular purpose requirement alone may rarely be 
determinative in striking dow•n a statute, it nevertheless 
serves an important function. It reminds government that 
when it acts it should do so without endorsing a particular re-
ligious belief or practice that all citizens do not share. In 
this sense the secular purpose requirement is squarely based 
in the text of the Establishment Clause it helps to enforce. 
Second, the Lynch concurrence suggested that the effect of 
a moment of silence law is not entirely a question of fact: 
"[W]hether a government activity communicates en-
dorsement of religion is not a question of simple histori-
cal fact. Although evidentiary submissions may help 
answer it, the question is, like the question whether ra-
cial or sex-based classifications communicate an invidi-
ous message, in large part a legal question to be an-
swered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social 
facts." 465 U. S., at-- (concurring opinion). 
The relevant issue is whether an objective observer, ac-
quainted with the text, legislative history, and implementa-
tion of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement 
of prayer in public schools. Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers 
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. --, -- n. 1 
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) (noting that questions whether 
fighting words are "likely to provoke the average person to 
retaliation," Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969), 
and whether allegedly obscene material appeals to "prurient 
interests," Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973), are 
mixed questions of law and fact that are properly subject to 
' . 
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de novo appellate review). A moment of silence law that is 
clearly drafted and implemented so as to permit prayer, 
meditation, and reflection within the prescribed period, with-
out endorsing one alternative over the others, should pass 
this test. 
B 
The analysis above suggests that moment of silence laws in 
many States should pass Establishment Clause scrutiny be-
cause they do not favor the child who chooses to pray during 
a moment of silence over the child who chooses to meditate or 
reflect. Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) does not 
stand on the same footing. However deferentially one ex-
amines its text and legislative history, however objectively 
one views the message attempted to be conveyed to the pub-
lic, the conclusion is unavoidable that the purpose of the stat-
ute is to endorse prayer in public schools. I accordingly 
agree with the Court of Appeals, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (1983), 
that the Alabama statute has a purpose which is in violation 
of the Establishment Clause, and cannot be upheld. 
In finding that the purpose of Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 is 
to endorse voluntary prayer during a moment of silence, the 
plurality relies on testimony elicited from State Senator Don-
ald G. Holmes during a preliminary injunction hearing. 
Ante, at --. Senator Holmes testified that the sole pur-
pose of the statute was to return voluntary prayer to the pub-
lic schools. For the reasons expressed above, I would give 
little, if any, weight to this sort of evidence of legislative in-
tent. Nevertheless, the text of the statute in light of its offi-
cial legislative history leaves little doubt that the purpose of 
this statute corresponds to the purpose expressed by Senator 
Holmes at the preliminary injunction hearing. 
First, it is notable that Alabama already had a moment of 
silence statute before it enacted § 16-1-20.1. See Ala. Code 
§ 16-1-20, reprinted ante, at--, n. 1. Appellees do not 
challenge this statute-indeed, they concede its validity. 
See Brief for Appellees 2. The only significant addition 
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made by Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 is to specify expressly 
that voluntary prayer is one of the authorized activities dur-
ing a moment of silence. Any doubt as to the legislative pur-
pose of that addition is removed by the official legislative his-
tory. The sole purpose reflected in the official history is "to 
return voluntary prayer to our public schools." App. 50. 
Nor does anything in the legislative history contradict an in-
tent to encourage children to choose prayer over other alter-
natives during the moment of silence. Given this legislative 
history, it is not surprising that the State of Alabama con-
ceded in the courts below that the purpose of the statute was 
to make prayer part of daily classroom activity, and that both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that 
the law's purpose was to encourage religious activity. See 
{ 
ante, at --, n. 44. In light of the legislative history and I 
the findings of the courts below, I agree \\ith the Court that 
the State intended Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 to convey a 
message that prayer was the endorsed activity during the 
state-prescribed moment of silence. 5 While it is therefore 
unnecessary also to determine the effect of the statute, 
Lynch, 465 U. S., at -- (concurring opinion), it also seems 
likely that the message actually conveyed to objective ob-
servers by Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 is approval of the child 
6 THE CHIEF JUSTICE suggests that one consequence of the Court's em-
phasis on the difference between § 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor statute 
might be to render the Pledge of Allegiance unconstitutional because Con-
gress amended it in 1954 to add the words .. under God." Post, at-. I 
disagree. In my view, the words "under God" in the Pledge, as codified at 
36 U. S. C. § 172, serve as a acknowledgement of religion with "the legiti-
mate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, [and] expressing 
confidence in the future." Lynch, 465 U. S., at- (concurring opinion). 
I also disagree with THE CmEF JuSTICE's suggestion that the Court's 
opinion invalidates any moment of silence statute that includes the word ~ 
"prayer." Post, at-. As noted infra, at-, "[e]ven if a statute 
specifies that a student may choose to pray during a quiet moment, the 
State has not thereby encouraged prayer over other specified 
alternatives." 
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who selects prayer over other alternatives during a moment 
of silence. 
Given this evidence in the record, candor requires us to ad-
mit that this Alabama statute was intended to convey a mes-
g!l~e of state encouragement and endorsement of religion. 
'1• Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S., at 669, the Court stated 
that the religion clauses of the First Amendment are flexible 
enough to "permit religious exercise to exist without sponsor-
ship and without interference." Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 
does more than permit prayer to occur during a moment of 
silence "without interference." It endorses the decision to 
pray during a moment of silence, and accordingly sponsors a 
religious exercise. For that reason, I concur in the judg-
ment of the Court. 
II 
In his dissenting opinion, post, at --, JUSTICE REHN-
QUIST reviews the text and history of the First Amendment 
religion clauses. His opinion suggests that a long line of this 
Court's decisions are inconsistent v.ith the intent of the draft-
ers of the Bill of Rights. He urges the Court to correct the 
historical inaccuracies in its past decisions by embracing a far 
more restricted interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 
an interpretation that presumably would permit vocal group 
prayer in public schools. See generally R. Cord, Separation 
of Church and State (1982). 
The United States, in an amicus brief, suggests a less 
sweeping modification of Establishment Clause principles. 
In the Federal Government's view, a state sponsored mo-
ment of silence is merely an "accommodation" of the desire of 
some public school children to practice their religion by pray-
ing silently. Such an accommodation is contemplated by the 
First Amendment's guaranty that the Government will not 
prohibit the free exercise of religion. Because the moment 
of silence implicates free exercise values, the United States 
suggests that the Lemon-mandated inquiry into purpose and 
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effect should be modified. Brief for United States as Ami-
cus Curiae 22. 
There is an element of truth and much helpful analysis in 
each of these suggestions. Particularly when we are inter-
prr-~ .~ • ·. ·' ·· Constitution, "a page of history is worth a volume 
of ~l~, ·--· .vew York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349 
(L .:! l). Whatever the provision of the Constitution that is at 
issue, I continue to believe that "fidelity to the notion of con-
stitutional-as opposed to purely judicial-limits on govern-
mental action requires us to impose a heavy burden on those 
who claim that practices accepted when [the provision] was 
adopted are now constitutionally impermissible." Tennessee 
v. Garner, 471 U. S. --, -- (1985) (dissenting opinion). 
The Court properly looked to history in upholding legislative 
prayer, Marsh \'. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), property 
tax exemptions for houses of worship, Walz v. Tax Comrn'n, 
supra, and Sunday closing laws, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U. S. 420 (1961). As Justice Holmes once observed, "[i]f a 
thing has been practised for two hundred years by common 
consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to affect it." Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S. 
22, 31 (1922). 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST does not assert, however, that the 
drafters of the First Amendment expressed a preference for 
prayer in public schools, or that the practice of prayer in pub-
lic schools enjoyed uninterrupted government endorsement 
from the time of enactment of the Bill of Rights to the 
present era. The simple truth is that free public education 
was virtually non-existent in the late eighteenth century. 
See Abington, 374 U. S., at 238, and n. 7 (BRENNAN, J., con-
curring). Since there then existed few government-run 
schools, it is unlikely that the persons who drafted the First 
Amendment, or the state legislators who ratified it, antici-
pated the problems of interaction of church and state in the 
public schools. Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Con-
gress, and the Schools: An Historical Perspective, 52 Va. L. 
. . 
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Rev. 1395, 1403-1404 (1966). Even at the time of adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, education in Southern States 
was still primarily in private hands, and the movement to-
ward free public schools supported by general taxation had 
not taken h·; ' :-' , own v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483, 489-49l • , • .;tA). 
This unce. t ainty as to the intent of the Framers of the Bill 
of Rights does not mean we should ignore history for guid-
ance on the role of religion in public education. The Court 
has not done so. See, e. g., Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. 
Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring). When the intent of the Framers is unclear, 
I believe we must employ both history and reason in our anal-
ysis. The primary issue raised by JUSTICE REHNQUIST's 
dissent is whether the historical fact that our Presidents have 
long called for public prayers of Thanks should be dispositive 
on the constitutionality of prayer in public schools. 6 I think 
not. At the very least, Presidential proclamations are 
t distinguishable from school prayer in that they are received} 
1 in a non-coercive setting and are primarily directed at adults, 
who presumably are not readily susceptible to unwilling reli-
gious indoctrination. This Court's decisions have recognized 
a distinction when government sponsored religious exercises 
are directed at impressionable children who are required to 
attend school, for then government endorsement is much 
more likely to result in coerced religious beliefs. See, e. g., 
Marsh v. Chambers, supra, at--; Tilton v. Richardson, 
403 U. S., at 686. Although history provides a touchstone 
for constitutional problems, the Establishment Clause con-
cern for religious liberty is dispositive here. 
• Even assuming a taxpayer could establish standing to challenge such a 
practice, see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, Inc ., 454 U. S. 464 (1982), these Presi-
dential proclamations would probably withstand Establishment Clause 
scrutiny given their long history. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 
(1983) . 
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The element of truth in the United States' arguments, I be-
lieve, lies in the suggestion that Establishment Clause analy-
sis must comport with the mandate of the Free Exercise 
Clause that government make no law prohibiting the free ex-
ercise of religion. Our ~~"P" have interpreted the Free Ex-
ercise Clause .to com]. . . 1 hvernment to exempt persons 
from some generally ~pplicable government requirements so 
as to permit those persons to freely exercise their religion. 
See, e. g., Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employ-
ment Security Division, 450 U. S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 
398 (1963). Even where the Free Exercise Clause does not 
compel the Government to grant an exemption, the Court has 
suggested that the Government in some circumstances may 
voluntarily choose to exempt religious observers without vi-
olating the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., Gillette v. 
United States, 401 U. S. 437, 453 (1971); Braunfeld v. 
Brown, 366 U. S. 599 (1961). The challenge posed by the 
United States' argument is how to define the proper Estab-
lishment Clause limits on voluntary government efforts to fa-
cilitate the free exercise of religion. On the one hand, a rigid 
application of the Lemon test would invalidate legislation ex-
empting religious observers from generally applicable gov-
ernment obligations. By definition, such legislation has a re-
ligious purpose and effect in promoting the free exercise of 
religion. On the other hand, judicial deference to all legisla-
tion that purports to facilitate the free exercise of religion 
would completely vitiate the Establishment Clause. Any 
statute pertaining to religion can be viewed as an "accommo-
dation" of free exercise rights. Indeed, the statute at issue 
in Lemon, which provided salary supplements, textbooks, 
and instructional materials to Pennsylvania parochial schools, 
can be viewed as an accommodation of the religious beliefs of 
parents who choose to send their children to religious 
schools. 
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It is obvious that the either of the two Religion Clauses, "if 
expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the 
other." Walz, 397 U. S., at 668-669. The Court has long 
exacerbated the conflict by calling for government "neutral-
ity" toward religion. See, e. [ - .. • ru itteefor Public Edu-
cation & Religious Liberty v. 1 .JfJu~'-, 413 U. S. 756 (1973), 
Board of Education v. Allen, i,;:.(; U. S. 236 (1968). It is dif-
ficult to square any notion of "complete neutrality," ante, at 
--, with the mandate of the Free Exercise Clause that gov-
ernment must sometimes exempt a religious observer from 
an otherwise generally applicable obligation. A government 
that confers a benefit on an explicitly religious basis is not 
neutral toward religion. See Welsh v. United States, 398 
U. S. 333, 372 (1970) (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
The solution to the conflict between the religion clauses lies 
not in "neutrality," but rather in identifying workable limits 
to the Government's license to promote the free exercise of 
religion. The text of the Free Exercise Cl~use speaks of 
laws that prohibit the free exercise of religion. On its face, 
the Clause is directed at government interference with free 
exercise. Given that concern, one can plausibly assert that 
government pursues free exercise clause values when it lifts 
a government-imposed burden on the free exercise of reli-
gion. If a statute falls within this category, then the stand-
ard Establishment Clause test should be modified accord-
ingly. It is disingenuous to look for a purely secular purpose 
when the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate the 
free exercise of religion by lifting a government-imposed bur-
den. Instead, the Court should simply acknowledge that the 
religious purpose of such a statute is legitimated by the Free 
Exercise Clause. I would also go further. In assessing the 
effect of such a statute-that is, in determining whether the 
statute conveys the message of endorsement of religion or a 
particular religious belief-courts should assume that the 
"objective observer," ante, at--, is acquainted with the 
Free Exercise Clause and the values it promotes. Thus indi-
... 
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vidual perceptions, or resentment that a religious observer is 
exempted from a particular government requirement, would 
be entitled to little weight if the Free Exercise Clause 
strongly supported the exemption. 
While this "accommodation" analysis would help reconcile 
our Free Exercise and Establishment .J -; ~andards, it 
would not save Alabama's moment of si. .ce 1aw. If we as-
sume that the religious activity that AHwama seeks to pro-
tect is silent prayer, then it is difficult to discern any state-
imposed burden on that activity that is lifted by Alabama 
Code§ 16-1-20.1. No law prevents a student who is so in-
clined from praying silently in public schools. Moreover, 
state law already provided a moment of silence to these ap-
pellees irrespective of Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1. See Ala. 
Code § 16-1-20. Of course, the State might argue that 
§ 16-1-20.1 protects not silent prayer, but rather group silent 
prayer under State sponsorship. Phrased in these terms, 
the burden lifted by the statute is not one imposed by the 
State of Alabama, but by the Establishment Clause as inter-
preted in E'ngle and Abington. In my view, it is beyond the 
authority of the State of Alabama to remove burdens im-
posed by the Constitution itself. I conclude that the Ala-
bama statute at issue today lifts no state-imposed burden on 
the free exercise of religion, and accordingly cannot properly 
be viewed as an accommodation statute. 
III 
The Court does not hold that the Establishment Clause is 
so hostile to religion that it precludes the States from afford-
ing schoolchildren an opportunity for voluntary silent prayer. 
To the contrary, the moment of silence statutes of many 
States should satisfy the Establishment Clause standard we 
have here applied. The Court holds only that Alabama has 
intentionally crossed the line between creating a quiet mo-
ment during which those so inclined may pray, and affinna-
tively endorsing the particular religious practice of prayer. 
11)111)$5/0,1) 
,, 
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This line may be a fine one, but our precedents and the prin-
ciples of religious liberty require that we draw it. In my 













From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: _________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 83-812 AND 83-929 
GEORGE C. WALLACE, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE 
OF ALABAMA, ET AL., APPELLANTS 
83-812 v. 
ISHMAEL JAFFREE ET AL. 
DOUGLAS T. SMITH, ET AL., APPELLANTS 
83-929 v. 
ISHMAEL JAFFREE ET AL. 
ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala. 
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. My concurrence is prompted by Ala-
bama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored 
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive stat-
utes. 1 I agree fully with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that 
some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a 
1 The three statutes are Ala. Code § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) (moment of 
silent meditation); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) (moment of silence 
for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984) (teachers 
authorized to lead students in vocal prayer). These statutes were enacted 
over a span of four years. There is some question whether § 16-1-20 was 
repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily affirmed the 
Court of Appeals' holding that § 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree, 
- U. S.- (1984). Thus, our opinions today address only the validity 
of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3. 
2 JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence stat-
utes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal 
prayer: 
" 
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suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante, 
at 20. 
I write separately to express additional views and to re-
spond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3 
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different 
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of 
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, 
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who par-
ticipates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or 
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts 
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not 
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court 
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member 
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment 
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374 
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of 
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular pur-
poses of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious 
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separa-
tion between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law,§ 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in 
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., 
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 MichL. 
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to 
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thought-
ful schoolchildren." 
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). 
3 JusTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon 
should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in 
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the 
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
As I state in the text, the Lemon test has been applied consistently in 
Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972. In a word, it has 
been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us to follow Lemon. 
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., -- U. S. --, --
(1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial decision, and with 
it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous 
overruling of multiple precedents .... "). The appellants have not di-
rectly argued that the test should be discarded. Moreover, a majority of 
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Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies stand-
ards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both 
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only 
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only 
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed 
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its three-
pronged test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 
(1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test 
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage 
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases 
on an ad hoc basis. 5 
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged 
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, supra, at 612 (1971). As JUSTICE O'CONNOR recog-
nizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere"; a law will not 
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated 
by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 9 (O'CoN-
the Court today in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, -- U. S. --
(1985), and Aguilar v. Felton, -- U. S. -- (1985), expressly follows 
Lemon and applies its test. 
4 In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), we held that the Ne-
braska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer 
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical accept-
ance of the practice, that had become "part of the fabric of our society." 
Id., at--. 
5 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), was a carefully considered 
opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was joined by six other Justices. 
Lemon's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of 
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court 
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon. Id., at--. 
In Lynch v. Donnelley, -- U. S. -- (1984), we said that the Court is 
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." I d., at 
--. The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including 
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the 
Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to 
the facts of that case. It focused on the "question whether there is a secu-
lar purpose for [the] display of the creche." !d., at--. 
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NOR, J., concurring in the judgment). In Stone v. Graham, 
449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a 
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments· in 
public schools violated the Establishment Clause, even 
though the Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was 
educational. We have not interpreted the first prong of 
Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a statute have 
"exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelley, --
U. S. --, -- n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much 
conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past 
would have been invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (New York's property tax ex-
emption for religious organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of 
Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may 
reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children 
to parochial schools). 
The record before us, however, makes clear that Ala-
bama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator 
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama 
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of 
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public 
schools. See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with JusTICE 
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if 
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to es-
tablish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring 
in the judgment). But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the 
religious purpose of § 16-1-20.1 is manifested in other evi-
dence, including the sequence and history of the three Ala-
bama statutes. See ante, at 19. 
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the Dis-
trict Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose, 
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion. 
6 The Court's opinion recognizes that "a statute motivated in part by a 
religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion." Ante, at 17. The Court 
simply holds that "a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated 
by a purpose to advance religion." Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1 
pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that 
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose." 
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). In-
stead, the District Court found that the enactment of the 
statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to 
encourage a religious activity." 7 Ibid. The Court of Ap-
peals likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of 
secular purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature." 
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CAll 1983). It 
held that the objective of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement 
of religion." Ibid. When both courts below are unable to 
discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court nor-
mally should hesitate to find one. 
I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a 
clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, -- U. S. 
--, -- (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute un-
constitutional motives to the state, particularly when a plau-
sible secular purpose may be discerned from the face of the 
statute"). Nothing in the record before us, however, identi-
fies a clear secular purpose, and the State also has failed to 
identify any non-religious reason for the statute's enact-
ment.8 Under these circumstances, the Court is required 
7 In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held .that 
prayer in the public schools-even if led by the teacher-did not violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court recog-
nized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless 
ruled that its decision was justified because "the United States Supreme 
Court has erred .... " Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 
1104 (S. D. Ala. 1983). 
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District 
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 
Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs,- U.S.- (1983) (POWELL, J., in 
chambers). 
8 Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that "the prin-
cipal problem [with the test] stems from the purpose prong." See Brief of 
Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9 et seq. 
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by our precedents to hold that the statute fails the first prong 
of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishment 
Clause. 
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the 
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward 
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advanc[e] or in-
hibi[t] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Com-
missioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970). 
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court. 
9 If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would 
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of imma-
ture pupils. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a 
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is 
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers 
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily con-
cerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment 
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other sub-
jects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that 
some children, raised in strongly religious families, properly would use the 
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice. 
-
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala. 
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. My concurrence is prompted by Ala-
bama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored 
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive stat-
utes. 1 I agree fully with JusTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that 
some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a 
'The three statutes are Ala. Code § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) (moment of 
silent meditation); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) (moment of silence 
for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984) (teachers 
authorized to lead students in vocal prayer). These statutes were enacted 
over a span of four years. There is some question whether § 16-1-20 was 
repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily affirmed the 
Court of Appeals' holding that§ 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree, 
- U. S.- (1984). Thus, our opinions today address only the validity 
of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3. 
2JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence stat-
utes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal 
prayer: 
1 
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suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante, 
at 20. 
I write separately to express additional views and to re-
spond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3 
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different 
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of 
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, 
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who par-
ticipates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or 
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts 
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not 
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court 
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member 
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment 
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374 
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J ., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of 
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular pur-
poses of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious 
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separa-
tion between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law, § 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in 
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., 
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 MichL. 
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to 
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thought-
ful schoolchildren." 
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). 
3 JusTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon 
should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in 
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the 
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
As I state in the text, the Lemon test has been applied consistently in 
Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972. In a word, it has 
been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us to follow Lemon. 
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. , --U.S.--,--
(1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial decision, and with 
it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous { 
overruling of multiple precedents .... "). .!Ihe appellant! nave not-d' 
rectly al'glied that the test !hould be discaraea. Moi=eeW-er,-tl--majm-ity-of------
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Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies stand-
ards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both 
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only 
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only 
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed 
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its three-
pronged test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 
(1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test 
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage 
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases 
on an ad hoc basis. 5 
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged 
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, supra, at 612 (1971). As JUSTICE O'CONNOR recog-
nizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere"; a law will not 
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose e ulated 
by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at ~A(O'CON-
the-Caw-t today in th6Jnfl R9.pid:s School Dist. "'· Ba,U, U. 8. ~'­
(lQga), ana Aguil6ir v. ,_7i'elten, U. 8. (lQ~,.....expreaal;=fe~ 
T.eman and applies its tes~ 
•In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), we held that the Ne-
braska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer 
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical accept-
ance of the practice, that had become "part of the fabric of our society." 
ld., at--. 
• Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), was a carefully considered 
opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was joined by six other Justices. 
Lemon's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of 
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court 
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon. ld., at--. 
In Lynch v. Donnelley, -- U. S. -- (1984), we said that the Court is 
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." I d., at 
--. The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including 
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the 
Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to 
the facts of that case. It focused on the "question whether there is a secu-
lar purpose for [the] display of the creche." ld., at--. 
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NOR, J., concurring in the judgment). In Stone v. Graham, 
449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a 
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in 
public schools violated the Establishment Clause, even 
though the Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was 
educational. We have not interpreted the first prong of 
Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a statute have 
"exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelley, --
U.S.--,-- n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much 
conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past 
would have been invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (New York's property tax ex-
emption for religious organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of 
Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may 
reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children 
to parochial schools). 
The record before us, however, makes clear that Ala-
bama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator 
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama 
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of 
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public 
schools. See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if 
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to es-
tablish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring 
in the judgment). But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the 
religious purpose of § 16-1-20.1 is manifested in other evi-
dence, including the sequence and history of the three Ala-
bama statutes. See ante, at 19. 
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the Dis-
trict Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose, 
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion. 
e The Court's opinion recognizes that "a statute motivated in part by a t 
religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion." Ante, at 17. The Court 
simply holds that "a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated 
by a purpose to advance religion." Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1 
pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that 
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose." 
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). In-
stead, the District Court found that the enactment of the 
statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to 
encourage a religious activity." 7 Ibid. The Court of Ap-
peals likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of 
secular purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature." 
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CAll 1983). It 
held that the objective of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement 
of religion." Ibid. When both courts below are unable to 
discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court nor-
mally should hesitate to find one. 
I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a 
clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, -- U. S. 
--, -- (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute un-
constitutional motives to the state, particularly when a plau-
sible secular purpose may be discerned from the face of the 
statute"). Nothing in the record before us, however, identi-
fies a clear secular purpose, and the State also has failed to 
identify any non-religious reason for the statute's enact-
ment. 8 Under these circumstances, the Court is required 
7 In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that 
prayer in the public schools-even if led by the teacher-did not violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court recog-
nized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless 
ruled that its decision was justified because "the United States Supreme 
Court has erred ... . " Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 
1104 (S. D. Ala. 1983). 
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District 
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 
Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs , - U.S. - (1983) (POWELL, J., in 
chambers). 
8 Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that "the prin-
cipal problem [with the test] stems from the purpose prong." See Brief of 
Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9 et seq. 
.. .... 
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by our precedents to hold that the statute fails the first prong 
of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishment 
Clause. 
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the 
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward 
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advanc[e] or in-
hibi[t] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Com-
missioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970). 
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court. 
9 If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would 
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of imma-
ture pupils. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a 
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is 
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers 
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily con-
cerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment 
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other sub-
jects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that 
some children, raised in strongly religious families, properly would use the 
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice . 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concun-ing. 
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala. 
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. My concun-ence is prompted by Ala-
bama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored 
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive stat-
utes.1 I agree fully with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that 
some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a 
1 The three statutes are Ala. Code § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) (moment of 
silent meditation); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) (moment of silence 
for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984) (teachers 
authorized to lead students in vocal prayer). These statutes were enacted 
over a span of four years. There is some question whether § 16-1-20 was 
repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily affirmed the 
Court of Appeals' holding that§ 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree, 
- U. S. - (1984). Thus, our opinions today address only the validity 
of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3. 
2 JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence stat-
utes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal 
prayer: 
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suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante, 
at 20. 
I write separately to express additional views and to re-
spond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3 
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different 
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of 
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, 
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who par-
ticipates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or 
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts 
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not 
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court 
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member 
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment 
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374 
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of 
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular pur-
poses of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious 
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separa-
tion between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law, § 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in 
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., 
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 MichL. 
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to 
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thought-
ful schoolchildren." 
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). 
8 JuSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon 
should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in 
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the 
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
As I state in the text, the Lemon test has been applied consistently in 
Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972. In a word, it has 
been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us to follow Lemon. 
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., --U.S.--,--
(1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial decision, and with 
it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous 
overruling of multiple precedents .... "). The appellants have not di-
rectly argued that the test should be discarded. Moreover, a majority of 
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Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies stand-
ards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both 
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only 
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only 
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed 
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its three-
·pronged test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 
(1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test 
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage 
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases 
on an ad hoc basis. 5 
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged 
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, supra, at 612 (1971). As JUSTICE O'CONNOR recog-
nizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere"; a law will not 
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated 
by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 9 (O'CoN-
the Court today in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, -- U. S. --
(1985), and Aguilar v. Felton, -- U. S. -- (1985), expressly follows 
Lemon and applies its test. 
'In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), we held that the Ne-
braska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer 
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical accept-
ance of the practice, that had become "part of the fabric of our society." 
Id., at--. 
5 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), was a carefully considered 
opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was joined by six other Justices. 
Lemon's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of 
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court 
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon. Id., at--. 
In Lynch v. Donnelley, -- U. S. -- (1984), we said that the Court is 
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." !d., at 
--. The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including 
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the 
Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to 
the facts of that case. It focused on the "question whether there is a secu-
lar purpose for [the] display of the creche." !d., at--. 
83-812 & 83-929--CONCUR 
4 WALLACE v. JAFFREE 
NOR, J., concurring in the judgment). In Stone v. Graham, 
449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a 
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in 
public schools violated the Establishment Clause, even 
though the Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was 
educational. We have not interpreted the first prong of 
Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a statute have 
"exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelley, --
U. S. --, -- n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much 
conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past 
would have been invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (New York's property tax ex-
emption for religious organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of 
Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may 
reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children 
to parochial schools). 
The record before us, however, makes clear that Ala-
bama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator 
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama 
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of 
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public 
schools. See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if 
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to es-
tablish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring 
in the judgment). But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the 
religious purpose of § 16-1-20.1 is manifested in other evi-
dence, including the sequence and history of the three Ala-
bama statutes. See ante, at 19. 
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the Dis-
trict Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose, 
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion. 
8 The Court's opinion recognizes that "a statute motivated in part by a l 
religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion." Ante, at 17. The Court 
simply holds that "a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated 
by a purpose to advance religion." Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1 
pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that 
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose." 
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). In-
stead, the District Court found that the enactment of the 
statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to 
encourage a religious activity." 7 Ibid. The Court of Ap-
peals likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of 
secular purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature." 
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CAll 1983). It 
held that the objective of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement 
of religion." Ibid. When both courts below are unable to 
discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court nor-
mally should hesitate to find one. 
I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a 
clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, -- U. S. 
--, -- (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute un-
constitutional motives to the state, particularly when a plau-
sible secular purpose may be discerned from the face of the 
statute"). Nothing in the record before us, however, identi-
fies a clear secular purpose, and the State also has failed to 
identify any non-religious reason for the statute's enact-
ment.8 Under these circumstances, the Court is required 
7 In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that 
prayer in the public schools-even if led by the teacher-did not violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court recog-
nized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless 
ruled that its decision was justified because "the United States Supreme 
Court has erred .... " Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 
1104 (S. D. Ala. 1983). 
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District 
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 
Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs,- U.S.- (1983) (POWELL, J., in 
chambers). 
8 Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that "the prin-
cipal problem [with the test] stems from the purpose prong." See Brief of 
Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9 et seq. 
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by our precedents to hold that the statute fails the first prong 
of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishq~ent 
Clause. 
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the 
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward 
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advanc[e] or in-
hibi[t] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Com-
missioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970). 
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court. 
9 If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would 
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of imma-
ture pupils. As JusTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a 
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is 
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers 
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily con-
cerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment 
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other sub-
jects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that 
some children, raised in strongly religious families, properly would use the 
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala. 
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. My concurrence is prompted by Ala-
bama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored 
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive stat-
utes. 1 I agree fully with JusTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that 
some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a 
'The three statutes are Ala. Code § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) (moment of 
silent meditation); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) (moment of silence 
for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984) (teachers 
authorized to lead students in vocal prayer). These statutes were enacted 
over a span of four years. There is some question whether § 16-1-20 was 
repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily affirmed the 
Court of Appeals' holding that§ 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree, 
- U. S. - (1984). Thus, our opinions today address only the validity 
of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3. 
2 JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence stat-
utes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal 
prayer: 
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suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante, 
at 20. 
I write separately to express additional views and to re-
spond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies stand-
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different 
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of 
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, 
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who par-
ticipates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or 
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts 
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not 
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court 
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member 
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment 
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374 
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of 
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular pur-
poses of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious 
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separa-
tion between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law, § 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in 
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., 
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 Mich L. 
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to 
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thought-
ful schoolchildren." 
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). 
8 JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon 
should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in 
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the 
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
As I state in the text, the Lemon test has been applied consistently in 
Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972. In a word, it has 
been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us to follow Lemon. 
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., --U.S.--,--
(1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial decision, and with 
it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous 
overruling of multiple precedents .... "). 
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ards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both 
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only 
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only 
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed 
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its three-
pronged test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 
(1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test 
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage 
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases 
on an ad hoc basis. 5 
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged 
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, supra, at 612 (1971). As JusTICE O'CONNOR recog-
nizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere"; a law will not 
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated 
by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 10 (O'CoN-
NOR, J., concurring in the judgment). In Stone v. Graham, 
449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a 
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in 
• In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), we held that the Ne-
braska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer 
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical accept-
ance of the practice, that had become "part of the fabric of our society." 
Id., at--. 
6 Lerrwn v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), was a carefully considered 
Qpinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was joined by six other Justices. 
Lerrwn's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of 
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court 
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon. I d., at --. 
In Lynch v. Donnelley, -- U. S. -- (1984), we said that the Court is 
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." /d., at 
--. The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including 
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the 
Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to 
the facts of that case. It focused on the "question whether there is a secu-
lar purpose for [the] display of the creche." /d., at--. 
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public schools violated the Establishment Clause, even 
though the Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was 
educational. We have not interpreted the first prong of 
Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a statute have 
"exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelley, --
U. S. --, -- n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much 
conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past 
would have been invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (New York's property tax ex-
emption for religious organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of 
Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may 
reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children 
to parochial schools). 
The record before us, however, makes clear that Ala-
bama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator 
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama 
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of 
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public 
schools. See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with JusTICE 
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if 
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to es-
tablish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring 
in the judgment). But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the 
religious purpose of§ 16-1~20.1 is manifested in other evi-
dence, including the sequence and history of the three Ala-
bama statutes. See ante, at 19. 
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the Dis-
trict Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose, 
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion. 
In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1 
pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that 
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose." 
8 The Court's opinion recognizes that "a statute motivated in part by a 
religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion." Ante, at 17. The Court 
simply holds that "a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated 
by a purpose to advance religion." Ibid. (emphasis added). 
. 
' 
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Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). In-
stead, the District Court found that the enactment of the 
statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to 
encourage a religious activity." 7 Ibid. The Court of Ap-
peals likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of 
secular purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature." 
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CAll 1983). It 
held that the objective of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement 
of religion." Ibid. When both courts below are unable to 
discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court nor-
mally should hesitate to find one. 
I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a 
clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, -- U. S. 
--, -- (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute un-
constitutional motives to the state, particularly when a plau-
sible secular purpose may be discerned from the face of the 
statute"). Nothing in the record before us, however, identi-
fies a clear secular purpose, and the State al~o has failed to 
identify any non-religious reason for the statute's enact-
ment.8 Under these circumstances, the Court is required 
by our precedents to hold that the statute fails the first prong 
of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishment 
Clause. 
1 In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that 
prayer in the public schools-even if led by the teacher-did not violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court recog-
nized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless 
ruled that its decision was justified because "the United States Supreme 
Court has erred .... " Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 
1104 (S. D. Ala. 1983). 
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District 
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 
Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs,- U.S.- (1983) (POWELL, J., in 
chambers). 
8 Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that "the prin-
cipal problem [with the test] stems from the purpose prong." See Brief of 
Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9 et seq. 
I" f' 
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Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the 
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward 
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advanc[e] or in-
hibi[t] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Com-
missioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970). 
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court. 
8 If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lerrwn, we would 
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of imma-
ture pupils. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a 
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is 
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers 
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily con .. 
cerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment 
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other sub-
jects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that 
some children, raised in strongly religious families, properly would use the 
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Alabama 
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. I agree particularly with JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR that momen -of-silence statutes may be constitu-
tional, 1 a view set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante, 
1 JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence stat-
utes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal 
prayer: 
A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different 
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of 
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, 
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who par-
ticipates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or 
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts 
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not 
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court 
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member 
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment 
~II 
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at 20. f l w;ite separately to express additional views, and to 
answer criticism of the three-prong Lemon test. 2 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies stand-
ards that have proven analytically useful in case after case 
both in our decisions and those of other courts. It is the only 
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. 
Only once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we ana-
lyzed an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its 
three-prong test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 
(1983). 3 Abandonment or even continued criticism of 
Lemon will leave this and other courts free to decide Estab-
lishment Clause cases on an ad hoc basis. It-
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged 
statute has a "secular legislative p[~se." Lemon v. 
Kurtzman,A~' 612 (1971). As JUSTICE O'CON-
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374 
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of 
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular pur-
poses of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious 
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separa-
tion between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law, § 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in 
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., 
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 Mich L. 
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to 
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thought-
ful schoolchildren. · 
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). 
2 JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon 
should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in 
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the 
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
3 In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), we held that the Ne-
braska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer 
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical accept-
ance of the practice, which had become "part of the fabric of our society." 
/d., at-- . 
.· 
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NOR recognizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere;" a law 
will not pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose 
articulated by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 9 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). In Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. , 
39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a statute 
requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public 
schools violated the Establishment Clause, even though the 
Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was educational. 
We have not interpreted the first prong of Lemon, supra, 
however, as requiring that a statute have "exclusively secu-
lar" objectives. Lynch v. Donnelley, --U.S.--,--
n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much conduct and legis-
lation approved by this Court in the past would have been in-
validated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 
(1970) (New York's property tax exemption for religious 
organizations upheld); post, at 18 (REHNQUIST, J., dissent-
ing) ("one of the purposes behind every statute, whether 
stated or not, is to aid the target of its largesse"). 
Where a statute has both secular and religious purposes, a 
court applying the Lemon test initially must identify the pre-
. dominant purpose. In this case the record before us makes 
clear th t Alabama's purpose was solely religious in charac-
ter Sen or Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that lSe-
ame abama Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that 
the purpose of this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" 
to the public schools. See ante, at 18 n. 43. 4 I agree with 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR that the statement of a single le'gislator, 
particularly following enactmen , is not JWCessarily sufficient 
to establish purpose. But, as noted in ;J.ystpfcE STEVENSZ... 
opinion, there is other evidence of the real purpose of 
§ 16-1-20.1, including the sequence and history of the three 
Alabama statutes. I also consider important in this respect 
the tone of the District Court's opinion and its holding as 
• As the Court's opinion states, "the First Amendment requires that a 
statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to ad-
vance religion." Ante, at 17 (emphasis added). 
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announced on January 14, 1982. Jaffree v. James, --554F." 
Supp. 1130, 1132 (SD Ala. 1983). The District Court clearly ,""1-,A~f 
.,lieved that teacher-led vocal prayer in the public schools v rr---
, proper, Supreme Court decisions to the contrary not-
*anding. Jaffree v. Bd. of School Commisf%f1rs, 
--, -- (1983) (POWELL, J., in chambers) . 
.c1. different question would be presented if the statute also 
had a clear secular purpose. The Court is "reluctan[t] to 
attribute unconstitutional motives to the state, particularly 
when a plausible secular purpose may be discerned from the 
face of the statute." Mueller v. Allen,-- U. S. --,--
(1983). JUSTICE O'CONNOR's concurring opinion, as well as 
JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion for the Court, convincingly show 
that nothing in the record before us identifies a secular pur-
pose. ~s virtually conceded by the State that the purpose}v 
was o fUrther religion, and no secular purpose was identi- l 
fied. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that no such purpose was shownj 
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the 
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward 
"moment-of-silence" statute is unlikely to "advance[] or in- \ 
hibit[] religion." 5 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon 
6 If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would 
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of imma-
ture pupils. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a 
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is 
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers 
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). Given the 
types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned with, it is un-
likely that many children would use a simple "moment of silence" as a time 
for religious prayer. There are too many other subjects on the mind of the 
typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that some children, raised in 
strongly religious families, properly would use the moment to reflect on the 
religion of his or her choice. 
,, 
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v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Com-
missioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concuiTing. 
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala. 
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. My concuiTence ~ is prompted by Ala-
bama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored 
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive stat-
utes. 1 I agree fully with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that 
some moment-of-silence statu · utional, 2 a 
1 The three statutes arel A~ Code § 16-1-~oment of silent medita-
tion); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.Wffioment of silence for meditation or prayer); 
and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.~chers authorized to lead students in vocal 
prayer). These statutes were enacted over a span offour years. There is 
some question whether § 16-1-20 was repealed by implication. The Court 
already has summarily affinned the Court of Appeals' holding that 
§ 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree, - U. S. - (1984). Thus, 
our opinions today address only the validity of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3. 
2 JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence stat-
utes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal 
prayer: 
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different 
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. suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante, 
at 20. 
I write separately to express additional views and to 
respond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3 
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of 
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, 
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who par-
ticipates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or 
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts 
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not 
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court 
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member 
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment 
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374 
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of 
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve ''the solely secular pur-
poses of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious 
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separa-
tion between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law, § 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in 
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., 
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 MichL. 
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It i~;~ difficult to 
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thought-
ful schoolchildren." 
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). 
8 JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon 
should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in 
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the 
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
As I state in the text, the ~e fi• &Rg"ed' Lemon test has been applied 
consistently in Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972. 
In a word, it has been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us 
to follow Lemon. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., --
U. S. --, -- (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial 
decision, and with it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served 
by the precipitous overruling of multiple precedents .... "). The appel-
lants have not directly argued that the test should be discarded. More-
over, a majority of the Court today in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 
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·Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies stand-
ards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both 
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only 
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only 
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed 
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its three-
pronged test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 
(1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test 
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage 
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases 
on an ad hoc basis. 5 
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged 
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, supra, at 612 (1971). As JUSTICE O'CONNOR recog-
nizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere;" a law will not 
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated 
by the legislature,~ met'ly a "sham.'' Post, at 9 (O'CoN-
NOR, J. , concurrin . n Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 
- U. S. ~ (1985), and A~ilar v. Felton,- U. S.- (1985), ex-
pressly follo~Lemon and app 1 s test. 
'In Marsh v. Chambers, 4 U. S. 783 (1983), we held that the Ne-
braska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer 
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical accept-
ance of the practice, that had become "part of the fabric of our society." 
Id. , at-. 
5 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), :Was a carefully considered 
opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was joined by six other Justices. 
Lemon's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of 
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court 
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon. I d., at - . 
In Lynch v. Donnelley,- U. S.- (1984), we said that the Court is 
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." Id. , at 
- . The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including 
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the 
Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to 
the facts of that case. 
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. (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a statute 
requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public 
schools violated the Establishment Clause, even though the 
Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was educational. 
We have not interpreted the first prong of Lemon, supra, 
however, as requiring that a statute have "exclusively secu-
lar" objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelley, --U.S.--,--
n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much conduct and legis-
lation approved by this Court in the past would have been 
invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 
(1970) (New York's property tax exemption for religious 
organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330 
U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may reimburse par-
ents for the cost of transporting their children to parochial 
schools); post, at 18 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("one of the 
purposes behind every statute, whether stated or not, is to 
aid the target of its largesse"). 
The record before us, however, makes clear that Ala-
bama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator 
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama 
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of 
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public 
schools. See ante, at 1~n. 43. I agree with JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if 
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to es-
tablish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., copcurring 
in the judgment). But, as noted in t}\e Court's opinion, the 
religious purpose of § 16-1-20.1 is manifested in other evi-
dence, including the sequence and history of the three Ala-
bama statutes. See ante, at 19. 
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the Dis-
trict Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose, 
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion. 
6 As the Court's opinion states, "the First Amendment requires that a 
statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to ad-
vance religion." Ante, at 17 (emphasis added). 
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· In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1 
pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that 
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose." 
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). In-
stead, the District Court found that the enactment of the 
statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to 
encourage a religious activity." 7 ld. The Court of Appeals 
likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of secular 
purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature." Jaffree v. 
Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CA111983). It held that the A 
objective of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement of religion." LJbi,; .J 
~When both courts below are unable to discern an argu-
ably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesi-
tate to find one. 
Despite the legislative 'Ristery a:ael tee finelings of the leweP Q 
eems as to r9lig:ior~poiep I would vote to uphold the 
Alabama statute if ttjhad a clear secular purpose. See o-1..., _. 
Mueller v. Allen,-- U.S.--,-- (1983) (the Court is 
"reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the 
state, particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be 
discerned from the face of the statute"). Nothing in the 
record before us, however, identifies a clear secular purpose, 
and the State also has failed to identify any non-religious 
reason for the statute's enactment.8 Under these circum-
7 In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that 
prayer in the public schools-even if led by the teacher-did not violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court recog-
nized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 
,, 
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless L . -- - / 
ruled that its decisi n was justified because "the United States Supreme (' "' :\ 
Court has err . J ... {~ri!.Cl " · ~ - of )c.J,...J c_...,..s I sn· F:')..,, . uo'i ;). v . AI .. . ,.,u,. 
In my capacit as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District 
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 
Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs,- U.S.- (1983) (POWELL, J., in 
chambers). 
8 Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that "the prin-
cipal problem [with the test] stems from the purpose prong." See Brief of 
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· stances, the Court is required by our precedents to hold that 
the statute fails the first prong of the Lemon test and there-
fore violates the Establishment Clause. 
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the 
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward 
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advancM or in-
hibi#EJ-] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Com-
missioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970). 
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court. 
Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9( et seq. 
9 If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would 
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of imma-
ture pupils. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a 
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is 
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers 
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily con-
cerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment 
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other sub-
jects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that 
some children, raised in strongly religious families, properly would use the 
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice. 
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83-929 ~ 
ISHMAEL JAFFREE ET AL. 
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[May -, 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala. 
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. My concurrence ~ is prompted by Ala-
bama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored 
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive stat-
utes. 1 I agree fully with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that 
some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a 
'The three statutes are: Ala. Code § 16-1-20 (moment of silent medita-
tion); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (moment of silence for meditation or prayer); 
and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (teachers authorized to lead students in vocal 
prayer). These statutes were enacted over a span of four years. There is 
some question whether § 16-1-20 was repealed by implication. The Court 
already has summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding that 
§ 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree,- U. S.- (1984). Thus, 
our opinions today address only the validity of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3. 
2 JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence stat-
utes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal 
prayer: 
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different 
•. f. 
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. suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante, 
at 20. 
I write separately to express additional views and to 
respond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3 
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of 
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, 
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who par-
ticipates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or 
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts 
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not 
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court 
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member 
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment 
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374 
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of 
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular pur-
poses of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious 
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separa-
tion between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law,§ 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in 
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47. Minn. L. Rev. , 
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 Mich L. 
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to 
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thought-
ful schoolchildren." 
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). 
8 JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon 
should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in 
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the 
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
As I state in the text, the three-pronged Lemon test has been applied 
consistently in Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972. 
In a word, it has been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us 
to follow Lemon. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., --
U. S. --, -- (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial 
decision, and with it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served 
by the precipitous overruling of multiple precedents .... "). The appel-
lants have not directly argued that the test should be discarded. More-
over, a majority of the Court today in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 
83-812 & 83-929-CONCUR 
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· Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies stand-
ards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both 
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only 
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only 
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed 
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its three-
pronged test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 
(1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test 
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage 
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases 
on an ad hoc basis. 5 
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged 
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, supra, at 612 (1971). As JUSTICE O'CONNOR recog-
nizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere;" a law will not 
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated 
by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 9 (O'CoN- .....) 
NOR, J., concurr~ In Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 \ i"' iL. j~ ' 
- U. S.- (1985), and Aguilar v. Felton,- U. S.- (1985), ex-
pressly follow Lerrwn and apply its test. 
• In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), we held that the Ne-
braska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer 
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical accept-
ance of the practice, that had become "part of the fabric of our society." 
!d., at-. 
5 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), :.Was a carefully considered 
opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was joined by six other Justices. 
Lerrwn's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of 
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court 
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon. I d., at -. 
In Lynch v. Donnelley,- U. S. - (1984), we said that the Court is 
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." Id., at 
-. The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including 
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the 
Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to 
the facts of that case. 
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. (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a statute 
requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public 
schools violated the Establishment Clause, even though the 
Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was educational. 
We have not interpreted the first prong of Lemon, supra, 
however, as requiring that a statute have "exclusively secu-
lar" objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelley, --U.S.--,--
n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much conduct and legis-
lation approved by this Court in the pa:st would have been 
invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 
(1970) (New York's property tax exemption for religious 
organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330 
U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may reimburse par-
ents for the cost of transporting their children to parochial 
schools); post, at 18 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("one of the 
purposes behind every statute, whether stated or not, is to 
aid the target of its largesse"). 
The record before us, however, makes clear that Ala-
bama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator 
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama 
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of 
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public 
schools. See ante, at 18 n. 43. I agree with JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if 
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to es-
tablish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., cop.curring 
in the judgment). But, as noted in t}\e Court's opinion, the 
religious purpose of§ 16-1-20.1 is manifested in other evi-
dence, including the sequence and history of the three Ala-
bama statutes. See ante, at 19. 
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the Dis-
trict Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose, 
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion. 
6 As the Court's opinion states, "the First Amendment 'requires that a 
statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to ad-
vance religion." Ante, at 17 (emphasis added). 
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· In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1 
pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that 
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose." 
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). In-
stead, the District Court found that the enactment of the 
statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to 
encourage a religious activity." 7 Id. The Court of Appeals 
likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of secular 
purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature." Jaffree v. 
Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CA111983). It held that the 
objective of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement of religion." , 
I d. When both courts below are unable to discern an argu-
ably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesi-
tate to find one 
esp1 e the legislative history and the findings of the lower 
ourts as to reli · ous pur ose wou d up o t e 
Alabama s atute i i~:a a clear secular purpose. See 
Mueller v. Allen, --- U. S. --, -- (1983) (the Court is 
"reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the 
state, particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be 
discerned from the face of the statute"). Nothing in the 
record before us, however, identifies a clear secular purpose, 
and the State also has failed to identify any non-religious 
reason for the statute's enactment.8 Under these circum-
7 In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that 
prayer in the public schools-even if led by the teacher-did not violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court recog-
nized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless 
ruled that its decision was justified because "the United States Supreme 
Court has erred." 
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District 
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 
Jaffree v. Bd. of Sclwol Comm'rs,- U. S.- (1983) (POWELL, J. , in 
chambers). 
8 Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that "the prin-
cipal problem [with the test] stems from the purpose prong." See Brief of 
83-812 & 83-929-CONCUR 
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· stances, the Court is required by our precedents to hold that 
the statute fails the first prong of the Lemon test and there-
fore violates the Establishment Clause. 
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the 
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward 
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advance[] or in-
hibit[] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.' " Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Com-
missioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970). 
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court. 
Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9, et seq. 
9 If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would 
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of imma-
ture pupils. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a 
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is 
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers 
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily con-
cerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment 
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other sub-
jects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that 
some children, raised in strongly religious families, properly would use the 
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala. 
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. My concurrence, is prompted by Ala-
bama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored 
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive stat-
utes. 1 I agree fully with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that 
some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a 
1 The three statutes are Ala. Code § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) (moment of 
silent meditation); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) (moment of silence 
for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984) (teachers 
authorized to lead students in vocal prayer). These statutes were enacted 
over a span of four years. There is some question whether § 16-1-20 was 
repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily affirmed the 
Court of Appeals' holding that§ 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree, 
- U. S. - (1984). Thus, our opinions today address only the validity 
of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3. 
2 JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence stat-
utes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal 
prayer: 
83-812 & 83-9~CONCUR 
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suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante, 
at 20. 
I write separately to express additional views and to 
respond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3 
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different 
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of 
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, 
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who par-
ticipates in a moment of silence need not compromis!'! his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or 
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts 
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not 
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court 
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member 
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment 
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374 
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of 
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular pur-
poses of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious 
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separa-
tion between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law,§ 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in 
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., 
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 Mich L. 
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to 
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thought-
ful schoolchildren." 
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). 
8 JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon 
should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in 
achieving the underlying purpose of the First ~endment." Post, at 2-3 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the 
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
As I state in the text, the Lemon test has been applied consistently in 
Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972. In a word, it has 
been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us to follow Lemon. 
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., --U.S.--,--
(1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial decision, and with 
it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous 
overruling of multiple precedents .... "). The appellants have not di-
rectly argued that the test should be discarded. Moreover, a majority of 
83-812 & 83-929-CONCUR 
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Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies stand-
ards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both 
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only 
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only 
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed 
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its three-
pronged test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 
(1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test 
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage 
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases 
on an ad hoc basis. 5 
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged 
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtz- Q 
man, supra, at 612 (1971). As JusTICE O'CONNOR recog-
nizes, this secular purpose must be "sincerf,\1 a law will not ..\--( 
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated 
by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 9 (O'CON-
NOR, J., concurring in the judgment). In Stone v. Graham, 
the Court today in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, - U. S. -
(1985), and Aguilar v. Felton, - U. S. - (1985), expressly follows 
Lerrwn and applies its test. 
• In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), we held that the Ne-
braska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer 
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical accept-
ance of the practice, that had become "part of the fabric of our society." 
Id., at-. 
5 Lerrwn v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972),, was a carefully considered 
opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was joined by six other Justices. 
Lerrwn's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of 
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court 
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lerrwn. I d., at -. 
In Lynch v. Donnelley,- U.S.- (1984), we said that the Court is 
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." I d., at 
-. The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including 
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the 
the facts of that case. H foc.u.~ ...,. .fk "t~~· ....... w~ ...._., i) ... 
Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to ) 
~"' f""t 0 .k .h.r [~c.] L·spfl o! h... c.r~c.~ · '' f.J.. J -:1 _ . 
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449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a 
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in 
public schools violated the Establishment Clause, even 
though the Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was 
educational. We have not interpreted the first prong of 
Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a statute have 
"exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelley, --
U. S. --, -- n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much 
conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past 
would have been invalidated. See, e.g:, Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (New York's property tax ex-
emption for religious organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of 
Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may 
reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children 
to parochial schools~~88~, at 18 (ft:EHNQOISI, J., disseft\iRg) • -f 
.("eRe of the ptw~eses behind evel.'y s~eiitte, n nether statee • 
or not , ilil to a,ig t.A& ta~et of its largesse").9-
The record before us, however, makes clear that Ala-
bama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator 
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama 
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of 
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public 
schools. See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if 
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to es-
tablish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring 
in the judgment). But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the 
religious purpose of § 16-1-20.1 is m_anifested in other evi-
dence, including the sequence and history of the three Ala-
bama statutes. See ante, at 19. 
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the Dis-
trict Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose, 
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion. 
1 As the Court's opinion states, "the First Amendment requires that a 
statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to ad-
vance religion." Ante, at 17 (emphasis added). 
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In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1 
pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that 
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose." b-j 
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). In- /{' 1 · 
stead, the District Court found that the enactment of ~t.----
statute was an "effort on the part o .the State of Alabama to -;:-
encourage a religious activity." 7 . I . e Court of Appeals ./ 
likewise applied the Lemon test found "a lack of secular 
purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature." J affree v. 
Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CA111983). · It held that the 
objective Of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement of religion." 
Ibid. When both courts below are unable to discern an argu-
ably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesi-
tate to find one. 
I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a 
clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, -- U. S. 
--, -- (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute un-
constitutional motives to the state, particularly when a plau-
sible secular purpose may be discerned from the face of the 
statute"). Nothing in the record before us, however, identi-
fies a clear secular purpose, and the State also has failed to 
identify any non-religious reason for the statute's enact-
ment.8 Under these circumstances, the Court is required 
7 In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that 
prayer in the public schools~ven if led by the teacher-did not violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court recog-
nized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless 
ruled that its decision was justified because uthe United States Supreme 
Court has erred .... " Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 
1104 (S. D. Ala. 1983). 
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District 
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 
Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs,- U. S.- (1983) (POWELL, J., in 
chambers). 
8 Instead, the State criticizes the Lerrwn test and asserts that ''the prin-
cipal problem [with the test] stems from the purposeS " See Brief of 
Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9 et seq. ~(oM~ 
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by our precedents to hold that the statute fails the first prong 
of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishment 
Clause. 
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the 
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward 
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advanc[e] or in-
hibi[t] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Com-
missioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970). 
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court. 
9 If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would 
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of imma-
ture pupils. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a 
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is 
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers 
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily con-
cerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment 
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other sub-
jects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that 
some children, raised in strongly religious families, properly would use the 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala. 
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. My concurrence is prompted· by Ala-
bama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored 
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive stat-
utes. 1 I agree fully with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that 
some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a 
1 The three statutes are Ala. Code § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) (moment of 
silent meditation); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) (moment of silence 
for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984) (teachers 
authorized to lead students in vocal prayer). These statutes were enacted 
over a span of four years. There is some question whether § 16-1-20 was 
repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily affinned the 
Court of Appeals' holding that§ 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree, 
- U. S. - (1984). Thus, our opinions today address only the validity 
of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3. 
2 JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence stat-
utes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal 
prayer: 
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suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante, 
at 20. 
I write separately to express additional views and to 
respond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3 
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different 
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of 
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, 
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who par-
ticipates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or 
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts 
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not 
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court 
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member 
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment 
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374 
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of 
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve ''the solely secular pur-
poses of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious 
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separa-
tion between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law, § 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in 
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., 
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 MichL. 
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to 
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thought-
ful schoolchildren." 
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). 
3 JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon 
should be reexamined and refined in order to make them mo~e useful in 
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the 
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
As I state in the text, the Lemon test has been applied consistently in 
Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972. In a word, it has 
been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us to follow Lemon. 
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., --U.S.--,--
(1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial decision, and with 
it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous 
overruling of multiple precedents .... "). The appellants have not di-
rectly argued that the test should be discarded. Moreover, a majority of 
83-812 & 83-929-CONCUR 
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Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies stand~ 
ards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both 
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only 
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only 
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed 
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its three-
pronged test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 
(1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test 
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it ~ould encourage 
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases 
on an ad hoc basis. 5 
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged 
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, supra, at 612 (1971). As JUSTICE O'CONNOR recog-
nizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere;" a law will not 
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated 
by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 9 (O'CoN-
NOR, J., concurring in the judgment). In Stone v. Graham, 
the Court today in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball,- U.S.-
(1985), and Aguilar v. Felton, - U. S. - (1985), expressly follows 
Lenum and applies its test. 
'In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), we held that the Ne-
braska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer 
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical accept-
ance of the practice, that had become ''part of the fabric of our society." 
Id., at-. 
5 Lenum v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), was a carefully considered 
opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was joined by six other Justices. 
Lemon's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of 
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court 
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lenum. I d., at -. 
In Lynch v. Donnelley,- U. S.- (1984), we said that the Court is 
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." Id., at 
--. The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including 
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the 
Court, without any criticism of Lenum, applied its three-pron~ . 
the facts of that case. .f 1-~~ ~ n {F - - -· - .... 
~~~~a.. ~4:ot•ld..V~ 
1-nt-[~J~~~ ~~":Jd~f- .. 
0 
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449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a 
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in 
public schools violated the Establishment Clause, even 
though the Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was 
educational. We have not interpreted the first prong of 
Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a statute have 
"exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelley, --
U.S.--,-- n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much 
conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past 
would have been invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (New York's property tax ex-
emption for religious organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of 
Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may 
reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children ~ .,'u~ 
to parochial schools); J>;st, at 18 (REHNQUIST, J., dissen~ ~ t--' 
("one of the purpos1~ehind every sta~tute whether stated 
or not, is to aid the target of its largesse"). 
The record before us, however, m s clear that Ala-
bama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator 
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama 
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of 
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public 
schools. See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with JusTICE 
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if 
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to es-
tablish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring 
in the judgment). But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the 
religious purpose of§ 16-1-20.1 is manifested in other evi-
dence, including the sequence and history of the three Ala-
bama statutes. See ante, at 19. 
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the Dis-
trict Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose, 
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion. 
8 As the Court's opinion states, ''the First Amendment requires that a 
statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to ad-
vance religion." Ante, at 17 (emphasis added). 
83-812 & 83-929-CONCUR 
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In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1 
pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that 
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose." 
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). In-
stead, the District Court found that the enactment of the 
statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to 
encourage a religious activity." 7 ld. The Court of Appeals 
likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of secular 
purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature." Jaffree v. 
Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CA111983). It held that the 
objective of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement of religion." 
Ibid. When both courts below are unable to discern an argu-
ably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesi-
tate to find one. 
I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a 
clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, -- U. S. 
--, -- (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute un-
constitutional motives to the state, particularly when a plau-
sible secular purpose may be discerned from the face of the 
statute"). Nothing in the record before us, however, identi-
fies a clear secular purpose, and the State also has failed to 
identify any non-religious reason for the statute's enact-
ment.8 Under these circumstances, the Court is required 
7 In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that 
prayer in the public schools-even if led by the teacher-did not violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court recog-
nized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless 
ruled that its decision was justified because "the United States Supreme 
Court has erred .... " Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 
1104 (S. D. Ala. 1983). 
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District 
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 
Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs,- U.S.- (1983) (POWELL, J., in 
chambers). 
8 Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that ''the prin-
cipal problem [with the test] stems from the purpose prong." See Brief of 
Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9 et seq. 
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by our precedents to hold that the statute fails the first prong 
of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishment 
Clause. 
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the 
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward 
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advanc[e] or in-
hibi[t] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Com-
missioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970). 
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court. 
~If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would 
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of imma-
ture pupils. As JusTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a 
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is 
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers 
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CoNNOR, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily con-
cerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment 
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other sub-
jects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that 
some children, raised in strongly religious families, properly would use the 
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala. 
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. My concurrence~ is prompted by Ala-
bama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored 
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive stat-
utes. 1 I agree fully with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that 
some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a 
1 The three statutes are Ala. Code § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) (moment of 
silent meditation); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) (moment of silence 
for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984) (teachers 
authorized to lead students in vocal prayer). These statutes were enacted 
over a span of fotir years. There is some question whether § 16-1-20 was 
repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily affirmed the 
Court of Appeals' holding that§ 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree, 
- U. S. - (1984). Thus, our opinions today address only the validity 
of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3. 
2 JuSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence stat-
utes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal 
prayer: 
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suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante, 
at 20. 
I write separately to express additional views and to re-
spond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3 
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different 
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of 
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, 
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who par-
ticipates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or 
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts 
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not 
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court 
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member 
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment 
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374 
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of 
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular pur-
poses of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious 
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separa-
tion between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law, § 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in 
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., 
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 Mich L. 
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to 
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thought-
ful schoolchildren." 
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). 
8 JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon 
should be reexamined and refined in order to :make them more useful in 
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the 
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
As I state in the text, the Lemon test has been applied consistently in 
Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972. In a word, it has 
been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us to follow Lemon. 
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., --U.S.--,--
(1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial decision, and with 
it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous 
overruling of multiple precedents .... "). The appellants have not di-
rectly argued that the test should be discarded. Moreover, a majority of 
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WALLACE v. JAFFREE 3 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies stand-
ards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both 
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only 
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only 
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed 
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its three-
pronged test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 
(1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test 
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage 
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases 
on an ad hoc basis. 5 
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged 
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, supra, at 612 (1971). As JUSTICE O'CONNOR recog-
nizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere"; a law will not 
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated 
by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 9 (O'CoN-
the Court today in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, - U. S. --
(1985), and Aguilar v. Felton, -- U. S. -- (1985), expressly follows 
Lemon and applies its test. 
'In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), we held that the Ne-
braska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer 
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical accept-
ance of the practice, that had become "part of the fabric of our society." 
Id., at--. 
5 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), was a carefully considered 
opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was joined by six other Justices. 
Lemon's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of 
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court 
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon. I d., at --. 
In Lynch v. Donnelley, -- U. S. -- (1984), we said that the Court is 
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." !d., at 
--. The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including 
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the 
Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to 
the facts of that c:;ase. It focused on the "question whether there is a secu-
lar purpose for [the] display of the creche." !d., at--. 
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NOR, J., concurring in the judgment). In Stone v. Graham, 
449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a 
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in 
public schools violated the Establishment Clause, even 
though the Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was 
educational. We have not interpreted the first prong of 
Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a statute have 
"exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v . .Donnelley, --
U. S. --, -- n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much 
conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past 
would have been invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (New York's property tax ex-
emption for religious organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of 
Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may 
reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children 
to parochial schools). 
The record before us, however, makes clear that Ala-
bama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator 
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama 
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of 
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public 
schools. See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if 
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to es-
tablish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring 
in the judgment). But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the 
religious purpose of§ 16-1-20.1 is manifested in other evi-
dence, including the sequence and history of the three Ala-
bama statutes. See ante, at 19. 
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the Dis-
trict Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose, 
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion. 
In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1 
8 As the Court's opinion states, ''the First Amendment requires that a 
statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to ad-
vance religion." Ante, at 17 (emphasis added). 
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pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that 
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose." 
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). In-
stead, the District Court found that the enactment of the 
statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to 
encourage a religious activity." 7 Ibid. The Court of Ap-
peals likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of 
secular purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature." 
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CAll 1983). It 
held that the objective of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement 
of religion." Ibid. When both courts below are unable to 
discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court nor-
mally should hesitate to find one. 
I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a 
clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, -- U. S. 
--, -- (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute un-
constitutional motives to the state, particularly when a plau-
sible secular purpose may be discerned from the face of the 
statute"). Nothing in the record before us, however, identi-
fies a clear secular purpose, and the State also has failed to 
identify any non-religious reason for the statute's enact-
ment.8 Under these circumstances, the Court is required 
by our precedents to hold that the statute fails the first prong 
7 In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that 
prayer in the public schools-even if led by the teacher-did not violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment._ The District Court recog-
nized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless 
ruled that its decision was justified because "the United States Supreme 
Court has erred .... " Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 
1104 (S. D. Ala. 1983). 
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District 
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 
Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs,- U.S.- (1983) (POWELL, J., in 
chambers). 
8 Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that "the prin-
cipal problem [with the test] stems from the purpose prong." See Brief of 
Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9 et seq. 
.. ' 
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of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishment 
Clause. 
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the 
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward 
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advanc[e] or in-
hibi[t] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.' " Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Com-
missioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970). 
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court. 
' 
9 1f it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would 
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of imma-
ture pupils. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a 
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is 
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers 
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily con-
cerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment 
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other sub-
jects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that 
some children, niised in strongly religious families, properly would use the 
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice . 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala. 
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. My concurrence; is prompted by Ala-
bama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored 
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive stat-
utes. 1 I agree fully with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that 
some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a 
1 The three statutes are Ala. Code § 16-1- 20 (Supp. 1984) (moment of 
silent meditation); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) (moment of silence 
for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984) (teachers 
authorized to lead students in vocal prayer). These statutes were enacted 
over a span of fotir years. There is some question whether § 16-1- 20 was 
repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily affirmed the 
Court of Appeals' holding that§ 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree, 
- U. S.- (1984). Thus, our opinions today address only the validity 
of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3. 
2 JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence stat-
utes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal 
prayer: 
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suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante, 
at 20. 
I write separately to express additional views and to re-
spond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3 
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different 
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of 
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, 
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who par-
ticipates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or 
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts 
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not 
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court 
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member 
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment 
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374 
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of 
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular pur-
poses of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious 
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separa-
tion between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law, § 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in 
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., 
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 MichL. 
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to 
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thought-
ful schoolchildren." 
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). 
3 JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon 
should be reexamined and refined in order to ~make them more useful in 
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3 
(O'CONNOR, J . , concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the 
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
As I state in the text, the Lemon test has been applied consistently in 
Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972. In a word, it has 
been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us to follow Lemon. 
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., --U.S.--,--
(1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial decision, and with 
it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous 
overruling of multiple precedents ... . "). The appellants have not di-
rectly argued that the test should be discarded. Moreover, a majority of 
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Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies stand-
ards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both 
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only 
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only 
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed 
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its three-
pronged test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 
(1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test 
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage 
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases 
on an ad hoc basis. 6 
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged 
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, supra, at 612 (1971). As JUSTICE O'CONNOR recog-
nizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere"; a law will not 
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated 
by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 9 (O'CoN-
the Court today in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, -- U. S. --
(1985), and Aguilar v. Felton, -- U. S. -- (1985), expressly follows 
Lemon and applies its test. 
•In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), we held that the Ne-
braska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer 
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical accept-
ance of the practice, that had become ''part of the fabric of our society." 
ld., at--. 
5 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), was a carefully considered 
opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was jvined by six other Justices. 
Lemon's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of 
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court 
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon. I d., at --. 
In Lynch v. Donnelley, -- U. S. -- (1984), we said that the Court is 
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." !d., at 
--. The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including 
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the 
Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to 
the facts of that ~ase. It focused on the "question whether there is a secu-
lar purpose for [the] display of the creche." !d., at--. 
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NOR, J., concurring in the judgment). In Stone v. Graham, 
449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a 
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in 
public schools violated the Establishment Clause, even 
though the Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was 
educational. We have not interpreted the first prong of 
Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a statute have 
"exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v . .Donnelley, --
U. S. --, -- n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much 
conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past 
would have been invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (New York's property tax ex-
emption for religious organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of 
Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may 
reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children 
to parochial schools). 
The record before us, however, makes clear that Ala-
bama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator 
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama 
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of 
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public 
schools. See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if 
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to es-
tablish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring 
in the judgment). But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the 
religious purpose of§ 16-1-20.1 is m'anifested in other evi-
dence, including the sequence and history of the three Ala-
bama statutes. See ante, at 19. 
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the Dis-
trict Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose, 
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion. 
In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1 
6 As the Court's opinion states, ''the First Amendment requires that a 
statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to ad-
vance religion." Ante, at 17 (emphasis added). 
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pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that 
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose." 
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). In-
stead, the District Court found that the enactment of the 
statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to 
encourage a religious activity." 7 Ibid. The Court of Ap-
peals likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of 
secular purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature." 
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CAll 1983). It 
held that the objective of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement 
of religion." Ibid. When both courts below are unable to 
discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court nor-
mally should hesitate to find one. 
I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a 
clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, -- U. S. 
--, -- (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute un-
constitutional motives to the state, particularly when a plau-
sible secular purpose may be discerned from the face of the 
statute"). Nothing in the record before us, however, identi-
fies a clear secular purpose, and the State also has failed to 
identify any non-religious reason for the statute's enact-
ment. 8 Under these circumstances, the Court is required 
by our precedents to hold that the statute fails the first prong 
7 In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that 
prayer in the public schools-even if led by the teacher -<lid not violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment._ The District Court recog-
nized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless 
ruled that its decision was justified because ''the United States Supreme 
Court has erred .... " Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 
1104 (S. D. Ala. 1983). 
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District 
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 
Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs,- U.S.- (1983) (POWELL, J., in 
chambers). 
8 Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that "the prin-
cipal problem [with the test] stems from the purpose prong." See Brief of 
Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9 et seq. 
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of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishment 
Clause. 
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the 
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward 
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advanc[e] or in-
hibi[t] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Com-
missioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970). 
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court. 
' 
'If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would 
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of imma-
ture pupils. As JusTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a 
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is 
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers 
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily con-
cerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment 
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other sub-
jects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that 
some children, r.Used in strongly religious families, properly would use the 
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice. 
lfp/ss 05/01/85 Rider A, p. 4 (Wallace) 
(Second Draft) 
WALLA4 SALLY-POW 
Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found 
a secular purpose. In its first opinion, in addresing 
both Senate Bill 8 and §16-1-20.0, the District Court said 
- c::1~ • ~-
/\ tha-t. si"ftee "these statutes do not reflect a clearly 
secular purpose. n~coRsider~ioA of th~ remaiAiA~ two 
(Lee: Cite to the 
decision; see 7ld of appendix). The Court of Appeals, 
citing Lemon, Nyquist, and Walz, applied the Lemon test. 
It found "a lack of secular legislative purpose on the 
part of the Alabama legislature." [cite] It is fair to 
say that the state of Alabama in effect concedes there is 
no evidence of a secular purpose. Rather, it criticizes 
, .. 
.. :~·,.:.~ ·-.. ' 
2. 
the Lemon three-part test, and states that "the principal 
problems [with the test] stems from the purpose prong". 
See brief of appellant, George c. Wallace, p. 9, et seq.* 
*The state, and the Solicitor General in the amicus curiae 
brief for the United States, argue that the statute should 
be sustained as an effort by the state "to accommodate the 
practice of religion". (Cite) This Court has not ~ 
sustained a statute on the "accommodation" theory where 
its principal purpose was the advancement of religion. As 
noted above, a statute that clearly has both a secular and 
religious purpose would present a different question from 
that before us. A court - in applying the Lemon test -
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83-812 and 83-929 Wallace Cases 
Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment. 
With reluctance, I concur in the judgment of the 
Court that Alabama Code 16-1-20.1 providing for a nmoment 
of meditation or prayerfl is contrary to the precedents of 
this Court. I agree in major part with Justice O'Connor's 
concurring opinion, and particularly with the extent to 
which she carefully distinguishes the Alabama Statute from 
the moment of silence statutes that have been adopted in a 
number of other states. See particularly Part lA of her 
opinion. Infra at 1 In the margin below, I quote a 
portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion with which I 
particularly agree. 
It takes a uniquely suspicious mind to believe that a 
minute of silence at the beginning of a school day, with 
1 n(Lee - at this point I would like to set forth in 
full in a footnote the paragraph that begins near the 
bottom of page 6 of O'Connor's opinion and goes all the 
way through to the end of that paragraph on page 7 • 
• . 2 . 
no leadership by the teacher or characterization of a 
religious purpose, would constitute any sort of threat to 
the purpose of the Establishment Clause. It is well to 
bear in mind that we are primarily concerned with the 
effect on the minds and feelings of the pupils. Given the 
types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned 
with, it is unlikely that many children - even if so 
encouraged by the teacher - will use the silent period as 
a time for religious prayer. There are too many other 
subjects on the mind of the typical child. For these 
reasons the intense feelings that .. moments of silence .. 
statutes have engendered seem misplaced. 
The opinions of other Justices in this case reflect 
dissatisfaction with the Lemon three part test. 2 
I am reluctant to downgrade Lemon. Our cases have 
emphasized that the test is flexible and not invariably 
applied strictly according to its terms. (Lee cite 
cases). Yet, Lemon does identify standards that have 
proved analytically useful in case after case both in our 
2Lee, cite the references to criticism by Stevens, 
Rehnquist and O'Connor. 
3. 
decisions and those of other courts. After all, it is the 
only coherent test a majority of the Court has ever 
adopted. If we should abandon Lemon, one may fear that 
the Court will be less consistent in its interpretation of 
the Establishment Clause than is evident from some of our 
prior decisions. 
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the purpose 
of the legislative enactment is to encourage support for a 
particular religion or for religion in general. Also, as 
our cases illustrate, there may be some combination of 
secular and general religious purposes. (Lee - cite cases 
if any) Thus, determination of the primary "purpose" 
often is unclear. In this case, however, we have a 
concession by the State of Alabama in the courts below 
that the purpose of the statute was to make prayer part of 
daily classroom activity, (Lee, SOC says this at the 
bottom of p. 12 but doesn't cite specifically - please do 
so). Moreover, the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals concluded that the legislative history made clear 
that the law's purpose was to encourage religious 
activity. (Lee: citations). I find it difficult to 
disagree with this view. 
, ... .. -:! 
4. 
Although I doubt that the actual effect of the 
Alabama Statute will comport with the Legislature's 
purpose, and there is little basis for the application of 
the "entanglement" prong of the Lemon test, I think we 
must accept the state's concession as to its sole purpose. 
Under 
this 
Lemon, at least in the absence of something more, 
is sufficient under our cases to invalidate the 
statute. (citations?) 
lfp/ss 04/29/85 Rider A, p. 6 (Wallace) 
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Where a statute has both secular and religious 
purposes, a court under the Lemon test initially must 
identify the predominant purpose. In this case the record 
before us makes clear that Alabama's purpose was religious 
in character. Senator Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the 
bill that became Alabama Code §16-1-20.1, freely 
acknowledged that the purpose of this amended statute was 
"to return voluntary prayer" to the public schools. See 
ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with Justice O'Connor that 
the statement of a single legislator, particularly 
following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient alone 
to establish purpose. As noted in Justice Stevens' 
opinion, there is other evidence of the real purpose of 
2. 
§16-1-20.1, including the sequence and history of the 
three Alabama statutes. I also consider important in this 
respect the tone of the District Court's opinion and its 
holding as announced on January 14, 1982. Jaffree v. 
James, 554 F.Supp. 1130, 1132 (S.D. Ala. 1983). In that 
decision the District Court in approving the sequence of 
the Alabama statutes on this subject clearly believed that 
even the conducting of prayers as a part of a school 
program was proper, Supreme Court decisions to the 
contrary. (Here, Lee, cite my Chambers opinion). 
A different question would be presented if the 
statute also had a secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, 
u.s. (1983). The Court is "reluctan[t] to 
attribute unconstitutional motives to the state, 
particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be 
) ,. 
u • .. 
3. 
discerned from the face of the statute". Justice 
O'Connor's concurring opinion, as well as Justice Stevens' 
opinion for the Court, convincingly show that nothing in 
the record before us identifies a secular purpose. It is 
virtually conceded that the purpose was to further 
religion, and no secular purpose was identified. The 
first prong of the Lemon test requires that a "statute 
must have a secular legislative purpose". Both the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that no 
such purpose was shown. 
lfp/ss 04/29/85 Rider A, p. 8 (Wallace) 
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Although we do not reach the other two prongs of 
the Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a 
straightforward "moment-of-silence" statute is unlikely to 
"advance[] or inhibit[] religion". See Board of Education 
v. Allen, 392 u.s. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a 
statute "foster 'an excessive government entangleme~t wit~ 
J ''-
----· .. _.1 
religion'.* Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 u.s. 664, 674 
(1970)". Lemon, at 612-613. 
*It is well to remember that if the "effect" prong of 
Lemon were before us, we would be concerned primarily with 
the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils. 
As Justice O'Connor noted, during "a moment of silence, a 
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be 
the purpose] is left to his or her own thoughts, and is 
not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of 
others". Post, at 7 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Given 
the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily 
concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would 
use a simple "moment of silence" as a time for religious 
2. 
prayer. There are too many other subjects on the mind of 
the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that 
some children, raised in strongly religious families, 
properly would use the moment to reflect on the religion 
of his or her choice. 
lfp/ss 04j29j85 Footnote A (Wallace) 
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As the Court's opinion states, "the First 
Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if 
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Where a statute has both secular and religious 
purposes, a court seeks to identify the predominant 
purpose, and if this is not reasonably clear we move to 
the other two components of the Lemon test. In this case 
- though the record is not without ambiguity - I think it 
clear that Alabama's purpose basically was religious in 
character. Justice Stevens relies on the testimony of 
Senator Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became 
Alabama Code §16-1-20.1, and correctly notes that the 
Senator conceded that the purpose of this amended statute 
was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public schools. 
See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with Justice O'Connor 
that the statement of a single legislator, particularly 
2. 
following enactment, would not be sufficient alone to 
establish purpose. As noted in Justice Stevens' plurality 
opinion, there is other evidence of the real purpose of 
the statute. I consider important in this respect the 
tone of the District Court's opinion and its holding as 
announced on January 14, 1982. Jaffree v. James, 554 
F.Supp. 1130, 1132 (S.D. Ala. 1983). In that decision the 
District Court in approving the sequence of the Alabama 
statutes on this subject clearly believed that even the 
conducting of prayers as a part of a school program was 
proper, Supreme Court decisions to the contrary. (Here, 
Lee, cite my Chambers opinion). 
,_ .... , 
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It is reasonably clear that the challenged 
statute comports with the other two prongs of the Lemon 
test. The "effect" on religion is likely to be de 
minimis. We are concerned primarily with the effect on 
the minds and feelings of the pupils. As Justice O'Connor 
noted, during "a moment of silence, a student who objects 
to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is left 
to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen 
to the prayers or thoughts of others". Post, at 7 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Given the types of subjects 
useful minds are primarily concerned with, it is unlikely 
that many children - even if so encouraged by the teacher 
- will use a silent period as a time for religious prayer. 
... 
.. 2 • 
There are too many other subjects on the mind of the 
typical child. For these reasons, the intense feelings as 
to the effects of "moments-of-silence" statutes have 
engendered seem misplaced. Nor is there any suggestions 
that this type of statute, requiring no affirmative 
implementation nor legislative appropriations, will foster 
"excessive government entangelement with religion". See 
Lemon, supra, at 615 (quoting Waltz v. Tax Commission, 397 
u.s. u.s. 664, 674 (1970). Nevertheless, under Lemon a 
statute that wholly fails one part of the three-prong test 
is invalid. Stone v. Graham, supra, at 40-41. As it is 
virtually conceded that the purpose of §16-1-20.1 was 
enacted solely to further religion, 1 concur in the 
judgment of the Court that the statute violates the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
lfp/ss 04/29/85 Footnote A (Wallace) 
WALA SALLY-POW 
As the Court's opinion states, "the First 
Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if 
it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance 
religion". a-J<~ ~f 11 ( ~ .c::A~,tj 
lfp/ss 04/29/85 Rider A, p. 1 (Wallace) 
WALl SALLY-POW 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment 
that Alabama Code §16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. I also agree particularly 
'?"<~ ~ 4-,J.~~ 
with Justice O'Connor's v-4:e-w£" that ·moment-of-silence 
statutes may be constitutional,! a view also expressed in 
the Court's opinion. Infra, at 20. I write separately to 
express additional views, and ~i~F~ to answer 
criticism of the three-prong Lemon test. 2 
lfp/ss 04/29/85 Rider A, p. 8 (Wallace) 
WAL8 SALLY-POW 
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of 
the Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a 
straightforward "moment-of-silence" statute is unlikely to 
"advance[] or inhibit[] religion". See Board of Education 
v. Allen, 392 u.s. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a 
statute "foster •an excessive government entanglement with 
religion'.* Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 u.s. 664, 674 
(1970)". Lemon, at 612-613. 
1 ... , ~~/'&I'" 
<ilJ  ~ ~A4•L~ 
lPf ~ ~-~---
*It is well to remember that if the "effect" prong of 
Lemon were before us, we would be concerned primarily with 
the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils. 
As Justice O'Connor noted, during "a moment of silence, a 
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be 
the purpose] is left to his or her own thoughts, and is 
not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of 
others". Post, at 7 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Given 
the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily 
concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would 
use a simple "moment of silence" as a time for religious 
2. 
prayer. There are too many other subjects on the mind of 
the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that 
some children, raised in strongly religious families, 
properly would use the moment to reflect on the religion 
of his or her choice. 
lfp/ss 04/29/85 Rider A, p. 6 (Wallace) 
WALL6 SALLY-POW 
Where a statute has both secular and religious 
purposes, a court under the Lemon test initially must 
identify the predominant purpose. In this case the record 
~ 
before us makes clear that Alabama's purpose was religious 
A 
in character. Senator Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the 
bill that became Alabama Code §16-1-20.1, freely 
acknowledged that the purpose of this amended statute was 
nto return voluntary prayeru to the public schools. See 
ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with Justice O'Connor that 
the statement of a single legislator, particularly 
following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient ~ 
13e...f, 
to establish purpose. A~ noted in Justice Stevens' 
opinion, there is other evidence of the real purpose of 
2. 
§16-1-20.1, including the sequence and history of the 
three Alabama statutes. I also consider important in this 
respect the tone of the District Court's opinion and its 
holding as announced on January 14, 1982. Jaffree v. 
James, 554 F.Supp. 1130, 1132 (S.D. Ala. 1983). In that 
decision the District Court in approving the sequence of 
the Alabama statutes on this subject clearly believed that 
even the conducting of prayers as a part of a school 
program was proper, Supreme Court decisions to the 
contrary. (Here, Lee, cite my Chambers opinion). 
A different question would be presented if the 
statute also had a secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, 
u.s. (1983). The Court is "reluctan[t] to 
attribute unconstitutional motives to the state, 
particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be 
.. , .. 
3. 
discerned from the face of the statute". Justice 
O'Connor's concurring opinion, as well as Justice Stevens' 
opinion for the Court, convincingly show that nothing in 
the record before us identifies a secular purpose. It is 
virtually conceded that the purpose was to further 
religion, and no secular purpose was identified. 
first prong of the Lemon test requires that a "statut 
District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that no 
such purpose was shown. 
,, ' 
;. 
lfp/ss 04/29/85 Rider A, p. 3 (Wallace) 
WALL3 SALLY-POW 
s 
Our cases have emphasized that the te1t is 
flexible and not invariably applied strictly according to 
its terms. It is not unusual for a test to be expressed 
in language subject to interpretation when applied. Yet, 
Lemon does identify standards that have proved 
analytically useful in case after case both in our 
decisions and those of other courts. After all, it is the 
only coherent test a majority of the Court has ever 
adopted. ~~ly once since our decision in Lemon 
have we analyzed an Establishment Clause issue without 
~~--
resort to its three factors. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 
'\ 
3 u.s. 783 (1983). Abandonment or even continued criticism 
2. 
of Lemon will leave this and other courts free to decide 
Establishment Clause cases on an ad hoc basis. 
s~-~< ~~'1 
~';: 1+ q f'?t.-t) 





83-812 and 83-929, Wallace v. Jaffree and Smith v. Jaffree 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment 
that Alabama Code §16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. I also agree particularly 
with Justice O'Connor's reasons for stating that moment-
of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 1 a view also 
1JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-
silence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as 
those providing for vocal prayer: 
A state sponsored moment of silence in the 
public schools is different from state sponsored 
vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment 
of silence is not inherently religious. 
Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, need 
not be associated with a religious exercise. 
Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of 
silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who 
objects to prayer is left to his or her own 
thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the 
prayers or thoughts of others. For these simple 
reasons, a moment of silence statute does not 
Footnote continued on next page. 
2. 
AvJ.... 
expressed in the Court's opinion. lRi~a, at 20. I write 
separately to express additional views, and to answer 
criticism of the three-prong Lemon test. 2 
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause 
according to how the Court regards vocal prayer 
or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one 
member of this Court have recognized the 
distinction and suggested that a moment of 
silence in public schools would be 
constitutional. See Abington, 374 u.s., at 281 
(BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a 
moment of reverent silence at the opening of 
class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of 
the devotional activities without jeopardizing 
either the religious liberties of any members of 
the community or the proper degree of separation 
between the spheres of religion and 
government") ; L. Tribe, American Constitutional 
Law, §14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal 
Issue," in Religion in the Public Schools 23 
(1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., at 371; 
Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme 
Court, 61 Mich L. Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a 
general matter, I agree. It is difficult to 
discern a serious threat to religious liberty 
from a room of silent, thoughtful 
schoolchildren. 
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). 
2JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced 
in Lemon should be reexamined and refined in order to make 
them more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of 
the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3 (O'CONNOR, J., 
Footnote continued on next page. 
3. 
Our cases have e 
Yet, 
Lemon does identify standards that have proved 
analytically useful in case after case both in our 
decisions and those of other courts. After all, it is the 
only coherent test a majority of the Court has ever 
adopted. Only once since our decision in Lemon have we 
analyzed an Establishment Clause issue without resort to 
its three factors test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 
783 (1983) • 3 Abandonment or even continued criticism of 
concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the Lemon 
test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
31n Marsh v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 783 (1983), we held that , 
the Nebraska Legislature Is practice of opening eaczh day .r 
Footnote continued on next page. 
~ 
~~ 
9 (). ~t 
4. 
Lemon will leave this and other courts free to decide 
Establishment Clause cases on an ad hoc basis. 
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the 
challenged statute has a "secular legislative purpose." 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602, 612 (1971). As Justice 
O'Connor recognizes, this secular purpose must be 
"sincere;" a law will not pass constitutional muster if 
the secular purpose articulated by the legislature~ 
-\ 
"sham. n Post, at 9 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Stone 
with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State did not 
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
Our holding was based upon the historical acceptance of 
the practice, which had become "part of the fabric of 
society . " Tttenmih;h--€~~:-l-l~"lYirt"'Lt-n-et1"rE"~t--rti"""i~'O'an-t~-f.r~ll... 
perhaps best 
challenged practice 
threat" to the purposes 




v. Graham, 449 u.s. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, 
we held that a statute requiring the posting of the Ten 
Commandments in public schools violated the Establishment 
Clause, even though the Kentucky legislature asserted that 
its goal was educational. We have not interpreted the 
first prong of Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a 
statute have nexclusively secularn objectives. Lynch v. 
Donnelley, u.s. n.6. If such a requirement 
existed, much conduct and legislation approved by this 
Court in the past would have been invalidated. See, ~' 
~~"· \~ c_, ... , (t-J ... h f,.."t'-'~ ~~'-- ~ ~t/)'-' -tr-~'"' ."iL.JJ) 
EJJ-er son 11. Bd. of Edueat ion 1 3 3 0 U.S. 1 (19 4 7) (l'lold in<}-
7 
that a township may teimbur~e parents for the ces-t of 
transporting their chil~ren to parochial school~); post, 
at 18 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) (none of the purposes 
6. 
behind every statute, whether stated or not, is to aid the 
target of its largesse"). 
Where a statute has both secular and religious 
purposes, a court under the Lemon test initially must 
identify the predominant purpose. In this case the record 
before us makes clear that Alabama's purpose was solely 
religious in character. Senator Donald Holmes, the 
sponsor of the bill that became Alabama Code §16-1-20.1, 
freely acknowledged that the purpose of this \~~ 
statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public 
schools. 4 See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with Justice 
O'Connor that the statement of a single legislator, 
4As the Court's opinion states, 
requires that a statute must be 
-::e..:..:n:...;:t:...:i:...:r:..:e:;..:l=...Y.._-='m~o-=t:-=i'-'v-=a;:..:t:"-'e~d~ by a purpose 









particularly following enactment, is not necessarily 
sufficient to establish purpose. But, as noted in Justice 
Stevens' opinion, there is other evidence of the real 
purpose of §16-1-20.1, including the sequence and history 
of the three Alabama statutes. I also consider important 
in this respect the tone of the District Court's opinion 
and its holding as announced on January 14, 1982. Jaffree 
v. James, 554 F.Supp. 1130, 1132 (S.D. Ala. 1983). In 
that decision the District Court in approving the sequence 
) 
of the Alabama statutes on this subjec~clearly believed 
that even the conducting of prayers as a part of a school 
program was proper, Supreme Court decisions to the 
~~-VV'(..~""" ..L.. ... ~~ . 
contrary. (Here, Lee, cite my Chambers opinion). 
A 
A different question would be presented if the 
~ 




u.s. (1983}. The Court is "reluctan[t] to 
attribute unconstitutional motives to the state, 
particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be 
discerned from the face of the statute". Justice 
(\ 
O'Connor's concurring opinion, as well as Justice Stevens' 
opinion for the Court, convincingly show that nothing in 
the record before us identifies a secular purpose. It is 
virtually 
-4 &$'4b-
conceded that the purpose was to further 
I\ 
religion, and no secular purpose was identified. Both the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that no 
such purpose was shown. 
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of 
the Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a 
straightforward "moment-of-silence" statute is unlikely to 
"advance[] or inhibit[] religion". See Board of Education 
9. 
v. Allen, 392 u.s. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a 
statute .. foster 'an excessive government entanglement with 
1 • • 1 5 re 1g1on • Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 u.s. 664, 674 
(1970) ... Lemon, at 612-613. 
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court. 
5 rt is well to remember that if the .. effect .. prong of 
Lemon were before us, we would be concerned primarily with 
the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils. ~ 
As Justice O'Connor noted, during .. a moment of silenc , a 
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be 
the purpose] is left to his or her own thoughts, and is 
not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of 
others ... Post, at 7 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Given 
the types~ subjects youthful minds are primarily 
concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would 
use a simple .. moment of silence .. as a time for religious 
prayer. There are too many other subjects on the mind of 
the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that 
some children, raised in strongly religious families, 
properly would use the moment to reflect on the religion 
of his or her choice. 
lfp/ss 05/01/85 ,, 
WALLAl SALLY-POW 
Rider A, p. 1 (Wallace) 
( 
My concurrence is based on the unique Alabama 
effort - by the enactment of three successive statutes -
to preserve state-sponsored prayer in the public schools. 1 
1. There were three statutes: Alabama Code §§ 16-1-20 
(moment of silent meditation), 16-1-22.1 (meditation or 
voluntary prayer), and 16-1-20.1 (teachers authorized to 
lead in prayer). These statutes were enacted by the 
legislature of Alabama ovr a span of four years. There is 
a question whether §16-1-20 was repealed by implication, 
and the Court today unanimously invalidates § 16-1-20.2. 
Thus, our opinions address only §16-1-20.1. See ante at 
[Lee: Check the foregoing. My ante reference is 
to Justice Stevens' opinion in which he discusses the 
sequence of these statutes. I don't have his opinion 
before me.J 
" >\. 
lfp/ss 05/01/85 Rider A, p. 2 (Footnote 4) Wallace 
(Second Draft) 
WALLA2 SALLY-POW 
4. Lemon was a carefully considered opinion of 
the Chief Justice, joined by six other Justices. ~d 
ab~ 9 t has been repeatedly followed since its adoption 
in 1972. In Committee of Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 
u.s. 756, 772, five other Justices joined my opinion for 
the Court, and the Chief Justice concurred in Part II-A 
the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon. Although 
we found that the New York statute had a clearly "secular 
legislative purpose", we held that the statute had the 
"primarily effect" of advancing religion. In Lynch v. 
Donnelly, ____ u.s. ____ (1983), we said the Court is not 
2. 
"confined to any single test or criterion in this 
sensitive area". The decision in Lynch - like that in 
-
Marsh v. Chambers, supra /\ was based primarily on the long 
h . t . 1 1'-r-~~f . 1 d' 1' . b 1 . IS orica accQpeaAae o Inc u Ing re Igious sym o s In 
the celebration of Christmas. There was no criticism of 
the Lemon test. 
', 
.. 
lfp/ss 05/01/85 Rider A, p. 4 (Wallace) 
(Second Draft) 
WALLA4 SALLY-POW 
Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found 
a secular purpose. In its first opinion, in addresing 
both Senate Bill 8 and §16-1-20.0, the District Court said 
that since "these statutes do not reflect a clearly 
secular purpose, no consideration of the remaining two 
parts of the Lemon test is necessary". (Lee: Cite to the 
decision; see 7ld of appendix). The Court of Appeals, 
citing Lemon, Nyquist, and Walz, applied the Lemon test. 
It found "a lack of secular legislative purpose on the 
part of the Alabama legislature." [cite] It is fair to 
say that the state of Alabama in effect concedes there is 
no evidence of a secular purpose. Rather, it criticizes 
2. 
the Lemon three-part test, and states that nthe principal 
problems [with the test] stems from the purpose prongn. 
See brief of appellant, George c. Wallace, p. 9, et seq.* 
*The state, and the Solicitor General in the amicus curiae 
brief for the United States, argue that the statute should 
be sustained as an effort by the state nto accommodate the 
practice of religionn. (Cite) This Court has not yet 
sustained a statute on the naccommodationn theory where 
its principal purpose was the advancement of religion. As 
noted above, a statute that clearly has both a secular and 
religious purpose would present a different question from 
that before us. A court - in applying the Lemon test -
then would be required to identify the predominant 
purpose. 
. .. 
lfp/ss 05/01/85 Rider A, p. 3 (Wallace) 
(Second Draft) 
WALLA3 SALLY-POW 
In the first opinion of the District Court (injoining 
enforcement of §16-1-20.1 pending a hearing on the 
merits), it noted that the enactment of this statute "is 
an effort on the part of the state of Alabama to encourage 
a religious activity. Even though [it is] permissive in 
form, it is nevertheless state involvement respecting an 
establishment of religion". (Lee: Add cite.) The 
District Court applyied the Lemon test, stated that the 
statute does not "reflect a clearly secular purpose" and 
therefore "no consideration of the remaining two parts of 
the Lemon test is necessary". (Lee: Cite ------' p. 7ld 
and 72d of the appendix to the Jurisdictional Statement). 
2. 
ln the District Court's second opinion, following a 
hearing on the merits, it concluded from a review of the 
history of the Establishment Clause that the decisions of 
this Court have been in error, and declined to follow 
them.* The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
stated that "both statutes [including §16-1-20.1] advance 
and encourage religious activities", and also quoted from 
the District Court's first opinion. (Lee: See appendix p. 
17a.) 
Senator Donald Holmes, sponsor of the bill that 
became §16-1-20.1 freely acknowledged that the purpose of 
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the 
public schools. See, ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with 
Jutice O'Connor that the statement of a single legislator, 
particularly following enactment, is not sufficient to 
3. 
establish purpose. But here, we have not only this 
acknowledgment by the sponsor of §16-1-20.1; as noted, 
both of the courts below were in agreement as to the 
religious purpose. Nor was there any evidence supporting 
a secular purpose. 
*See my Chambers opinion in which I stayed the judgment of 
the District Court pending final disposition of the case, 
noting that the Court had ruled nthat the United States 
Supreme Court has erredn. (Lee: cite). 
lfp/ss 05/01/85 Rider A, p. 2 (Footnote 4) Wallace 
(Second Draft) 
WALLA2 SALLY-POW 
4. Lemon was a carefully considered opinion of 
the Chief Justice, joined by six other Justices. As noted 
above, it has been repeatedly followed since its adoption 
in 1972. In Committee of Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 
u.s. 756, 772, five other Justices joined my opinion for 
the Court, and the Chief Justice concurred in Part II-A 
thereof. In that part of the opinion, the Court followed 
the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon. Although 
we found that the New York statute had a clearly "secular 
legislative purpose", we held that the statute had the 
"primarily effect" of advancing religion. In Lynch v. 
Donnelly, u.s. (1983), we said the Court is not 
2. 
"confined to any single test or criterion in this 
sensitive area". The decision in Lynch - like that in 
Marsh v. Chambers, supra, was based primarily on the long 
historical acceptance of including religious symbols in 
the celebration of Christmas. There was no criticism of 
the Lemon test. 
.. 
lfp/ss 05/02/85 Rider X, Wallace 
WALLX SALLY-POW 
Possibly add a footnote as follows: 
The Court of Appeals that decided this case 
included two Florida judges and a Georgia judge. There 
are 12 active Circuit Court judges on the Court of 
Appeals, and the vote denying the Suggestion for Rehearing 
En Bane was 8 to 4. Judge Roney wrote a dissent joined by 
three other Circuit judges from states other than Alabama. 
Apparently the three members of that court from Alabama, 
Chief Judge Godbold, and Judges Henderson and Vance voted 
against rehearing en bane. I do not suggest that the 
foregoing is significant except one may assume that the 
2. 
three judges from Alabama had a greater familiarity with 
the history of this case and the statutes involved. 
' ' 
lfp/ss 05j03j85 Rider A, p. 3 (Wallace) 
(Third Draft) 
WALLA3 SALLY-POW 
In the first opinion of the District Court (injoining 
enforcement of §16-1-20.1 pending a hearing on the 
merits), it noted that the enactment of this statute "is 
an effort on the part of the state of Alabama to encourage 
a religious activity. Even though [it is] permissive in 
form, it is nevertheless state involvement respecting an 
establishment of religion". (Lee: Add cite.) The 
District Court applied the Lemon test, stated that the 
statute does not "reflect a clearly secular purpose" and 
therefore "no consideration of the remaining two parts of 
the Lemon test is necessary". (Lee: Cite ---, p. 7ld 
and 72d of the appendix to the Jurisdictional Statement). 
2. 
In the District Court's second opinion, following a 
hearing on the merits, it concluded from a review of the 
history of the Establishment Clause that the decisions of 
this Court have been in error, and declined to follow 
them.* The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
found that "both statutes [including §16-1-20.1] advance 
and encourage religious activities", and it also quoted 
from the District Court's first opinion. (Lee: See 
appendix p. 17a.) Although these findings may be mixed 
questions of fact and law, the Court normally would 
hesitate to disagree where both the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals have made these critical findings. 
I also note that Senator Donald Holmes, sponsor 
of the bill that became §16-1-20.1 freely acknowledged 
that the purpose of this statute was "to return voluntary 
3. 
prayer" to the public schools. See, ante, at 18, n. 43. 
I agree with Jutice O'Connor that the statement of a 
single legislator, particularly following enactment, is 
not sufficient to establish purpose. But here, we have 
not only this acknowledgment by the sponsor of §16-1-20.1: 
as noted, both of the courts below were in agreement as to 
the religious purpose. Nor was there any evidence 
supporting a secular purpose. 
*See my Chambers opinion in which I stayed the judgment of 
the District Court pending final disposition of the case, 
noting that the Court had ruled "that the United States 
Supreme Court has erred". (Lee: cite). 
lfp/ss 05/03/85 Rider X, Wallace 
(Second Draft) 
WALLX SALLY-POW 
Possibly add a footnote as follows: 
The Court of Appeals .that decided this case 
included two Florida judges and a Georgia judge. There 
are 12 active Circuit Court judges on the Court of 
Appeals, and the vote denying the Suggestion for Rehearing 
En Bane was 8 to 4. Judge Roney wrote a dissent 
emphasizing that the question was important and merited en 
bane consideration. He was joined by three Circuit judges 
from states other than Alabama. Apparently the three 
members of that court from Alabama, Chief Judge Godbold, 
and Judges ~nd Vance voted against rehearing en 
2. 
bane. I do not suggest that the foregoing is particularly 
significant except one may assume that the three judges 
from Alabama had a greater familiarity with the history of 
this case and the statutes involved. 
. . 
• < 
~·, .. ~ 
lfp/ss 05/03/85 ~ tllace) 
(Third Draft) 
WALLA3 SALLY-POW 
In the first opinion of the District Court (injoining 
enforcement of §16-1-20.1 pending a hearing on the 
merits), it noted that the enactment of this statute "is 
an effort on the part of the state of Alabama to encourage 
a religious activity. Even though [it is] permissive in 
form, it is nevertheless state involvement respecting an 
establishment of religion". (Lee: Add cite.) The 
District Court applied the Lemon test, stated that the 
statute does not "reflect a clearly secular purpose" and 
therefore "no consideration of the remaining two parts of 
the Lemon test is necessary". (Lee: Cite ---' p. 7ld 
and 72d of the appendix to the Jurisdictional Statement). 
2. 
In the District Court's second opinion, following a 
hearing on the merits, it concluded from a review of the 
history of the Establishment Clause that the decisions of 
this Court have been in error, and declined to follow 
them.• The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
found that "both statutes [including §16-1-20.1] advance 
and encourage religious activities", and it also quoted 
from the District Court's first opinion. (Lee: See 
appendix p. 17a.) Although these findings may be mixed 
questions of fact and law, the Court normally would 
hesitate to disagree where both the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals have made these critical findings. 
I also note that Senator Donald Holmes, sponsor 
of the bill that became §16-1-20.1 freely acknowledged 
that the purpose of this statute was "to return voluntary 
·~ 
3. 
prayer" to the public schools. See, ante, at 18, n. 43. 
I agree with Jutice O'Connor that the statement of a 
single legislator, particularly following enactment, is 
not sufficient to establish purpose. But here, we have 
not only this acknowledgment by the sponsor of §16-1-20.1; 
as noted, both of the courts below were in agreement as to 
the religious purpose. Nor was there any evidence 
supporting a secular purpose. 
*See my Chambers opinion in which I stayed the judgment of 
the District Court pending final disposition of the case, 
noting that the Court had ruled "that the United States 
Supreme Court has erred". (Lee: cite) . 
. ,
April 23, 1985 
PRAYER GI~ 
83-812 and 83-929 Wallace Cases 
Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment. 
With reluctance, I concur in the judgment of the 
Court that Alabama Code 16-1-20.1 providing for a "moment 
of meditation or prayer" is contrary to the precedents of 
this Court. I agree in major part with Justice O'Connor's 
concurring opinion, and particularly with the extent to 
which she carefully distinguishes the Alabama Statute from 
the moment of silence statutes that have been adopted in a 
number of other states. See particularly Part lA of her 
opinion. Infra at 1 In the margin below, I quote a 
portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion with which I 
particularly agree. 
It takes a uniquely suspicious mind to believe that a 
minute of silence at the beginning of a school day, with 
1 "(Lee - at this point I would like to set forth in 
full in a footnote the paragraph that beg ins near the 
bottom of page 6 of O'Connor's opinion and goes all the 
way through to the end of that paragraph on page 7 . 
2. 
no leadership by the teacher or characterization of a 
religious purpose, would constitute any sort of threat to 
the purpose of the Establishment Clause. It is well to 
bear in mind that we are primarily concerned with the 
effect on the minds and feelings of the pupils. Given the 
types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned 
with, it is unlikely that many children - even if so 
encouraged by the teacher - will use the silent period as 
a time for religious prayer. There are too many other 
subjects on the mind of the typical child. For these 
reasons the intense feelings that "moments of silence" 
statutes have engendered seem misplaced. 
The opinions of other Justices in this case reflect 
dissatisfaction with the Lemon three part test. 2 
I am reluctant to downgrade Lemon. Our cases have 
emphasized that the test is flexible and not invariably 
applied strictly according to its terms. (Lee cite 
cases) • Yet, Lemon does identify standards that have 
proved analytically useful in case after case both in our 
2Lee, cite the references to critic ism by Stevens, 
Rehnquist and O'Connor. 
3. 
decisions and those of other courts. After all, it is the 
only coherent test a majority of the Court has ever 
adopted. If we should abandon Lemon, one may fear that 
the Court will be less consistent in its interpretation of 
the Establishment Clause than is evident from some of our 
prior decisions. 
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the purpose 
of the legislative enactment is to encourage support for a 
particular religion or for religion in general. Also, as 
our cases illustrate, there may be some combination of 
secular and general religious purposes. (Lee- cite cases 
if any) Thus, determination of the primary "purpose" 
often is unclear. In this case, however, we have a 
concession by the State of Alabama in the courts below 
that the purpose of the statute was to make prayer part of 
daily classroom activity, (Lee, SOC says this at the 
bottom of p. 12 but doesn't cite specifically - please do 
so). Moreover, the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals concluded that the legislative history made clear 
that the law's purpose was to encourage religious 
activity. (Lee: citations). I find it difficult to 
disagree with this view. 
4. 
Although I doubt that the actual effect of the 
Alabama Statute will comport with the Legislature's 
purpose, and there is little basis for the application of 
the "entanglement" prong of the Lemon test, I think we 
must accept the state's concession as to its sole purpose. 
Under Lemon, at least in the absence of something more, 
this is sufficient under our cases to invalidate the 
statute. (citations?) 
• 
Nos. 83-812 and 83-929, Wallace v. Jaf free and Smith v. 
Jaffree 
~ 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
With r reluctance, I concur in 
judgment that Ala. Code §16-1-20.1 violates 
Establishment Clause of the First Ame~~gree 
..,.,_... --
;;;. ~ ~~~4)-r~.S,~~ 
much) of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, includi 
--cJ- her assessment that other moment-of-silence statutes ar 
not necessarily unconstitutional. 1 Nevertheless, I write 
1JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-
silence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as 
those providing for vocal prayer: 
A state sponsored moment of silence in the 
public schools is different from state sponsored 
vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment 
of silence is not inherently religious. 
Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, need 
not be associated with a religious exercise. 
Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of 
silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who 
objects to prayer is left to his or her own 
thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the 
prayers or thoughts of others. For these simple 
Footnote continued on next page. 
2. 
separately because I cannot join Justice o•connor•s~ 
modification of the three-prong Lemon test. See Lemon v. ( 
Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 (1971). (" 
L_ The opinions of other Justices 
reasons, a moment of silence statute does not 
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause 
according to how the Court regards vocal prayer 
or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one 
member of this Court have recognized the 
distinction and suggested that a moment of 
silence in public schools would be 
constitutional. See Abington, 374 u.s., at 281 
(BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a 
moment of reverent silence at the opening of 
class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of 
the devotional activities without jeopardizing 
either the religious liberties of any members of 
the community or the proper degree of separation 
between the spheres of religion and 
government"); L. Tribe, American Constitutional 
Law, §14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal 
Issue," in Religion in the Public Schools 23 
(1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., at 371; 
Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme 
Court, 61 Mich L. Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a 
general matter, I agree. It is difficult to 
discern a serious threat to religious liberty 
from a room of silent, thoughtful 
schoolchildren. 
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test has not always prQdnged 
1\ 
consistent results. Se post, at 20-21 (REHNQUIST, J., 
dissenting) . ( N~verthele I am reluctant to modify or 
abandon the Lemon ~~· 
~~~., 
 test identifies stantlards that have proven 
1\ 
useful in case after case. Only once since our decision 
in Lemon have we analyzed an Establishment Clause issue 
without resort to its three factors. See Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 u.s. 783 (1983) .3 
~ ~~ 4-.. 
~ fear that if we abandon 
1\ 
2JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced 
in Lemon should be reexamined and refined in order to make 
them more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of 
the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3 (O'CONNOR, J., 
concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the Lemon 
test entirely. ~, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
( 
3 In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 783 (1983), we held that 
the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day 
with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State did not 
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
Footnote continued on next page • 
~ i.,., I 1 -./s•f.. 
this ~~test, without a coherent substitute, th 
Court will be even less consistent with its interpretatio 
of Establishment Clause than it has been in the past. -
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the 
challenged statute has a "secular legislative purpose." 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602, 612 (1971). As Justice 
O'Connor recognizes, this secular purpose must be 
"sincere;" a law will not pass constitutional muster if 
the secular purpose articulated by the legislature is a 
"sham." Post, at 9 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Stone 
v. Graham, 449 u.s. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, 
Our holding was based upon the historical acceptance of 
the practice, which had become "part of the fabric of our 
society." The Marsh Court • s willingness to depart from 
the Lemon test is perhaps best explained by our 
observation that the challenged practice did not 
constitute a "real threat" to the purposes of the 
Establishment Clause. 
5. 
we held that a statute requiring the posting of the Ten 
Commandments in public schools violated the Establishment 
Clause, even though the Kentucky legislature asserted that 
its goal was educational. We have not interpreted the 
first prong of Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a 
statute have "exclusively secular" objectives. Lynch v. 
Donnelley, u.s. __ , n.6. If such a requirement 
existed, much conduct and legislation approved by this 
Court in the past would have been invalidated. See, ~, 
Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330 u.s. 1 (1947) (holding 
that a township may reimburse parents for the cost of 
transporting their children to parochial schools); post, 
at 18 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("one of the purposes 
behind every statute, whether stated or not, is to aid the 
target of its largesse"). 
6. 
~ Because a valid statute may have both secular and 
religious purposes, I find unpersuasive the plurality's 
discussion of the legislative history. State Senator 
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Ala. 
Code §16-1-20.1, apparently did have only a religious goal 
in mind when he introduced the challenged legislation. I 
1\ 
db not believe, however, that the statements of one 
legislator can support a holding that a statute lacks a 
secular purpose. Almost every statute with dual purposes 
is passed by a coalition of legislators whose reasons for 
supporting it vary widely. Some legislators may view such 
legislation as desirable for both religious and non-
religious reasons. Undoubtedly, however, many lawmakers 
supporting dual-purpose legislation will have either 
I 
solely sectarian or purely secular motives. I do not 
7. 
believe that a statute with an obvious secular purpose 
should be invalidated simply because one or more 
legislators expressed solely religious reasons for its 
passage. / 
Although I do not find the remarks of State 
~ 
hold 
that the statute at issue here does not have a clear 
secu ar purpose. 
/ 
The educational value of a moment of 
' silence is not obvious to 




is "reluctan[t] to 
to the state, 
particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be 





J- 4.~ ~ ~ ~ <; ~....._.__ :.,t~llliiiiiiii-liit;J~""\..;._::...._ 
havi reached the {egislative history, find nothing 
purpose. Finally, s far as I can 
I 
I 
tell from my examination of the reco d, nowhere in the 
course of this litigation have the respondents explained 
/ 
I 
what secular purpose the momentj of silence serves. Under 
' 
~--<. ~~
to disagree with 
J I) 
these circumstance , I the 
I 
Court of Appeals' conclysion that a secular purpose is 
I 
lacking. See 705 F.2d 1526, 1535 (CAll 1983). 
I doubt that the ch llenged statute will have the ~ 
"primary effect" of advancing r~igion. See Lemon, supra, 
at 612. Given the subjects of con ern to schoolchildren, 
it is unlikely that many students--eve if encouraged by a 
teacher--will use the silent period for yer. Moreover, 
it seems that there is little basis for arguing that §16-
1-20.1 would foster an "excessive government entanglement 
9. 
/ 
with relig'on." !d., at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 
/ --
397 u.s. 664, 674 (1970)). Never the less, under Lemon a 
statute must be n ld invalid if it fails just one part of 
the three-prong Stone v. Graham, supra, at 40-41. 
Therefore, because lacks a clear secular 
purpose, I concur in judgment that the statute 
violates th~ Establishment Cla se of the First Amendment. 
! 
lfp/ss 04/29/85 
83-812 and 83-929, Wallace v. Jaffree and Smith v. Jaffree 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
1 concur in the Court's opinion and judgment 
that Alabama Code §16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. 1 also agree particularly 
with Justice O'Connor's reasons for stating that moment-
of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 1 a view also 
1JUST!CE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-
silence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as 
those providing for vocal prayer: 
A state sponsored moment of silence in the 
public schools is different from state sponsored 
vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment 
of silence is not inherently religious. 
Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, need 
not be associated with a religious exercise. 
Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of 
silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who 
objects to prayer is left to his or her own 
thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the 
prayers or thoughts of others. For these simple 
reasons, a moment of silence statute does not 
Footnote continued on next page. 
2. 
expressed in the Court's opinion. Infra, at 20. I write 
separately to express additional views, and to answer 
criticism of the three-prong Lemon test. 2 
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause 
according to how the Court regards vocal prayer 
or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one 
member of this Court have recognized the 
distinction and suggested that a moment of 
silence in public schools would be 
constitutional. See Abington, 374 u.s., at 281 
(BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a 
moment of reverent silence at the opening of 
class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of 
the devotional activities without jeopardizing 
either the religious liberties of any members of 
the community or the proper degree of separation 
between the spheres of religion and 
government")~ L. Tribe, American Constitutional 
Law, Sl4-6, at 829 (1978) ~ P. Freund, "The Legal 
Issue," in Religion in the Public Schools 23 
(1965) ~ Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., at 371~ 
Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme 
Court, 61 Mich L. Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a 
general matter, I agree. It is difficult to 
discern a serious threat to religious liberty 
from a room of silent, thoughtful 
schoolchildren. 
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). 
2JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced 
in Lemon should be reexamined and refined in order to make 
them more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of 
the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3 (O'CONNOR, J., 
Footnote continued on next page. 
3. 
Our cases have emphasized that the test is 
flexible and not invariably applied strictly according to 
its terms. It is not unusual for a test to be expressed 
in language subject to interpretation when applied. Yet, 
Lemon does identify standards that have proved 
analytically useful in case after case both in our 
decisions and those of other courts. After all, it is the 
only coherent test a majority of the Court has ever 
adopted. Only once since our decision in Lemon have we 
analyzed an Establishment Clause issue without resort to 
its three factors test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 
783 (1983). 3 
concurring). 
test entirely. 
Abandonment or even continued criticism of 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the Lemon 
Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
3In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 783 (1983), we held that 
the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day 
Footnote continued on next page. 
4. 
Lemon will leave this and other courts free to decide 
Establishment Clause cases on an ad hoc basis. 
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the 
challenged statute has a "secular legislative purpose." 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602, 612 (1971). As Justice 
O'Connor recognizes, this secular purpose must be 
"sincere:" a law will not pass constitutional muster if 
the secular purpose articulated by the legislature is a 
"sham." Post, at 9 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Stone 
with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State did not 
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
Our holding was based upon the historical acceptance of 
the practice, which had become "part of the fabric of our 
society. • The Marsh Court's willingness to depart from 
the Lemon test is perhaps best explained by our 
observation that the challenged practice did not 
constitute a "real threat" to the purposes of the 
Establishment Clause. 
s. 
v. Graham, 449 u.s. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, 
we held that a statute requiring the posting of the Ten 
Commandments in public schools violated the Establishment 
Clause, even though the Kentucky legislature asserted that 
its goal was educational. We have not interpreted the 
first prong of Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a 
statute have "exclusively secular" objectives. Lynch v. 
Donnelley, u.s. , n.6. If such a requirement 
existed, much conduct and legislation approved by this 
Court in the past would have been invalidated. See, ~, 
Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330 u.s. 1 (1947) (holding 
that a township may reimburse parents for the cost of 
transporting their children to parochial schools); post, 
at 18 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("one of the purposes 
6. 
behind every statute, whether stated or not, is to aid the 
target of its largessew). 
Where a statute has both secular and religious 
purposes, a court under the Lemon test initially must 
identify the predominant purpose. ln this case the record 
before us makes clear that Alabama's purpose was solely 
religious in character. Senator Donald Holmes, the 
sponsor of the bill that became Alabama Code §16-1-20.1, 
freely acknowledged that the purpose of this amended 
statute was wto return voluntary prayerw to the public 
schools. 4 See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with Justice 
O'Connor that the statement of a single legislator, 
4As the Court's opinion states, 
requires that a statute must be 
..:e.:.:n:...::t:..:i:..:r:....:e:...:l:.Y'--...:m:o::;.t=i...;.v.=a...,::t:..::e=-d by a pur pose 





if it is 
religionw. 
7. 
particularly following enactment, is not necessarily 
sufficient to establish purpose. But, as noted in Justice 
Stevens' opinion, there is other evidence of the real 
purpose of §16-1-20.1, including the sequence and history 
of the three Alabama statutes. I also consider important 
in this respect the tone of the District Court's opinion 
and its holding as announced on January 14, 1982. Jaffree 
~James, 554 F.Supp. 1130, 1132 (S.D. Ala. 1983). In 
that decision the District Court in approving the sequence 
of the Alabama statutes on this subject clearly believed 
that even the conducting of prayers as a part of a school 
program was proper, Supreme Court decisions to the 
contrary,. (Here, Lee, cite my Chambers opinion). 
A different question would be presented if the 
statute also had a secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, 
8. 
__ u.s. __ , (1983). The Court is "reluctan[t] to 
attribute unconstitutional motives to the state, 
particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be 
discerned from the face of the statute". Justice 
O'Connor's concurring opinion, as well as Justice Stevens' 
opinion for the Court, convincingly show that nothing in 
the record before us identifies a secular purpose. It is 
virtually conceded that the purpose was to further 
religion, and no secular purpose was identified. Both the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that no 
such purpose was shown. 
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of 
the Lemon test, 1 note that the "effect" of a 
straightforward "moment-of-silence" statute is unlikely to 
"advance[] or inhibit[] religion". See Board of Education 
9. 
v. Allen, 392 u.s. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a 
statute "foster 'an excessive government entanglement with 
religion•. 5 Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 u.s. 664, 674 
(1970)". Lemon, at 612-613. 
1 join the opinion and judgment of the Court. 
5It is well to remember that if the "effect" prong of 
Lemon were before us, we would be concerned primarily with 
the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils. 
As Justice O'Connor noted, during "a moment of silence, a 
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be 
the purpose] is left to his or her own thoughts, and is 
not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of 
others". Post, at 7 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Given 
the types~ subjects youthful minds are primarily 
concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would 
use a simple "moment of silence" as a time for religious 
prayer. There are too many other subjects on the mind of 
the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that 
some children, raised in strongly religious families, 
properly would use the moment to reflect on the religion 
of his or her choice. 
fJ. 
lfp/ss 05j03j85 






83-812 and 83-929, Wallace v. Jaffree and Smith v. Jaffree 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court • s opinion and judgment 
that Ala. Code §16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. My concurrence is prompted 
by Alabama's persistence in attempting to institute state-
sponsored prayer in the public schools by enacting three 
successive statutes. 1 I agree fully with JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR's assertion that some moment-of-silence statutes 
1The three statutes are: Ala. Code §16-1-20 (moment of 
silent meditation); Ala. Code §16-1-20.1 (moment of 
silence for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code §16-1-
20.2 (teachers authorized to lead students in vocal 
prayer). These statutes were enacted over a span of four 
years. There is some question whether §16-1-20 was 
repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily 
affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding that §16-1-20.2 is 
invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree, U.S. (1984) [104 S.Ct. 
1704]. Thus, our opinions l address only the validity of 
§16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3. 
h-4' 
2. 
may be constitutional, 2 a suggestion set forth in the 
2JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-
silence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as 
those providing for vocal prayer: 
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the 
public schools is different from state sponsored 
vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment 
of silence is not inherently religious. 
Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, need 
not be associated with a religious exercise. 
Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of 
silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who 
objects to prayer is left to his or her own 
thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the 
prayers or thoughts of others. For these simple 
reasons, a moment of silence statute does not 
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause 
according to how the Court regards vocal prayer 
or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one 
member of this Court have recognized the 
distinction and suggested that a moment of 
silence in public schools would be 
constitutional. See Abington, 374 u.s., at 281 
(BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a 
moment of reverent silence at the opening of 
class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of 
the devotional activities without jeopardizing 
either the religious liberties of any members of 
the community or the proper degree of separation 
between the spheres of religion and 
government"): L. Tribe, American Constitutional 
Law, §14-6, at 829 (1978): P. Freund, "The Legal 
Issue," in Religion in the Public Schools 23 
(1965): Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., at 371: 
Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme 
Court, 61 Mich L. Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a 
general matter, I agree. It is difficult to 
Footnote continued on next page. 
3. 
Court's opinion as well. Ante, at 20. 
I write separately to express additional views 
and to respond to critic ism of the three-pronged Lemon 
test. 3 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 (1972)' 
identifies standards that have proven useful in analyzing 
case after case both in our decisions and in those of 
other courts. It is the only coherent test a majority of 
the Court has ever adopted. Only once since our decision 
in Lemon, supra, have we addressed an Establishment Clause 
discern a serious 




to religious liberty 
silent, thoughtful 
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). 
3JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced 
in Lemon should be reexamined and refined in order to make 
them more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of 
the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3 (O'CONNOR, J., 
concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the Lemon 
test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
4. 
( 
issue without resort to its three-pronged test. See Marsh 
v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 783 (1983). b~ndonment or even { 
:1 ' 
leave this 
courts free to decide Establishment Clause cases on an ad 
hoc basis. 5 
4 rn Marsh v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 783 (1983), we held that 
the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day's 
session with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State did 
not violate the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical 
acceptance of the practice, "-wJH.e.h had become "part of the 
fabric of our society." Id., at __ • 
5Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 (1972), was a carefully 
considered opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was 
joined by six other Justices. Lemon's three-pronged test 
has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of Public 
Education v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756 (1974), for example, 
the Court applied the "now well defined three part test" 
of Lemon. Id., at 
In Lynch v. Donnelley, u.s. (1984), we said that 
the Court is not "confined to any single test or criterion 
in this sensitive area." !d., at The decision in 
Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 783 
(1983), was based primarily on the long historical 
practice of including religious symbols in the celebration 
of Christmas. Nevertheless, the Court, without any 
criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to the 
facts of that case. 
' . 
5. 
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the 
challenged statute has a "secular legislative purpose." 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, ~~ 612 (1971). As Justice 
O'Connor recognizes, this secular purpose must be 
"sincere;" a law will not pass constitutional muster if 
the secular purpose articulated by the legislature is 
merely a "sham." Post, at 9 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
In Stone v. Graham, 449 u.s. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for 
example, we held that a statute requiring the posting of 
the Ten Commandments in public schools violated the 
Establishment Clause, even though the Kentucky legislature 
asserted that its goal was educational. .we have not 
interpreted the first prong of Lemon, supra, however, as 
requiring that a statute have "exclusively secular" 
objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelley, u.s. __ , n.6. If 
Footnote(s) 6 will appear on following pages. 
6. 
such a requirement existed, much conduct and legislation 
approved by this Court in the past would have been 
invalidated. See, ~, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 u.s. 664 
(1970) (New York's property tax exemption for religious 
organizations upheld); post, at 18 (REHNQUIST, J. , 
dissenting) ("one of the purposes behind every statute, 
whether stated or not, is to aid the target of its 
largesse") • 
The record before us, however, makes clear that 
Alabama's purpose was solely religious in character. 
Senator Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became 
Alabama Code §16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the 
6As the Court's opinion states, 
requires that a statute must be 
..:e:..:;n:...:t:..:i:..:r::...;e:;.;l=-y"---_m::==o-=t-=i:....:vc...::a=-t:..;e:..;d~ by a purpose 





if it is 
religion". 
7. 
purpose of this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" 
to the public schools. See ante, at 18 n. 43. I agree 
with JUSTICE O'CONNOR that a single legislator's 
statement, particularly if made following enactment, is 
not necessarily sufficient to establish purpose. See 
post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). 
But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the religious 
purpose of §16-1-20 .1 is manifested in other evidence, 
including the sequence and history of the three Alabama 
statutes. See ante, at 19. 
·; -
I also consider important that neither the 
District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular 
purpose 
~ ~ 
In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement 
of §16-1-20.1 pending a hearing on the merits), the 
District Court said that the statute did "not reflect a 
. . 
8. 
clearly secular purpose." Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 
7 2 7 , 7 3 2 ( S. D. Ala • 19 8 2) • Instead, the District Court 
found that the enactment of the statute was an "effort on 
the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious 
activity." 7 Id. The Court of Appeals likewise applied the 
Lemon test and found "a lack of secular purpose on the 
part of the Alabama legislature." Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 
F.2d 1526, 1535 (CAll 1983). It held that the objective 
of §16-1-20.1 was the "advancement of religion." Id. 
7 rn its subsequent decision on the merits, the District 
Court held that prayer in the public schools--even if led 
by the teacher--did not violate the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment. The District Court recognized 
that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 
370 u.s. 421 (1962), and other decisions of this Court. 
The District Court nevertheless ruled that its decision 
was justified because "th~ United States Supreme Court has 
erred." 
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the 
judgment of the District Court pending appeal to the Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Jaffree v. Bd. of 




~+-When the courts below are unable to discern an arguably 
'\ 
valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate 
to find one. 
Despite the legislative history and the findings 
~ L. 
of the lower courts, 
statute if it had a clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. 
Allen, u.s. (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to 
attribute unconstitutional motives to the state, 
particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be 
discerned from the face of the statute"). Nothing in the 
record before us, however, identifies a clear secular 
purpose, 
~ 
and the State has failed to identify any non-
1\ 
religious reason for the statute's enactrnent. 8 Under 
8Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and 
asserts that "the principal problem [with the test] sterns 
Footnote continued on next page. 
I 
these circumstances, the Court i 
I l 
10. 
statute fails the first prong of the Lemon test and 
therefore violates the Establishment Clause. 
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of 
the Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a 
straightforward moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to 
"advance[] or inhibit[] religion." 9 See Board of 
from the purpose prong." See Brief of Appellant George c. 
Wallace, p.9, et ~ 
9 If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of 
Lemon, we would be concerned primarily with the effect on 
the minds and feelings of immature pupils. As Justice 
O'Connor notes, during "a moment of silence a student who 
objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] 
is left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled 
to listen to the prayers or thoughts of others." Post, at 
7 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Given the 
types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned 
with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple 
"moment of silence" as a time for religious prayer. 
There are too many other subjects on the mind of the 
typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that some 
children, raised in strongly religious families, properly 
would use the moment to reflect on the religion of his or 
her choice. 
11. 
Education v. Allen, 392 u.s. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would 
such a statute "foster 'an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 
at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 u.s. 
664, 674 (1970). 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment 
that Ala. Code §16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. My concurrence is prompted 
by Alabama's persistence in attempting to institute state-
sponsored prayer in the public schools by enacting three 
successive statutes. 1 I agree fully with JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR's assertion that some moment-of-silence statutes 
1The three statutes are: Ala. Code §16-1-20 (moment of 
silent meditation); Ala. Code §16-1-20.1 (moment of 
silence for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code §16-1-
20.2 (teachers authorized to lead students in vocal 
prayer). These statutes were enacted over a span of four 
years. · There is some question whether §16-1-20 was 
repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily 
affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding that §16-1-20.2 is 
invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree, U.S. (1984) . Thus, 
our opinions today address only-the validity of §16-1-
20.1. See ante, at 3. 
2. 
may be constitutional, 2 a suggestion set forth in the 
2JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-
silence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as 
those providing for vocal prayer: 
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the 
public schools is different from state sponsored 
vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment 
of silence is not inherently religious. 
Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, need 
not be associated with a religious exercise. 
Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of 
silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who 
objects to prayer is left to his or her own 
thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the 
prayers or thoughts of others. For these simple 
reasons, a moment of silence statute does not 
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause 
according to how the Court regards vocal prayer 
or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one 
member of this Court have recognized the 
distinction and suggested that a moment of 
silence in public schools would be 
constitutional. See Abington, 374 u.s., at 281 
(BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a 
moment of reverent silence at the opening of 
class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of 
the devotional activities without jeopardizing 
either the religious liberties of any members of 
the community or the proper degree of separation 
between the spheres of religion and 
government"); L. Tribe, American Constitutional 
Law, §14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal 
Issue," in Religion in the Public Schools 23 
(1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., at 371; 
Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme 
Court, 61 Mich L. Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a 
general matter, I agree. It is difficult to 
Footnote continued on next page. 
3. 
Court's opinion as well. Ante, at 20. 
I write separately to express additional views 
and to respond to critic ism of the three-pronged Lemon 
test. 3 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 (1972), 
discern a serious threat to religious liberty 
from a room of silent, thoughtful 
schoolchildren." 
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). 
3JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced 
in Lemon should be reexamined and refined in order to make 
them more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of 
the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3 (O'CONNOR, J., 
concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the Lemon 
test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
As I state in the text, the three-pronged Lemon test 
has been applied consistently in Establishment Clause 
cases since it was adopted in 1972. In a word, it has 
been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us 
to follow Lemon~ ~v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., __ u.s. __ ,.~-- ( ll~HS!:>J A ("The stability of judicial 
decision, and with it respect for the au thor i ty of this 
Court, are not served by the precipitous overruling of 
multiple precedents •••• "). The appellants have not 
directly argued that the test should be discarded. 
Moreover, a majority of the Court today in Grand Rapids 
School Dist. v. Ball, u.s. (1985), and Aguilar v. 
Felton, __ u.s. ___ ---r.l98:nl, expressly follow Lemon and 
apply its test. 
'.¢('1; ·-.., 
4. 
identifies standards that have proven useful in analyzing 
case after case both in our decisions and in those of 
other courts. It is the only coherent test a majority of 
the Court has ever adopted. Only once since our decision 
in Lemon, supra, have we addressed an Establishment Clause 
issue without resort to its three-pronged test. See Marsh 
v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 783 (1983) • 4 Lemon, supra, has not 
been overruled or its test modified. Yet, continued 
criticism of it could encourage other courts to feel free 
to decide Establishment Clause cases on an ad hoc basis. 5 
4 rn Marsh v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 783 (1983), we held that 
the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day's 
session with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State did 
not violate the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical 
acceptance of the practice, that had become "part of the 
fabric of our society." Id., at 
5Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 (1972), was a carefully 
considered opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was 
joined by six other Justices. Lemon's three-pronged test 





The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the 
challenged statute has a "secular legislative purpose." 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612 (1971). As Justice 
O'Connor recognizes, this secular purpose must be 
"sincere;" a law will not pass constitutional muster if 
the secular purpose articulated by the legislature is 
merely a "sham." Post, at 9 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
In Stone v. Graham, 449 u.s. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for 
example, we held that a statute requiring the posting of 
has been repeatedly 
Education v. Nyquist, 
the Court applied the 
of Lemon. Id., at 
followed. In Comm. of Public 
413 u.s. 756 (1974), for example, 
"now well defined three part test" 
In Lync~. Don~ley, ___ u.s. ___ (1984), we said that 
the Court is not "confined to any single test or criterion 
in this sensitive area." Id., at The decision in 
Lynch, like that in Mars~. Cha~ers, 463 u.s. 783 
(1983), was based primarily on the long historical 
practice of including religious symbols in the celebration 
of Christmas. Nevertheless, the Court, without any 
criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to the 
facts of that case. 
6. 
the Ten Commandments in public schools violated the 
Establishment Clause, even though the Kentucky legislature 
asserted that its goal was educational. We have not 
interpreted the first prong of Lemon, supra, however, as 
requiring that a statute have nexclusively secularn 
objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelley, U.S. ___ , n.6. If 
such a requirement existed, much conduct and legislation 
approved by this Court in the past would have been 
invalidated. See, ~' Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 u.s. 664 
(1970) (New York's property tax exemption for religious 
organizations upheld) : Ever son v. Bd. of Education, 330 
u.s. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may reimburse 
6As the Court's opinion states, 
requires that a statute must be 
..::;;e;..:.;n:....:t:...:i:...:r::....;e"'"'l=-y.._
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if it is 
religionn. 
7. 
parents for the cost of transporting their children to 
parochial schools) : post, at 18 (REHNQUIST, J. , 
dissenting) ("one of the purposes behind every statute, 
whether stated or not, is to aid the target of its 
largesse"). 
The record before us, however, makes clear that 
Alabama's purpose was solely religious in character. 
Senator Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became 
Alabama Code §16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the 
purpose of this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" 
to the public schools. See ante, at 18 n. 43. I agree 
with JUSTICE O'CONNOR that a single legislator's 
statement, particularly if made following enactment, is 
not necessarily sufficient to establish purpose. See 
post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). 
8. 
-But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the religious 
purpose of §16-1-20 .1 is manifested in other evidence, 
including the sequence and history of the three Alabama 
statutes. See ante, at 19. 
I also consider it of critical importance that 
neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found 
a secular purpose, while both agreed that the purpose was 
to advance religion. In its first opinion (enjoining the 
enforcement of §16-1-20.1 pending a hearing on the 
merits), the District Court said that the statute did "not 
reflect a clearly secular purpose." Jaffree v. James, 544 
F.Supp. 727, 732 (S.D. Ala. 1982). Instead, the District 
Court found that the enactment of the statute was an 
"effort on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a 
religious activity." 7 Id. The Court of Appeals likewise 
Footnote(s) 7 will appear on following pages. 
9. 
applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of secular 
purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature." Jaffree 
v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1535 (CAll 1983). It held that 
the objective of §16-1-20.1 was the "advancement of 
religion." Id. When both courts below are unable to 
discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court 
normally should hesitate to find one. 
Despite the legislative history and the findings 
of the lower courts as to religious purpose, I would vote 
7 In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District 
Court held that prayer in the public schools--even if led 
by the teacher--did not violate the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment. The District Court recognized 
that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 
370 u.s. 421 (1962), and other decisions of this Court. 
The District Court nevertheless ruled that its decision 
was justified because "the United States Supreme Court has 
erred." 
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the 
judgment of the District Court pending appeal to the Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Jaffree v. Bd. of 
School Comm'rs, __ u.s. (1983) (POWELL, J., in 
chambers). 
10. 
to uphold the Alabama statute if it had a clear secular 
purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, u.s. , (1983) (the 
Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional 
motives to the state, particularly when a plausible 
secular purpose may be discerned from the face of the 
statute"). Nothing in the record before us, however, 
identifies a clear secular purpose, and the State also has 
failed to identify any non-religious reason for the 
statute's enactment. 8 Under these circumstances, the 
Court is required by our precedents to hold that the 
statute fails the first prong of the Lemon test and 
therefore violates the Establishment Clause. 
8 rnstead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and 
asserts that "the principal problem [with the test] stems 
from the purpose prong." See Brief of Appellant George c. 




Although we do not reach the other two prongs of 
the Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a 
straightforward moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to 
"advance[] or inhibit[] religion." 9 See Board of 
Education v. Allen, 392 u.s. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would 
such a statute "foster 'an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 
at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 u.s. 
9 If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of 
Lemon, we would be concerned primarily with the effect on 
the minds and feelings of immature pupils. As Justice 
O'Connor notes, during "a moment of silence a student who 
objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] 
is left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled 
to listen to the prayers or thoughts of others." Post, at 
7 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Given the 
types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned 
with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple 
"moment of silence" as a time for religious prayer. 
There are too many other subjects on the mind of the 
typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that some 
children, raised in strongly religious families, properly 
would use the moment to reflect on the religion of his or 
her choice. 
12. 
664, 674 (1970). 
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 83-812 AND 83-929 
GEORGE C. WALLACE, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE 
OF ALABAMA, ET AL., APPELLANTS 
83-812 v. 
ISHMAEL JAFFREE ET AL. 
DOUGLAS T. SMITH, ET AL., APPELLANTS 
83-929 v. 
ISHMAEL JAFFREE ET AL. 
ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1985] 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
At an early stage of this litigation, the constitutionality of 
three Alabama statutes was questioned: (1) § 16-1-20, en-
acted in 1978, which authorized a one-minute period of silence 
in all public schools "for meditation;" 1 (2) § 16-1-20.1, en-
acted in 1981, which author~riod of silence "for medi-
tation or voluntary prayer;" 2 and (3) § 16-1-20.2, enacted in 
1 Alabama Code § 16-1-20 reads as foll!)ws: 
"At the commencement of the first class each day in the first through the 
sixth grades in all public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which 
each such class is held shall announce that a period of silence, not to exceed 
one minute in duration, shall be observed for meditation, and during any 
such period silence shall be maintained and no activities engaged in." 
V Appellees have abandoned any claim that § 16-1-20 is unconstitutio . 
See Brief of Appellees 2. 
1 Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 provides: 
"At the commencement of"the first class of each day in all grades in all 
public schools the teacher in charge of the room in which each class is held 
may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration 
' ' 
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1982, which authorized teachers to lead "willing students" in 
a prescribed prayer to "Almighty God ... the Creator and 
Supreme Judge of the world.'' 3 
At the preliminary-injunction stage of this case, the Dis-
trict Court distinguished § 16-1-20 from the other two stat-
utes. It then held that there was "nothing wrong" with 
§ 16-1-20,4 but that § 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 were both 
invalid because the sole purpose of both was "an effort on the 
part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activ-
ity."5 After the trial on the merits, the District Court did 
not change its interpretation of these two statutes, but held 
that they were constitutional because, in its opinion, Ala-
bama has the power to establish a state religion if it chooses 
to do so.8 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's ini-
tial interpretation of the purpose of both §§ 16-1-20.1 and 
16-1-20.2, and held them both unconstitutional. 7 We have 
shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such 
period no other activities shall be engaged in." 
1 Alabama Code § 16-1-20.2 provides: 
"From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any public educational in-
stitution within the State of Alabama, recognizing that the Lord God is 
one, at the beginning of any homeroom or any class, may pray, may lead 
willing students in prayer, or may lead the willing students in the following 
prayer to God: 
"Almighty God, You alone are our God. We aclmowledge You as the 
Creator and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your justice, Your truth, 
and Your peace abound this day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the 
counsels of our government, in the sanctity of our homes and in the class-
rooms of our schools in the name of our Lord. Amen." 
•'The court stated that it did not find any potential infirmity in§ 16-1-20 
because "it is a statute which prescribes nothing more than a child in school 
shall have the right to meditate in silence and there is nothing wrong with a 
little meditation and quietness." Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 
(SD Ala. 1982). 
5 Ibid. 
'Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 554 F. 
Supp. 1104, 1128 (SD Ala. 1983). 
1 Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535-1536 (CA111983). 
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already affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding with respect 
to § 16-1-20.2.8 Moreover, ap'a~~have not questioned 
the holding that§ 16-1-20 is vall . us, the narrow ques-
tion -for aeciS~~16-1-20.1, which authorizes a 
period of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer," is a 
law respecting the establishment of religion within the mean-
ing of the First Amendment. 10 
I 
Appellee Ishmael Jaffree is a resident of Mobile County, 
Alabama. On May 28, 1982, he filed a complaint on behalf of 
three of his minor children; two of them were second-grade 
students and the third was then in kindergarten. The com-
plaint named members of the Mobile County School Board, 
various school officials, and the minor plaintiffs' three teach-
ers as defendants. 11 The complaint alleged that the appellees 
brought the action "seeking principally a declaratory judg-
ment and an injunction restraining the Defendants and each 
of them from maintaining or allowmg the maintenance of reg-
ular religious prayer services or other forms of religious 
observances in the Mobile County Public Schools in violation 
of the First Amendment as made applicable to states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion." 12 The complaint further alleged that two of the chil-
dren had been subjected to various acts of religious indoctri-
nation ''from the beginning of the school year in September, 
1981;" 18 that the defendant teachers had "on a daily basis" led 
their classes in saying certain prayers in unison; 14 that the 
'Wallace v. Jaffree, 104 S. Ct. 1704 (1984). 
• See n. 1, S'IJ:pra.. 
10 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, of course, has 
long ~n held applicable to the States. Everson v. Board of Education, 
330 u. s. 1, 15-16 (1947). 
11 App. 4-7. 
11 I d., at 4. 
11 I d., at 7. 
U]bi,d. 
.. 
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minor children were exposed to ostracism from their peer 
group class members if they did not participate; 16 and that 
Ishmael J affree had repeatedly but unsuccessfully requested· 
that the devotional services be stopped. The original com-
plaint made no reference to any Alabama statute. 
On June 4, 1982, appellees filed an amended complaint 
seeking class certification, 18 and on June 30, 1982, they filed 
a second amended complaint naming the Governor of Ala-
bama and various State officials as additional defendants. In 
that amendment the appellees challenged the constitution-
ality of three Alabama statutes: §§ 16-1-20, 16-1-20.1, and 
16-1-20.2.17 
On August 2, 1982, the District Court held an evidentiary 
hearing on appellees' motion for a preliminary injunction. 
At that hearing, State Senator Donald G. Holmes testified 
that he was the ''prime sponsor" of the bill that was enacted 
in 1981 as § 16-1-20.1!8 He explained that the bill was an 
"effort to return voluntary prayer to our public schools . . . it 
is a beginning and a step in the right direction." 11 Apart 
from the purpose to return voluntary prayer to public school, 
Senator Holmes unequivocally testified that he had ''no other 
purpose in mind." 20 A week after the hearing, the District 
Court entered a preliminary injunction. 21 The court held 
that appellees were likely to prevail on the merits because 
the enactment of§§ 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 did not reflect a 
clearly secular purpose. 22 
11 !d., at 8-9. 
II App. 17. 
1
' !d., at 21. See nn. 1, 2, and 3, supra. 
11 !d., at 47-49. 
11 !d., at 50. 
• Id., at 52. 
11 Jaffree v. Ja'TIUB, 544 F. Supp. 727 (SD Ala. 1982). 
•See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). Insofar as 
relevant to the issue now before us, the District Court explained: 
"The injury to plaintiffs from the possible establishment of a religion by 
the State of Alabama contrary to the proscription of the establishment 
•• 
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In November 1982, the District Court held a four-day trial 
on the merits. The evidence related primarily to the 
1981-1982 academic year-the year after the enactment of 
§ 16-1-20.1 and prior to the enactment of§ 16-1-20.2. The 
District Court found that during that academic year each of 
the minor plaintiffs' teachers had led classes in prayer activi-
ties, even after being informed of appellees' objections to 
these activities. 23 
In its lengthy conclusions of law, the District Court re-
viewed a number of opinions of this Court interpreting the 
clause outweighs any indirect harm which may occur to defendants as a re-
sult of an injunction. Granting an injunction will merely maintain the sta-
tus quo existing prior to the enactment of the statute. 
"The purpose of Senate BillS [§ 16-1-20.2] as evidenced by its preamble, 
is to provide for a prayer that may be given in public schools. Senator 
Holmes testified that his purpose in sponsoring § 16-1-20.1 was to return 
voluntary prayer to the public schools. He intended to provide children 
the opportunity of sharing in their spiritual heritage of Alabama and of this 
country. See Alabama Senate Journal 921 (1981). The Fifth Circuit has 
explained that 'prayer is a primary religious activity in itself. . . . ' Karen 
B. v. Treen, 653 F. 2d S97, 901 (5th Cir. 1981). The state may not employ 
a religious means in its public schools. Abington School District v. 
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 224 [ ... ] (1963). Since these statutes do not 
reftect a clearly secular purpose, no consideration of the remaining two-
parts of the Lemon test is necessary. 
"The enactment of Senate BillS[§ 16-1-20.2] and§ 16-1-2-.1 is an effort 
on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity. 
Even though these statutes are permissive in form, it is nevertheless state 
involvement respecting an establishment of religion. Engle v. Vitale, 370 
U. S. 421, 430 (1962). Thus, binding precedent which this Court is under 
a duty to follow indicates the substantial likelihood plaintiffs will prevail on 
the merits." I d., at 730-732. 
• The District Court wrote: 
"Defendant Boyd, as early as September 16, 1981, led her class at E. R. 
Dickson in singing the following phrase: 
"'God is great, God is good,' 
"'Let us thank him for our food, 
" 'bow our heads we all are fed, 
" 'Give us Lord our daily bread. 
83-812 & 83-929-0PINION 
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Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and then em-
barked on a fresh examination of the question whether the 
First Amendment imposes any barrier to the establishment 
of an official religion by the State of Alabama. After review-
ing at length what it perceived to be newly discovered his-
torical evidence, the District Court concluded that ''the 
establishment clause of the first amendment to the United 
States Constitution does not prohibit the state from estab-
lishing a religion." 24 In a separate opinion, the District 
Court dismissed appellees' challenge to the three Alabama 
statutes because of a failure to state any claim for which relief 
could be granted. The court's dismissal of this challenge was 
"'Amen!'" 
"The recitation of this phrase continued on a daily basis throughout the 
1981-82 school year." 
"Defendant Pixie Alexander has led her class at Craighead in reciting 
the following phrase: 
"'God is great, God is good, 
" 'Let us thank him for our food.' " 
"Further, defendant Pixie Alexander had her class recite the following, 
which is known as the Lord's Prayer: 
"'Our Father, which are in heaven, hallowed be Thy name. Thy king-
dom come. Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day 
our daily bread and forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors. And 
lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil for thine is the kingdom 
and the power and the glory forever. Amen.'" 
"The recitation of these phrases continued on a daily basis throughout the 
1981-82 school year. 
"Ms. Green admitted that she frequently leads her class in singing the 
following song: 
"'For health and strength and daily food, we praise Thy name, Oh 
Lord.'" 
"This activity continued throughout the school year, despite the fact that 
Ms. Green had knowledge that plaintifY did not want his child exposed to 
the above-mentioned song.'' Jaffree v. Board ofCCYmmisttionera of Mobile 
CO'Unty, 554 F. Supp., at 1107-1108. 
• I d., at 1128. 
' .. 
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also based on its conclusion that the Establishment Clause 
did not bar the States from establishing a religion. 26 
The Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases; not sur-
prisingly, it reversed. The Court of Appeals noted that this 
•Jaffree v. James, 554 F. Supp. 1130, 1132 (SD Ala. 1983). The Dis-
trict Court's opinion was announced on January 14, 1983. On February 2, 
1983, JUSTICE POWELL, in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Eleventh 
Circuit, entered a stay which in effect prevented the District Court from 
dissolving the preliminary injunction that had been entered in August of 
1982. JUSTICE POWELL accurately summarized the prior proceedings: 
"The situation, quite briefly, is as follows: Beginning in the fall of 1981, 
teachers and the minor applicants' schools conducted prayers in their regu-
lar classes, including group recitations of the Lord's Prayer. At the time, 
an Alabama statute provided for a one-minute period of silence 'for medita-
tion or voluntary prayer' at the commencement of each day's classes in the 
public elementary schools. Ala. Code§ 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1982). In 1982, 
Alabama enacted a statute permitting public school teachers to lead their 
classes in prayer. 1982 Ala. Acts 735. 
"Applicants, objecting to prayer in the public schools, filed suit to enjoin 
the activities. They later amended their complaint to challenge the appli-
cable state statutes. After a hearing, the District Court granted a pre-
liminary injunction. Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (1982). It recog-
nized that it was bound by the decisions of this Court, id., at 731, and that 
under those decisions it was 'obligated to enjoin the enforcement' of the 
statutes, id., at 733. 
"In its subsequent decision on the merits, however, the District Court 
reached a different conclusion. Jaffree v. Board of School Commiaaionera 
of Mobile County,- F. Supp.- (1983). It again recognized that the 
prayers at issue, given in public school classes and led by teachers, were 
violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as that 
clause had been construed by this Court. The District Court nevertheless 
ruled 'that the United States Supreme Court had erred.' !d., at--. It 
therefore dismissed the complaint and dissolved the injunction. 
"There can be little doubt that the District Court was correct in finding 
that conducting prayers as part of a school program is unconstitutional 
under this Court's decisions. In E1U}le v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962), the 
Court held that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made 
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits a State 
from authorizing prayer in the public schools. The following Term, in 
Murray v. Curlett, decided with School District of Abi1U}ton T01JJ'n8hip v. 
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963), the Court explicitly invalidated a school 
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Court had considered and had rejected the historical argu-
ments that the District Court found persuasive, and that the 
District Court had misapplied the doctrine of stare decisis. 28 
The Court of Appeals then held that the teachers' religious 
activities violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.'n With respect to§ 16-1-20.1 and§ 16-l-20.2, 
the Court of Appeals stated that "both statutes advance and 
encourage religious activities." 28 The Court of Appeals then 
quoted with approval the District Court's finding that § 16-
1-20.1, and§ 16-1-20.2, were efforts ''to encourage religious 
activity. Even though these statutes are permissive in 
district's rule providing for the reading of the Lord's Prayer as part of a 
school's opening exercises, despite the fact that participation in those exer-
cises was voluntary. 
"Unless and until this Court reconsiders the foregoing decisions, they 
appear to control this case. In my view, the District Court was obligated 
to follow them." Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of Molnle 
County, 103 S. Ct. 842, 842-843 (1983). 
• The Court of Appeals wrote: 
"The stare decisis doctrine and its exceptions do not apply where a lower 
· court is compelled to apply the precedent of a higher court. See 20 Am. 
Jur. 2d Courts § 183 (1965). 
"Federal district courts and circuit courts are bound to adhere to the con-
trolling decisions of the Supreme Court. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370, 
375 (1982) . . . . JUSTICE REHNQUIST emphasized the importance of 
precedent when he observed that 'unless we wish anarchy to prevail within 
the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by 
the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those 
courts may think it to be.' Davis, 454 U. S. at 375, 102 S. Ct. at 706. See 
Al8o, Thurston Moto-r Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., - U. S. 
-, 103 S. Ct. 1343, 75 L. Ed. 2d - (1983) (the Supreme Court, in a 
per curiam decision, recently stated: 'Needless to say, only this Court may 
overrule one of its precedents')." Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1532 
(CAll 1983). 
21 /d., at 1533-1534. This Court has denied a petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari that presented the question whether the Establishment Clause pro-
hibited the teachers' religious prayer activities. Board of School Com mis-
sioners of Molnle County, Alabama v. Jaffree, - U. S. - (1984). 
• Id., at 1535. 
I • 
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fonn, it is nevertheless state involvement respecting an 
establishment of religion." 29 Thus, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that both statutes were "specifically the type 
which the Supreme Court addressed in Engle [v. Vitale, 370 
u. s. 421 (1962)]." 30 
A suggestion for rehearing en bane was denied over the 
dissent of four judges who expressed the opinion that the full 
court should reconsider the panel decision insofar as it held 
§ 16-1-20.1 unconstitutional. 31 When this Court noted prob-
able jurisdiction, it limited argument to the question that 
those four judges thought worthy of reconsideration. The 
judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the other 
issues presented by the appeals was affirmed. Wallace v. 
Jaffree,- U.S.- (1984). 
II 
Our unanimous affirmance of the Court of Appeals' judg-
• Ibid. 
• Ibid. After noting that the invalidity of § 16-1-20.2 was aggravated 
by "the existence of a government-composed prayer," and that the propo-
nents of the legislation admitted that that section "amounts to the estab-
lishment of a state religion," the court added this comment on§ 16-1-20.1: 
"The objective of the meditation or prayer statute (Ala. Code § 16-1-
20.1) was also the advancement of religion. This fact was recognized by 
the district court at the hearing for preliminary relief where it was estab-
lished that the intent of the statute was to return prayer to the public 
schools. James, 544 F. Supp. at 731. The existence of this fact and the 
inclusion of prayer obviously involves the state in religious activities. 
Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161 (MD Tenn. 1982). This demon-
strates a lack of secular legislative purpose on the part of the Alabama 
Legislature. Additionally, the statute has the primary effect of advancing 
religion. We do not imply that simple meditation or silence is barred from 
the public schools; we hold that the state cannot participate in the advance-
ment of religious activities through any guise, including teacher-led medi-
tation. It is not the activity itself that concerns us; it is the purpose of the 
activity that we shall scrutinize. Thus, the existence of these elements 
require that we also hold section 16-1-20.1 in violation of the establishment 
clause." Id., at 1535-1536 
RJaffree v. Wallace, 718 F. 2d 614 (CA111983) (per curiam). 
' .. 
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ment concerning § 16-1-20.2 makes it unnecessary to com-
ment at length on the District Court's remarkable conclusion 
that the Federal Constitution imposes no obstacle to Ala-
bama's establishment of a state religion. Before analyzing 
the precise issue that is presented to us, it is nevertheless ap-
propriate to recall how firmly embedded in our constitutional 
jurisprudence is the proposition that the several States have 
no greater power to restrain the individual freedoms pro-
tected by the First Amendment than does the Congress of 
the United States. 
As is plain from its text, the First Amendment was 
adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the 
individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express 
himself in accordance with the dictates of his own con-
science.31 Until the Fourteenth Amendment was added to 
the Constitution, the First Amendment's restraints on the 
exercise of federal power simply did not apply to the States. 33 
But when the Constitution was amended to prohibit any 
State from depriving any person of liberty without due proc-
ess of law, that Amendment imposed the same substantive 
limitations on the States' power to legislate that the First 
Amendment had always imposed on the Congress' power. 
This Court has confirmed and endorsed this elementary prop-
osition of law time and time again. 34 
• The First Amendment provides: 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U. S. Const., 
Arndt. 1. 
•see Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New Orleans, 44 
u.s. 589, 609 (1845). 
"See, e. g., Maynard v. Wooley, 430 U. S. 706, 714 (1977) (right to 
refuse endorsement of an offensive state motto); Terminello v. Chicago, 
337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949) (right to free speech); Board of Education v. Barnett, 
319 U. S. 624, 637-638 (1943) (right to refuse to participate in a ceremony 
that offends one's conscience); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 
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Writing for a unanimous Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940), Justice Roberts explained: 
''We hold that the statute, as construed and applied to 
the appellants, deprives them of their liberty without 
due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The fundamental concept of liberty em-
bodied in that Amendment embraces the liberties guar-
anteed by the First Amendment. The First Amend-
ment declares that Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has 
rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as 
Congress to enact such laws. The constitutional inhi-
bition oflegislation on the subject of religion has a double 
aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by' law 
of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form 
of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to ad-
here to such religious organization or form of worship as 
the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. 
On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the 
chosen form of religion." 
Cantwell, of course, is but one case in which the Court has 
identified the individual's freedom of conscience as the cen-
tral liberty that unifies the various clauses in the First 
(1940) (right to proselytize one's religious faith); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 
496, 519 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring) (right to assemble peaceably); Near 
v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 707 (1931) (right to publish an unpopular 
newspaper); Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 557, 573 (Brandeis, J., con-
curring) (right to advocate the cause of communism); Gitlow v. New York, 
268 U. S. 652, 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (right to express an unpopular 
opinion); cf. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 215, n. 6 
(1963), where the Court apP.rovingly quoted Board of Education v. Minor, 
23 Ohio St. 211, 253 (1872), which stated: 
"The great bulk of human affairs and human interests is left by any free 
government to individual enterprise and individual action. Religion is em-
inently one of these interests, lying outside the true and legitimate prov-
ince of government." 
~. 
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Amendment. 36 Enlarging on this theme, THE CHIEF Jus-
TICE recently wrote: 
"'We begin with the proposition that the right of free-
dom of thought protected by the First Amendment 
against state action includes both the right to speak 
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. See 
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 633-634 
(1943); id., at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring). A system 
which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, 
and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomi-
tant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right 
to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are com-
plementary components of the broader concept of 'indi-
vidual freedom of mind.'" I d., at 637. 
"'The Court in Barnette, supra, was faced with a state 
statute which required public school students to partici-
pate in daily public ceremonies by honoring the flag both 
with words and traditional salute gestures. In overrul-
ing its prior decision in Minersville District v. Gobitis, 
310 U. S. 586 (1940), the Court held that 'a ceremony so 
touching matters of opinion and political attitude may 
[not] be imposed upon the individual by official authority 
•For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 164 (1944), 
the Court wrote: 
"If by this position appellant seeks for freedom of conscience a broader 
protection than for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted that any of the 
great liberties insured by the First Article can be given higher place than 
the others. All have preferred position in our basic scheme. Schneider v. 
State, 308 U. S. 147; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296. All are in-
terwoven there together. Differences there are, in them and in the modes 
appropriate for their exercise. But they have unity in the charter's prime 
place because they have unity in their human sources and functionings." 
See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 269 (1981) (stating that reli-
gious worship and discuasion "are forms of speech and association pro-
tected by the First Amendment"). 
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under powers committed to any political organization 
under our Constituiton.' 319 U. S., at 636. Compel-
ling the affirmative act of a flag salute involved a more 
serious infringement upon personal liberties than the 
passive act of carrying the state motto on a license plate, 
but the difference is essentially one of degree. Here, as 
in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which 
forces an individual, as part of his daily life-indeed con-
stantly while his automobile is in public view-to be an 
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideologi-
cal point of view he finds unacceptable. In doing so, the 
State 'invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it 
is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitu-
tion to reserve from all official control.' I d., at 642." 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714-715 (1977). 
Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from 
speaking are complimentary components of a broader concept 
of individual freedom of mind, so also the individual's free-
dom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his right to 
refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority. 
At one time it was thought that this right merely proscribed 
the preference of one Christian sect over another, but would 
not require equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the 
atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Mo-
hammedism or Judaism. 311 But when the underlying princi-
•Thus Joseph Story wrote: 
"Probably at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and of the 
amendment to it now under consideration [First Amendment], the general 
if not the universal sentiment in America was, that christianity ought to 
receive encouragement from the state so far as was not incompatible with 
the private rights of conscience and the freedom of religious worship. An 
attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold 
all in utter indift'erence, would have created universal disapprobation, if 
not universal indignation." 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 
of the United States § 1874, at 593 (1861) (footnote omitted). 
In the same volume, Story continued: 
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ple has been examined in the crucible of litigation, the Court 
has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of 
conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the 
right to select any religious faith or none at all. :rr This con-
clusion derives support not only from the interest in respect-
ing the individual's freedom of conscience, but also from the 
conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the 
"The real object of the amendment was, not to countenance, much less to 
advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating chris-
tianity; but to e:x:clude all rivalry among christian sects, and to p1'6Vent any 
national ecclesiastical establishment which slwuld give to a hierarchy the 
e:x:clusive patT01UI{Je of the national gC11Jernment. It thw cut off the meam 
of religiouB persecution (the vice and pest of former ages), and of the 
subversion of the rights of comcience in matters of religion which had 
been trampled upon almost from the days of the Apostles to the present 
age •... " Id., at§ 1877, at 594 (emphasis supplied). 
"Thus, in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947), the 
Court stated: 
"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at 
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. 
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one 
religion over another." 
Id., at 18 (the First Amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its 
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers"); Abington 
School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 216 (1963) ("this Court has re-
jected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids 
only governmental preference of one religion over another"); id., at 226 
("The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a 
long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel 
of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bit-
ter experience that it is not within the power of the government to invade 
that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance 
or retard. In the relationship between man and religion, the State is 
firmly committed to a position of neutrality"); Torasco v. Watkim, 367 
U. S. 488, 495 (1961) ("We repeat and again reaffinn that neither a State 
nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess 
a belief or disbelief in any religion.' Neither can constitutionally pass laws 
or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, 
and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God 
as against those religions founded on different beliefs"). 
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product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful. 38 As 
Justice Jackson eloquently stated in Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943): 
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional con-
stellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, re-
• In his "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 
1785," James Madison wrote, in part: 
"1. Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, 'that Re-
ligion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of discharg-
ing it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or vio-
lence.' The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and 
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as 
these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is 
unalienable; because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence 
contemplated by their own minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men: 
It is unalienable also; because what is here a right towards men, is a duty 
towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator 
such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. 
"We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is 
abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly 
exempt from its cognizance. 
"3. Because, it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our lib-
erties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of citizens, and 
one of [the] noblest characteristics of the late Revolution. The freemen of 
America did not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exer-
cise, and entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the conse-
quences in the principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the 
principle. We revere this lesson too much, soon to forget it. Who does 
not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclu-
sion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular 
sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?" The Complete Madison 
299-301 (1953) 
See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 435 (1961) ("It is neither sacri-
legious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this coun-
try should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers 
and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to 
those the people choose to look for religious guidance''). 
16 
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ligion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein." 
Alabama, no less than the Congress, must respect that basic 
truth. 38 
III 
When the Court has been called upon to construe the 
breadth of the Establishment Clause, it has examined the 
criteria developed over a period of many years. Thus, in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971), we 
wrote: . 
"Every analysis in this area must begin with consider-
ation of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court 
over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned 
• As the Barnette opinion explained, it is the teaching of history, rather 
than any appraisal of the quality of a State's motive, that supports this 
duty to respect basic freed~ms: 
"Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end 
thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many good 
as well as by evil men. Nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon but 
at other times and places the ends have been racial or territorial security, 
support of a dynasty or regime, and particular plans for saving souls. As 
the first and moderate methods to obtain unity have failed, those bent on 
its accomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity. As gov-
ernmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more 
bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper division of our 
people could proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary 
to choose what doctrine and whose program public educational officials 
shall compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate futility of such at-
tempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort from the 
Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, 
the Inquisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian ex-
iles as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our 
present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination of dis-
sent soon ftnd themselves extenninating dissenters. Compulsory unifica-
tion of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard." 319 U. S., 
at 640-641. 
See also E11!Jel v. Vitale, 370 U. S., at 431 ("a union of government and 
religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion"). 
' 
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from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary ef-
fect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 243 
(1968); finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.' Walz [v. Tax 
Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970)]." 
It is the first of these three criteria that is most plainly impli-
cated by this case. As the District Court correctly recog-
nized, no consideration of the second or third criteria is nec-
essary if a statute does not have a clearly secular purpose. 40 
At the very least, the First Amendment requires that a stat-
ute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a pur-
pose to advance religion. 41 
In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask 
''whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or dis-
approve of religion." 42 In this case, the answer to that 
question is dispositive. For the record not only provides us 
with an unambiguous affirmative answer, but it also reveals 
that the enactment of§ 16-1-20.1 was not motivated by any 
clearly secular purpose-indeed, the statute had no secular 
purpose. 
• See trupra, n. 22. 
"See Lynch v. Donnelly, - U. S. -, - (1984); id., at -
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring); id., at- (BRENNAN, J., joined by MAR-
SHALL, BLACKMUN and STEVENS, JJ., dissenting); Mueller v. Allen, 103 
S. Ct. 3062, 3066-3067 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 271 
(1982); Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39,40-41 (1980) (per curiam); Wolman 
v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 236 (1977). 
•Lynch v. Donnelly,- U.S.-,- (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., con-
curring) ("The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether govern-
ment's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect 
prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the prac-
tice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. 
An afftrmative answer to either question should render the challenged 
practice invalid''). 
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IV 
The sponsor of the bill that became § 16-1-20.1, Senator 
Donald Holmes, inserted into the legislative record-appar-
ently without dissent-a statement indicating that the legis-
lation was an "effort to return voluntary prayer" to the public 
schools.~ Later Senator Holmes confirmed this purpose be-
fore the District Court. In response to the question whether 
he had any purpose for the legislation other than returning 
voluntary prayer to public schools, he stated, "No, I did not 
have no other purpose in mind."" The State did not present 
evidence of any secular purpose.~ 
• The statement indicated, in pertinent part: 
"Gentlemen, by passage of this bill by the Alabama Legislature our chil-
dren in this state will have the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heri-
tage of this state and this country. The United States as well as the State 
of Alabama was founded by people who believe in God. I believe this effort 
to return voluntary prayer to our public schools for its return to us to the 
original position of the writers of the Constitution, this local philosophies 
and beliefs hundreds of Alabamians have urged my continuous support for 
permitting school prayer. Since coming to the Alabama Senate I have 
worked hard on this legislation to accomplish the return of voluntary 
prayer in our public schools and return to the basic moral fiber." App. 50 
(emphasis added). 
,. /d., at 52. The District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that 
the purpose of§ 16-1-20.1 was "an effort on the part of the State of Ala-
bama to encourage a religious activity." Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 
727, 732 (SD Ala. 1882); Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CAll 
1983). The evidence presented to the District Court elaborated on the 
express admission of the Governor of Alabama (then Fob James) that the 
enactment of§ 16-1-20.1 was intended to "clarify [the State's] intent to 
have prayer as part of the daily classroom activity," compare Second 
Amended Complaint 4ft 32(d) (App. 24-25) with Governor's Answer to 
§ 32(d) (App. 40); and that the "expressed legislative purpose in enacting 
Section 16-1-20.1 (1981) was to 'return voluntary prayer to public 
schools,'" compare Second Amended Complaint 4ft4ft 32(b) and (c) (App. 24) 
with Governor's Answer to 114ft 32(b) and (c) (App. 40). 
• Appellant Governor George C. Wallace now argues that§ 16-1-20.1 "is 
best understood as a permissible accommodation of religion" and that 
viewed even in terms of the Lemon test, the "statute conforms to accept-
t •• 
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The unrebutted evidence of legislative intent contained in 
the legislative record and in the testimony of the sponsor of 
§ 16-1-20.1 is confirmed by a consideration of the relationship 
between this statute and the two other measures that were 
considered in this case. The District Court found that the 
1981 statute and its 1982 sequel had a common, nonsecular 
purpose. The wholly religious character of the later enact-
ment is plainly evident from its text. When the differences 
between§ 16-1-20.1 and its 1978 predecessor, § 16-1-20, are 
examined, it is equally clear that the 1981 statute has the 
same wholly religious character. 
There are only three textual differences between § 16-
able constitutional criteria." Brief of Appellant George C. Wallace 5; see 
also Brief of Appellants Douglas T. Smith et al., 39 (§ 16-1-20.1 "accommo-
dates the free exercise of the religious beliefs and free exercise of speech 
and belief of those affected''), 47. These arguments seem to be based on 
the theory that the free exercise of religion of some of the State's citizens 
was burdened before the statute was enacted. The United States, ap-
pearing as amicus curiae in support of the appellants, candidly aclmowl-
edges that "it is unlikely that a strong Free Exercise claim could be made 
that time for personal prayer must be set aside during the school day." 
Brief for the United States 10. There is no basis for the suggestion that 
§ 16-1-20.1 "is a means for accommodating the religious and meditative 
needs of students without in any way diminishing the school's own neutral-
ity or secular atmosphere." !d., at 11. In this case, it is undisputed that 
at the time of the enactment of § 16-1-20.1 there was no governmental 
practice impeding students from silently praying for one minute at the be-
ginning of each school day; thus, there was no need to "accommodate" or to 
exempt individuals from any general governmental requirement because of 
the dictates of our cases interpreting the Free Exercise Clause. See, 
e. g., Thoma8 v. Review Board, 450 U. S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U. S. 398 (1963); see also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 
U. S. 203, 226 (1963) ("While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits 
the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has 
never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to prac-
tice its beliefs''). What was missing in the appellants' eyes at time of the 
enactment of§ 16-1-20.1--and therefore what is precisely the aspect that 
makes the statute unconstitutional-was the State's endorsement and pro-
motion of religion and a particular religious practice. 
-· 
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1-20.1 and § 16-1-20: (1) the earlier statute applies only to 
grades one through six, whereas § 16-1-20.1 applies to all 
grades; (2) the earlier statute uses the word "shall" whereas 
§ 16-1-20.1 uses the word ''may''; (3) the earlier statute refers 
only to ''meditation" whereas § 16-1-20.1 refers to "medita-
tion or voluntary prayer." The first difference is of no rele-
vance in this litigation because the ·minor appellees were in 
kindergarten or second grade during the 1981-1982 academic 
year. The second difference would also have no impact on 
this litigation because the mandatory language of§ 16-1-20 
continued to apply to grades one through six. 48 Thus, the 
only significant textual difference is the addition of the words 
"or voluntary prayer." 
f! 
The legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools \ 
is, of course, quite different from merely protecting every 
student's right to engage in voluntary prayer during an ap-
propriate oment of sile ce during the school day. The 1978 
statute alrea y protected that right, containing nothing that 
prevented any student from engaging in voluntary prayer 
during a silent minute of meditation. 47 Appellants have not 
identified any secular purpose that was not fully served by 
§ 16-1-20 before the enactment of § 16-1-20.1. Thus, only 
two conclusions are consistent with the text of§ 16-1-20.1: 
(1) the statute was enacted to convey a message of State en-
dorsement and promotion of prayer; or (2) the statute was en-
acted for no purpose. No one suggests that the statute was 
nothing but a meaningless or irrational act. 48 
• See n. 1, supra. 
n Indeed, for some persons meditation itself may be a form of prayer. 
B. Larson, Larson's Book of Cults 62-65 (1982); C. Whittier, Silent Prayer 
and Meditation in World Religions 1-7 (Cong. Research Service). 
• If the conclusion that the statute had no purpose were tenable, it 
would remain true that no purpose ia not a secular purpose. But such a 
conclusion ia inconsistent with the common-sense presumption that stat-
utes are usually enacted to change existing law. Appellants do not even 
suggest that the State had no purpose in enacting§ 16-1-20.1. 
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We must, therefore, conclude that the Alabama Legisla-
ture intended to change existing law 411 and that it was moti-
vated by the same purpose that the Governor's Answer to 
the Second Amended Complaint expressly admitted; that the 
statement inserted in the legislative history revealed; and 
that Senator's Holmes testimony frankly described. The 
Legislature enacted § 16-1-20.1 despite the existence of 
§ 16-1-20 for the sole purpose of expressing the State's en-
dorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the begin-
ning of each school day. The addition of "or voluntary 
prayer" indicates that the State intended to characterize 
prayer as a favored practice. Such an endorsement is not 
consistent with the established principle that the Govern-
ment must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward 
religion. 60 
The importance of that principle does not permit us to treat 
this as an inconsequential case involving nothing more than a 
few words of symbolic speech on behalf of the political major-
ity.61 For whenever the State itself speaks on a religious 
• United States v. Champlin, 341 U. S. 290, 297 (1951) (a "statute 
cannot be divorced from the circumstances existing at the time it was 
passed"); id., at 298 (refusing to attribute pointless purpose to Congress in 
the absence of facts to the contrary); United States v. N aticrrw,l City Lines, 
337 U. S. 78, 80-81 (1949) (rejecting Government's argument that Con-
gress had no desire to change law when enacting legislation). 
•See, e. g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curiam); 
Committee for Public Educatim& v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 792-793 (1973) 
("A proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment 
Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward reli-
gion''); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 109 (1968); Abington School 
District v. Sckem'flP, 374 U. S. 203, 215-222 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 
U. S. 421, 430 (1961) ("Neither the fact that the prayer may be denomina-
tionally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students 
is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment 
Clause"); McCollum v. Board of EducatWn, 333 U.S 203, 211-212 (1948); 
Everson v. Board of Educatim&, 330 U. S. 1, 18 (1947). 
11 As this Court stated in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430-431 (1962): 
,.,. 
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subject, one of the questions that we must ask is ''whether 
the Government intends to convey a message of endorsement 
or disapproval of religion." 52 The well-supported concurrent 
findings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals-that 
§ 16-1-20.1 was intended to convey a message of State-ap-
proval of prayer activities in the public schools-make it un-
necessary, and indeed inappropraite, to evaluate the practi-
cal significance of the addition of the words "or voluntary 
prayer" to the statute. Keeping in mind, as we must, "both 
"The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not de-
pend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated 
by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those 
laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or not." 
Moroever, this Court has noted that "[w]hen the power, prestige and finan-
cial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the 
indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the pre-
vailing officially approved religion is plain." Id., at 431. This comment 
has special force in the public-school context where attendance is manda-
tory. Justice Frankfurter aclmowledged this reality in McCollum v. 
Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 2Z1 (1948~ (concurring opinion): 
"That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint, it does 
not eliminate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to 
conscience and outside the school's domain. The law of imitation operates, 
and non-conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children." 
See also Abington School Di8trict v. Sclurmpp, 374 U. S. 203, 290 (1963) 
(BRENNAN, J., concurring); cf. Marsh v. Chambers,- U. S. -, 3336 
(1983) (distinguishing between adults not susceptible to "religious indoctri-
nation" and children subject to ''peer pressure"). Further, this Court has 
observed: 
"That [Boards of Education] are educating the young for citizenship is rea-
son for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, 
if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to dis-
count important principles of our government as mere platitudes." Board 
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943). 
•Lynch v. Donnelly,- U.S.-,- (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., con-
curring) ("The purpose prong of the Lemon test requires that a govern-
ment activity have a secular purpose. . . . The proper inquiry under the 
prupsoe prong of the Lemon test . . . is whether the government intends to 
convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion''). 
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the fundamental place held by the Establishment Clause in 
our constitutional scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in 
which Establishment Clause values can be eroded," 58 we con-
clude that§ 16-1-20.1 violates the First Amendment. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
•Id., at-. 
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fnt A- mcE STE NS delivered the opinion of the Court. ~
~ ... ~ ~early stage of this litigation, the constitutionality of ?t--o ,'- ;; 
t'liree Alabama statutes was questioned: (1) § 16-1-20, en-  - I 
acted in 1978, which authorized a one-minute period of silence 
in all public schools "for meditation;" 1 (2) § 16-1-20.1, en-
acted in 1981, which authorized a period of silence "for medi-
tation or voluntary prayer;" 2 and (3) § 16-1-20.2, enacted in 
Alabama Code § 16-1-20 reads as follows: 
"At the commencement of the first class each day in the first through the 
sixth grades in all public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which 
each such class is held shall announce that a period of silence, not to exceed 
one minute in duration, shall be observed for meditation, and during any 
such period silence shall be maintained and no activities engaged in." 
Appellees have abandoned any claim that § 16-1-20 is unconstitutional. 
See Brief of Appellees 2. 
1 Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 provides: 
"At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all 
public schools the teacher in charge of the room in which each class is held 
may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration 
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1982, which authorized teachers to lead "willing students" in 
a prescribed prayer to "Almighty God ... the Creator and 
Supreme Judge of the world.'' 8 
At the preliminary-injunction stage of this case, the Dis-
trict Court distinguished § 16-1-20 from the other two stat-
utes. It then held that there was "nothing wrong" with 
§ 16-1-20,4 but that § 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 were both 
invalid because the sole purpose of both was "an effort on the 
part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activ-
ity."~ After the trial on the merits, the District Court did 
not change its interpretation of these two statutes, but held 
that they were constitutional because, in its opinion, Ala-
bama has the power to establish a state religion if it chooses 
to do so.8 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's ini-
tial interpretation of the purpose of both §§ 16-1-20.1 and 
16-1-20.2, and held them both unconstitutional. 7 We have 
shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such 
period no other activities shall be engaged in." 
• Alabama Code § 16-1-20.2 provides: 
"From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any public educational in-
stitution within the State of Alabama, recognizing that the Lord God is 
one, at the beginning of any homeroom or any class, may pray, may lead 
willing students in prayer, or may lead the willing students in the following 
prayer to God: 
"Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge You as the 
Creator and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your justice, Your truth, 
and Your peace abound this day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the 
counsels of our government, in the sanctity of our homes and in the class-
rooms of our schools in the name of our Lord. Amen." 
•The court stated that it did not find any potential infirmity in§ 16-1-20 
because "it is a statute which prescribes nothing more than a child in school 
shall have the right to meditate in silence and there is nothing wrong with a 
little meditation and quietness." Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 
(SD Ala. 1982). 
'Ibid. 
'Jaffree v. Board of School Commissicmers of Mobile County, 554 F. 
Supp. 1104, 1128 (SD Ala. 1983). 
1 Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535-1536 (CA111983). 
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already affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding with respect 
to § 16-1-20.2.8 Moreover, appellees have not questioned 
the holding that § 16-1-20 is valid. 9 Thus, the narrow ques-
tion for decision is whether § 16-1-20.1, which authorizes a 
period of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer," is a 
law respecting the establishment of religion within the mean-
ing of the First Amendment. 10 
I 
Appellee Ishmael J affree is a resident of Mobile County, 
Alabama. On May 28, 1982, he filed a complaint on behalf of 
three of his minor children; two of them were second-grade 
students and the third was then in kindergarten. The com-
plaint named members of the Mobile County School Board, 
various school officials, and the minor plaintiffs' three teach-
ers as defendants. 11 The complaint alleged that the appellees 
brought the action "seeking principally a declaratory judg-
ment and an injunction restraining the Defendants and each 
of them from maintaining or allowing the maintenance of reg-
ular religious prayer services or other forms of religious 
observances in the Mobile County Public Schools in violation 
of the First Amendment as made applicable to states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion." 12 The complaint further alleged that two of the chil-
dren had been subjected to various acts of religious indoctri-
nation ''from the beginning of the school year in September, 
1981;" 18 that the defendant teachers had "on a daily basis" led 
their classes in saying certain prayers in unison; 14 that the 
'Wallace v. Jaffree, 104 S. Ct. 1704 (1984). 
• See n. 1, mpro. 
10 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, of course, has 
long been held applicable to the States. Everson v. Board of Education, 
330 u. s. 1, 15-16 (1947). 
11 App. 4-7. 
11 /d., at 4. 
11 /d., at 7. 
U[bid. 
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minor children were exposed to ostracism from their peer 
group class members if they did not participate; 15 and that 
Ishmael J affree had repeatedly but unsuccessfully requested· 
that the devotional services be stopped. The original com-
plaint made no reference to any Alabama statute. 
On June 4, 1982, appellees filed an amended complaint 
seeking class certification, 18 and on June 30, 1982, they filed 
a second amended complaint naming the Governor of Ala-
bama and various State officials as additional defendants. In 
that amendment the appellees challenged the constitution-
ality of three Alabama statutes: §§ 16-1-20, 16-1-20.1, and 
16-1-20.2.17 
On August 2, 1982, the District Court held an evidentiary 
hearing on appellees' motion for a prelimin injunction. 
At that hearing, State Senator Ilald -G. Holme testified 
that he was the ''prime sponsor" as enacted 
in 1981 as § 16-1-20.1. 18 He explained that the bill was an 
"effort to return voluntary prayer to our public schools . . . it 
is a egmning an a e 1g ec IOn. " Apart 
from the purpose to return voluntary prayer to public school, 
Senator Holmes unequivocally testified that he had ''no other 
purpose in mind." 20 A wee after e , e · rict 
Co~ a preliminary injunction. 21 The court held ] j) 
that appellees were likely to prevail on the merits because C.. 
the enactment of§§ 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 did not reflect a 
clearly secular pur ose. 22 
11 I d., at 8-9. 
II App. 17. 
11 Id., at 21. See nn. 1, 2, and 3, supra. 
11 I d., at 47-49. 
11 Id., at 50. 
• Id., at 52. 
DJaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (SD Ala. 1982). 
• See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). Insofar as 
relevant to the issue now before us, the District Court explained: 
"The injury to plaintiffs from the possible establishment of a religion by 
the State of Alabama contrary to the proscription of the establishment 
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In November 1982, the District Court held a four-day trial 
on the merits. The evi en e p · the 
1981-1982'aademic year-the year after the enactment of 
§ 16-1-20.1 and.miqr to the enactment of§ 16-1-20.2. The 
District Court round that during that academic year each of 
the minor plaintiffs' teachers had led classes in prayer actiVi-
ties, even r eing s o ecti to 
these activities. 23 
In its lengthy conclusions of law, the District Court re-
viewed a number of opinions of this Court interpreting the 
clause outweighs any indirect harm which may occur to defendants as a re-
sult of an injunction. Granting an injunction will merely maintain the sta-
tus quo existing prior to the enactment of the statute. 
"The purpose of Senate BillS[§ 16-1-20.2] as evidenced by its preamble, 
is to provide for a prayer that may be given in public schools. Senator 
Holmes testified that his purpose in sponsoring§ 16-1-20.1 was to return 
voluntary prayer to the public schools. He intended to provide children 
the opportunity of sharing in their spiritual heritage of Alabama and of this 
country. See Alabama Senate Journal 921 (19S1). The Fifth Circuit has 
explained that 'prayer is a primary religious activity in itself. . . . ' Karen 
B. v. Treen, 653 F . 2d S97, 901 (5th Cir. 19S1). The state may not employ 
a religious means in its public schools. Abington School District v. 
Schmnpp, 374 U. S. 203, 224 [ ... ] (1963). Since these statutes do not 
reftect a clearly secular purpose, no consideration of the remaining two-
parts of the Lerrum test is necessary. 
l 
"The enactment of Senate BillS[§ 16-1-20.2] and§ 16-1-2-.1 is an effort 
on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity. 
Even oug these statutes are perrrussive m orm, 1t lS neve e ess s te 
involvement respecting an establishment of religion. Engle v. Vitale, 370 
U. S. 421, 430 (1962). Thus, binding precedent which this Court is under 
a duty to follow indicates the substantial likelihood plaintiffs will prevail on 
the merits." I d., at 730-732. 
• The District Court wrote: 
"Defendant Boyd, as early as September 16, 1981, led her class at E. R. 
Dickson in singing the following phrase: 
"'God is great, God is good,' 
"'Let us thank him for our food, 
" 'bow our heads we all are fed, 
" 'Give us Lord our daily bread. 
.. 
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Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and then em-
barked on a fresh examination of the question whether the 
First Amendment imposes any barrier to the establishment 
of an official religion by the State of Alabama. After review-
ing at length what it perceived to be newly discovered his-
torical evidence, the District Court concluded that ''the ) 
establishment clause of the first amendment to the United 
States Constitution does not rohibit the state from estab-
lishing a rel!gion." :u n a sep e opimo , t e istrict 
Co~sed appellees' challenge to the three Alabama 
statutes because of a failure to state any claim for which relief 
could be granted. The court's dismissal of this challenge was 
"'Amen!'" 
"The recitation of this phrase continued on a daily basis throughout the 
1981-82 school year." 
"Defendant Pixie Alexander has led her class at Craighead in reciting 
the following phrase: 
"'God is great, God is good, 
"'Let us thank him for our food.'" 
"Further, defendant Pixie Alexander had her class recite the following, 
which is lmown as the Lord's Prayer: 
"'Our Father, which are in heaven, hallowed be Thy name. Thy king-
dom come. Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day 
our daily bread and forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors. And 
lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil for thine is the kingdom 
and the power and the glory forever. Amen.'" 
"The recitation of these phrases continued on a daily basis throughout the 
1981-82 school year. 
"Ms. Green admitted that she frequently leads her class in singing the 
following song: 
"'For health and strength and daily food, we praise Thy name, Oh 
Lord.'" 
"This activity continued throughout the school year, despite the fact that 
Ms. Green had lmowledge that plaintiff did not want his child exposed to 
the above-mentioned song.'' /a/free v. Board ofCommistrionera of Mobile 
County, 554 F. Supp., at 1107-1108. 
16 ld., at 1128. 
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also based on its conclusion that the Establishment Clause 
did not bar the States from establishing a religion. 215 
The Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases; not sur-
prisingly, it reversed. The Court of Appeals noted that this 
•Jaffree v. James, 554 F. Supp. 1130, 1132 (SD Ala. 1983). The Dis-
. / trict Court's opinion was announced on January 14, 1983. On February 2, 
V 1983, JUSTICE POWELL, in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Eleventh 
Circuit, entered a stay which in effect prevented the District Court from 
/
dissolving the preliminary injunction that had been entered in August of 
1982. JUSTICE POWELL accurately summarized the prior proceedings: 
"The situation, quite briefly, is as follows: Beginning in the fall of 1981, 
teachers and the minor applicants' schools conducted prayers in their regu-
lar classes, including group recitations of the Lord's Prayer. At the time, 
an Alabama statute provided for a one-minute period of silence 'for medita-
tion or voluntary prayer' at the commencement of each day's classes in the 
public elementary schools. Ala. Code§ 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1982). In 1982, 
Alabama enacted a statute permitting public school teachers to lead their 
classes in prayer. 1982 Ala. Acts 735. -
"Applicants, objecting to prayer in the public schools, filed suit to enjoin 
the activities. They later amended their complaint to challenge the appli-
cable state statutes. After a hearing, the District Court granted a pre-
liminary injunction. Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (1982). It recog-
nized that it was bound by the decisions of this Court, id., at 731, and that 
under those decisions it was 'obligated to enjoin the enforcement' of the 
statutes, id., at 733. 
"In its subsequent decision on the merits, however, the District Court 
reached a different conclusion. Jaffree v. Board of School Commissicmers 
of Mobile County,- F. Supp.- (1983). It again recognized that the 
prayers at issue, given in public school classes and led by teachers, were 
violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as that 
clause had been ~nstrued by this Court. The District Court nevertheless 
ruled 'that the "(J nited States Supreme Court had erred.' I d., at --. It 
therefore dismissed the complaint and dissolved the injunction. 
"There can be little doubt that the District Court was correct in finding 
that conducting prayers as part of a school program is unconstitutional 
under tJiiS Court'S declSibns. In Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962), the 
Court held that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made 
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits a State 
from authorizing prayer in the public schools. The following Term, in 
Murray v. Curlett, decided with School District of Abington Township v. 
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963), the Court explicitly invalidated a school 
( . 
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Court had considered and had rejected the historical argu-
ments that the District Court found persuasive, and that the 
District Court had misapplied the doctrine of stare decisis. 211 
The Court of Appeals then held that the teachers' religious C..A 11 
activities violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. 27 With respec~to § 16::±:_gQJ and § 16-1-20.2, 
the Court of Appeals stateo that "both statutes advance and 
enco~!e!!gi~a~vities." 211 Th~en 
quote<r wifllapprovar the District Court's finding that § 16-
1-20.1, and § 16-1-20.2, were efforts "to encourage religious _, __, 
activity. Even though these statutes are permissive in ~ 
district's rule providing for the reading of the Lord's Prayer as part of a 
school's opening exercises, despite the fact that participation in those exer-
cises was voluntary. 
"Unless and until this Court reconsiders the foregoing decisions, they 
appear to control this case. In my view, the District Court was obligated 
to follow them." Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile 
County, 103 S. Ct. 842, 842-843 (1983). 
• The Court of Appeals wrote: 
"The stare decisis doctrine and its exceptions do not apply where a lower 
· court is compelled to apply the precedent of a higher court. See 20 Am. 
Jur. 2d Courts § 183 (1965). 
"Federal district courts and circuit courts are bound to adhere to the con-
trolling decisions of the Supreme Court. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370, 
375 (1982) . . . . JUSTICE REHNQUIST emphasized the importance of 
precedent when he observed that 'unless we wish anarchy to prevail within 
the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by 
the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those 
courts may think it to be.' Davis, 454 U. S. at 375, 102 S. Ct. at 706. See 
Al8o, Thuraton Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., - U. S. 
-, 103 S. Ct. 1343, 75 L. Ed. 2d - (1983) (the Supreme Court, in a 
per curiam decision, recently stated: 'Needless to say, only this Court may 
overrule one of its precedents')." Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1532 
(CA111983). 
rr Id., at 1533-1534. This Court has denied a petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari that presented the question whether the Establishment Clause pro-
hibited the teachers' religious prayer activities. Board of School Commis-
sioners of Mobile County, Alabama v. Jaffree, - U. S. - (1984). 
• /d., at 1535. 
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fonn, it is nevertheless state involvement respecting an 
establishment of religion." 29 Thus, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that both statutes were "specifically the type 
which the Supreme Court addressed in Engle [v. Vitale, 370 
u. s. 421 (1962)]." 30 ~ 
A suggestion for rehearing en bane was denied over the 
dissent of four judges who expressed the opinion that the full 
court should reconsider the panel decision insofar as it held 
§ 16-1-20.1 unconstitutional. 31 When this Court noted prob-
abiej\:iFiS(tiction, it limited argument to the question that 
those four judges thought worthy of reconsideration. The 
judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the other 
issues presented by the appeals was affirmed. Wallace v. 
Jaffree,- U.S.- (1984). 
II 
Our unanimous affirmance of the Court of Appeals' judg-
•]bid. 
• Ibid. After noting that the invalidity of § 16-1-20.2 was aggravated 
by "the existence of a government-composed prayer,'' and that the propo-
nents of the legislation admitted that that section "amounts to the estab-
lishment of a state religion,'' the court added this comment on§ 16-1-20.1: 
"The objective of the meditation or prayer statute (Ala. Code § 16-1-
20.1) was also the advancement of religion. This fact was recognized by 
the district court at the hearing for preliminary relief where it was estab-
lished that the intent of the statute was to return prayer to the public 
schools. James, 544 F. Supp. at 731. The existence of this fact and the 
inclusion of prayer obviously involves the state in religious activities. 
Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161 (MD Tenn. 1982). This demon-
strates a lack of secular legislative purpose on the part of the Alabama 
Legislature. Additionally, the statute has the primary effect of advancing 
religion. We do not imply that simple meditation or silence is barred from 
the public schools; we hold that the state cannot participate in the advance-
ment of religious activities through any guise, including teacher-led medi-
tation. It is not the activity itself that concerns us; it is the purpose of the 
activity that we shall scrutinize. Thus, the existence of these elements 
require that we also hold section 16-1-20.1 in violation of the establishment 
clause." I d., at 1535-1536 
RJaffree v. Wallace, 718 F. 2d 614 (CA111983) (per curiam). 
~ 
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ment concerning § 16-1-20.2 makes it unnecessary to com-
ment at length on the District Court's remarkable conclusion 
that the Federal Constitution imposes no obstacle to Ala-
bama's establishment of a state religion. Before analyzing 
the precise issue that is presented to us, it is nevertheless ap-
propriate to recall how finnly embedded in our constitutional 
jurisprudence is the proposition that the several States have 
no greater power to restrain the individual freedoms pro-
tected by the First Amendment than does the Congress of 
the United States. 
As is plain from its text, the First Amendment was 
adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the 
individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express 
himself in accordance with the dictates of his own con-
science.31 Until the Fourteenth Amendment was added to 
the Constitution, the First Amendment's restraints on the 
exercise of federal power simply did not apply to the States. 33 
But when the Constitution was amended to prohibit any 
State from depriving any person of liberty without due proc-
ess of law, that Amendment imposed the same substantive 
limitations on the States' power to legislate that the First 
Amendment had always imposed on the Congress' power. 
This Court has confinned and endorsed this elementary prop-
osition of law time and time again. 34 
• The First Amendment provides: 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U. S. Const., 
Arndt. 1. 
•see Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of Nw Orleans, 44 
u. s. 589, 609 (1845). 
"See, e. g., Mayrw:rd v. Wooley, 430 U. S. 705, 714 (1977) (right to 
refuse endorsement of an offensive state motto); Terminello v. Chicago, 
337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949) (right to free speech); Board of Education v. Barnett, 
319 U. S. 624, 637-638 (1943) (right to refuse to participate in a ceremony 
that offends one's conscience); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 
.· 
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Writing for a unanimous Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940), Justice Roberts explained: 
''We hold that the statute, as construed and applied to 
the appellants, deprives them of their liberty without 
due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The fundamental concept of liberty em-
bodied in that Amendment embraces the liberties guar-
anteed by the First Amendment. The First Amend-
ment declares that Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has 
rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as 
Congress to enact such laws. The constitutional inhi-
bition oflegislation on the subject of religion has a double 
aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by' law 
of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form 
of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to ad-
here to such religious organization or form of worship as 
the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. 
On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the 
chosen form of religion." 
Cantwell, of course, is but one case in which the Court has 
identified the individual's freedom of conscience as the cen-
tral liberty that unifies the various clauses in the First 
(1940) (right to proselytize one's religious faith); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 
496, 519 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring) (right to assemble peaceably); Near 
v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 707 (1931) (right to publish an unpopular 
newspaper); Whitney v. Californi4, 274 U. S. 557, 573 (Brandeis, J ., con-
curring) (right to advocate the cause of communism); Gitlow v. New York, 
268 U. S. 652, 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (right to express an unpopular 
opinion); cf. Abington School .District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 215, n. 6 
(1963), where the Court apJ!rovingly quoted Board of Education v. Minor, 
23 Ohio St. 211, 253 (1872), which stated: 
"The great bulk of human affairs and human interests is left by any free 
government to individual enterprise and individual action. Religion is em-
inently one of these interests, lying outside the true and legitimate prov-
ince of government." 
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Amendment. 36 Enlarging on this theme, THE CmEF Jus-
TICE recently wrote: ,____ 
" 'We begin with the proposition that the right of free-
dom of thought protected by the First Amendment 
against state action includes both the right to speak 
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. See 
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 633-634 
(1943); id., at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring). A system 
which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, 
and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomi-
tant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right 
to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are com-
plementary components of the broader concept of 'indi-
vidual freedom of mind."' I d., at 637. 
"'The Court in Barnette, supra, was faced with a state 
statute which required public school students to partici-
pate in daily public ceremonies by h~g both 
with words and traditional salute gestures. In overrul-
ing its prior decision in MineT81Jille District v. Gobitis, 
310 U. S. 586 (1940), the Court held that 'a ceremony so 
touching matters of opinion and political attitude may 
[not] be imposed upon the individual by official authority 
•For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 164 (1944), 
the Court wrote: 
"If by this position appellant seeks for freedom of conscience a broader 
protection than for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted that any of the 
great liberties insured by the First Article can be given higher place than 
the others. All have preferred position in our basic scheme. Schneider v. 
State, 308 U. S. 147; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296. All are in-
terwoven there together. Differences there are, in them and in the modes 
appropriate for their exercise. But they have unity in the charter's prime 
place because they have unity in their human sources and functionings." 
See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 269 (1981) (stating that reli-
gious worship and discussion "are forms of speech and association pro-
tected by the First Amendment"). 
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under powers committed to any political organization 
under our Constituiton.' 319 U. S., at 636. Compel-
ling the affirmative act of a flag salute involved a more 
serious infringement upon personal liberties than the 
passive act of carrying the state motto on a license plate, 
but the difference is essentially one of degree. Here, as 
in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which 
forces an individual, as part of his daily life-indeed con-
stantly while his automobile is in public view-to be an 
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideologi-
cal point of view he finds unacceptable. In doing so, the 
State 'invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it 
is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitu-
tion to reserve from all official control.' I d., at 642." 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714-715 (1977). 
~
Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from 
speaking are complimentary components of a broader concept 
of individual freedom of mind, so also the individual's free-
dom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his right to 
refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority. 
At one time it was thought that this right merely proscribed 
the preference of one Christian sect over another, but would 
not require equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the 
atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Mo-
hammedism or Judaism. 311 But when the underlying princi-
• Thus Joseph Story wrote: 
"Probably at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and of the 
amendment to it now under consideration [First Amendment], the general 
if not the universal sentiment in America was, that christianity ought to 
receive encouragement from the state so far as was not incompatible with 
the private rights of conscience and the freedom of religious worship. An 
attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold 
all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if 
not universal indignation." 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 
of the United States § 1874, at 593 (1851) (footnote omitted). 
In the same volume, Story continued: 
.· 
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ple has been examined in the crucible of litigation, the Court 
has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of 
conscience protect~ by ~e F~endm~he 
right to select an re!i ous faith gr. n~e af ii!!; 31 "11ii8Con-
cluston dertves support not o y from the interest in respect-
ing the individual's freedom of conscience, but also from the 
conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the 
"The real object of the amendment was, not to countenance, much less to 
advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating chris-
tianity; but to ncluds all rivalry amoTU} christian sects, and to prevent any 
na.timtal ecclesiastical establi8hment which should give to a hierarchy the 
eulUBive patronage of the national government. It thus cut off the means 
of religioua peraecution (the vice and pest of fO'T"TneT ages), and of the 
subversion of the rights of conscience in matters of religiqn which had 
been trampled upon almost from the days of the Apostles to the present 
age •••• " Id., at § 1877, at 594 (emphasis supplied). 
"Thus, in Everaon v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15 (1947), the 
Court stated: 
"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at 
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. 
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one 
religion over another." 
Id., at 18 (the First Amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its 
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers"); Abington 
School Di8trict v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 216 (1963) ("this Court has re-
jected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids 
only governmental preference of one religion over another"); id., at 226 
("The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a 
long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel 
of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bit-
ter experience that it is not within the power of the government to invade 
that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance 
or retard. In the relationship between man and religion, the State is 
firmly committed to a position of neutrality"); Torasco v. Watkins, 367 
U. S. 488, 495 (1961) ("We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State 
nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess 
a belief or disbelief in any religion.' Neither can constitutionally pass laws 
or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, 
and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God 
as against those religions founded on different beliefs''). 
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product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful. 38 As 
Justice Jackson eloquently stated in Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943): 
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional con-
stellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, re-
• In his "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 
1785," James Madison wrote, in part: 
"1. Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, 'that Re-
ligion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of discharg-
ing it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or vio-
lence.' The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and 
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as 
these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is 
unalienable; because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence 
contemplated by their own minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men: 
It is unalienable also; because what is here a right towards men, is a duty 
towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator 
such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. 
"We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is 
abridged by the iilstitution of Civil . Society, and that Religion is wholly 
exempt from its cognizance. 
"3. Because, it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our lib-
erties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of citizens, and 
one of [the] noblest characteristics of the late Revolution. The freemen of 
America did not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exer-
cise, and entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the conse-
quences in the principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the 
principle. We revere this lesson too much, soon to forget it. Who does 
not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclu-
sion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular 
sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?" The Complete Madison 
299-301 (1953) 
See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 435 (1961) ("It is neither sacri-
legious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this coun-
try should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers 
and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to 
those the people choose to look for religious guidance"). 
16 
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ligion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein." 
Alabama, no less than the Congress, must respect that basic 
truth. 38 
III 
When the Court has been called upon to construe the 
breadth of the Establishment Clause, it has examined the 
/ criteria developed over a period of many years. Thus, in 
L~ v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (~971), we 
wrote: . 
"Every analysis in this area must begin with consider-
ation of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court 
over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned 
• As the Barnette opinion explained, it is the teaching of history, rather 
than any appraisal of the quality of a State's motive, that supports this 
duty to respect basic freedoms: 
"Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in . support of some end 
thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many good 
as well as by evil men. Nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon but 
at other times and places the ends have been racial or territorial security, 
support of a dynasty or regime, and particular plans for saving souls. As 
the first and moderate methods to obtain unity have failed, those bent on 
its accomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity. As gov-
ernmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more 
bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper division of our 
people could proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary 
to choose what doctrine and whose program public educational officials 
shall compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate futility of such at-
tempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort from the 
Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, 
the Inquisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian ex-
iles as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our 
present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive eliminati9n of dis-
sent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unifica-
tion of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard." 319 U. S., 
at 640-641. 
See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S., at 431 ("a union of government and 
religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion"). 
c • 
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from our cases. First, th~tute must have a secular 
legislativefeurpose; secon/i;-1~ principal or rimary ef-
fect "=" e one · eit er-advanc or inhibits reli-
gio Board 9/:Epucation v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 243 
(1968); finall~e statute must not foster 'an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.' Walz [v. Tax 
Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970)]." 
It is the first of these three criteria that is most plainly impli-
cated by this~trict Court correctly recog-
nized, no consideration e seco d or third criteria is nec-
essary if a statute does not have a clear! secular urpose. 40 
At thevery east, the irst Amendment requires that a stat-
ute must be invalidated if it is entirelJ' motivated py a pur-
pose to advance rel!gion 41 •• ,___ 
In applying thelp\11-;;se ~' it is appropriate to ask 
"whether government's actual pur se is to endorse or dis-
approve of religion." 42 n s case, the answer o that 
question is dispositive. For the record not only provides us 
with an unambiguous affirmative answer, but it also reveals 
that the enactment of§ 16-1-20.1 was not motivated by any ~ 
cl~ indeed, the s~cular 
purpose. - -------.::> 
~
• See B'UP"'J', n. 22. 
"See Lynch v. Donnelly,- U.S.-,- (1984); id., at-
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring); id., at- (BRENNAN, J., joined by MAR-
SHALL, BLACKMUN and STEVENS, JJ., dissenting); Mueller v. Allen, 103 
S. Ct. 3062, 3066-3067 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 271 
(1982); Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam); Wolman 
v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 236 (1977). 
• Lynch v. Donnelly, - U. S. -, - (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., con-
curring) ("The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether govern-
ment's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect 
prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the prac-
tice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. 
An affirmative wer to either question should render the challenged 
practice mv 'd . 
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• The statement indicated, in pertinent part: 
"Gentlemen, by passage of this bill by the Alabama Legislature our chil-
dren in this state will have the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heri-
tage of this state and this country. The United States as well as the State 
of Alabama was founded by people who believe in God. I believe this effort 
j to return voluntary prayer to our public schools for its return to us to the original position of the writers of the Constitution, this local philosophies 
and beliefs hundreds of Alabamians have urged my continuous support for 
permitting school prayer. Since coming to the Alabama Senate I have 
j 
worked hard on this legislation to accompZish the return of voluntary 
prayer in our public schools and return to the basic moral fiber." App. 50 
(emphasis added) . 
.. I d., at 52. The District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that 
the purpose of§ 16-1-20.1 was "an effort on the part of the State of Ala-
bama to encourage a religious activity." Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 
727, 732 (SD Ala. 1882); Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CAll 
1983). The evidence presented to the District Court elaborated on. the 
express admission of the Governor of Alabama (then Fob James) that the 
enactment of§ 16-1-20.1 was intended to "clarify [the State's] intent to 
have prayer as part of the daily classroom activity," compare Second 
Amended Complaint , 32(d) (App. 24-25) with Governor's Answer to 
§ 32(d) (App. 40); and that the "expressed legislative purpose in enacting 
Section 16-1-20.1 (1981) was . to 'return voluntary prayer to public 
schools,'" compare Second Amended Complaint ,, 32(b) and (c) (App. 24) 
with Governor's Answer to n 32(b) and (c) (App. 40). 
• Appellant Governor George C. Wallace now argues that§ 16-1-20.1 "is 
best understood as a permissible accommodation of religion" and that 
viewed even in terms of the Lemon test, the "statute conforms to accept-
4"' 8 0 llsz :a 
~~ 
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The unrebutted evidence of legislative intent contained in 
the legislative record and in the testimony of the sponsor of 
§ 16-1-20.1 is confirmed by a consideration of the relationship 
between this statute and the two other measures that were 
considered in this case. The District Court found that the 
1981 st~d its 1982 sequel had a common, nonsecular 
purpose. The wholly religious haracter of the later enact-
ment i · yfdt o its x "Em the diffeTe"nces 
between§ 16-1-20.1 and its 1978 predecessor, § 16-1-20, are 
examined, it is equally clear that the 1981 statute has the 
same wholly religious character. 
There are only three textual differences between § 16-
able constitutional criteria." Brief of Appellant George C. Wallace 5; see 
also Brief of Appellants Douglas T. Smith et al., 39 (§ 16-1-20.1 "accommo-
dates the free exercise of the religious beliefs and free exercise of speech 
and belief of those affected"), 47. These arguments seem to he based on 
the theor:y that the free exercise of religion of some of the State's citizens 
~ened before the statute was eDacted. The United States, ap-
pearing as amicus curiae in support of the appellants, candidly acknowl-
edges that "it is unlikely that a strong Free Exercise claim could be made 
that time for personal prayer must be set aside during the school day." 
Brief for the United States 10. There is no basis for the suggestion that 
§ 16-1-20.1 "is a means for accommodating the religious and meditative 
needs of students without in any way diminishing the school's own neutral-
ity or secular atmosphere." !d., at 11. In this case, it is undisputed that 
at the time of the enactment of§ 16-1-20.1 there was no governmental 
practice impeding students from silently praying for one minute at the be-
ginning of each school day; thus, there was no need to "accommodate" or to 
exempt individuals from any general governmental requirement because of 
the dictates of our cases interpreting the Free Exercise Clause. See, 
e. g., Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U. S. 398 (1963); see also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 
U. S. 203, 226 (1963) ("While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits 
the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has 
never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to prac-
tice its beliefs''). What was missing in the appellants' eyes at time of the 
enactment of§ 16-1-20.1--and therefore what is precisely the aspect that 
makes the statute unconstitutional-was the State's endorsement and pro-
motion of religion and a particular religious practice. 
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1-20.1 and § 16-1-20: (1) the earlier statute applies only to 
grades one through six, whereas § 16-1-20.1 applies to all 
grades; (2) the earlier statute uses the word "shall" whereas 
§ 16-1-20.1 uses the word "may"; (3) the earlier statute refers 
only to ''meditation" whereas § 16-1-20.1 refers to "medita-
tion or voluntary prayer." The first difference is of no rele-
vance in this litigation because the ·minor appellees were in 
kindergarten or second grade during the 1981-1982 academic 
year. The second difference would also have no impact on 
this litigation because the mandatory language of§ 16-1-20 
continued to apply to grades one through six. 46 Thus, the 
only significant textual difference is the addition of the words 
"or voluntary prayer." 
( 
The legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools 
is, of course, quite different from merely protectin everJ 
student's ri ht to· en ge in volun ra er during an jlP-
propriate moment ofs1 ence durin the school day. The 1978 
statu e eady protecte that right, contaming nothing that 
prevented any student from engaging in voluntary prayer 
during a silent minute of meditation. 47 Appellants have not 
identified any secular purpose that was not fully served by 
§ 16-1-20 before the enactment of§ 16-1-20.1. Thus, only 
two conclusions are consistent with the text of§ 16-1-20.1: 
(1) the statute was ~nacted to convey a message of State en-
dorsement and promotion of prayer; or (2) the statute was en-
acted for no purpose. No one suggests that the statute was 
nothing but a meaningless or irrational act. 46 
• See n. 1, supra. 
#I Indeed, for some persons meditation itself may be a form of prayer. 
B. Larson, Larson's Book of Cults 62-65 (1982); C. Whittier, Silent Prayer 
. and Meditation in World Religions 1-7 (Cong. Research Service). 
• If the conclusion that the statute had no purpose were tenable, it 
would remain true that no purpose is not a secular purpose. But such a 
conclusion is inconsistent with the common-sense presumption that stat-
utes are usually enacted to change existing law. Appellants do not even 
suggest that the State had no purpose in enacting§ 16-1-20.1. 
I~ 
\ 
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We must, therefore, conclude that the Alabama Legisla-
ture intended to change existing law 48 and that it was moti-
vated by the same purpose that the Governor's Answer to 
the Second Amended Complaint expressly admitted; that the 
statement inserted in the legislative history revealed; and 
that Senator's Holmes testimony frankly described. The 
Legislature enacted § 16-1-20.1 despite the existence of 
§ 16-1-20 for the sole purpose of expressing the State's en-
dorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the begin-
ning of each school day. The addition of "or voluntary 
prayer" indicates that the State intended to characterize 
prayer as a favored practice. Such an endorsement is not 
consistent with the established principle that the Govern-
ment must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward 
religion. 50 
The importance of that principle does not permit us to treat 
this as an inconsequential case involving nothing more than a 
few words of symbolic speech on behalf of the political major-
ity.61 For whenever the State itself speaks on a religious 
• United States v. Champlin, 341 U. S. 290, 297 (1951) (a "statute 
cannot be divorced from the circumstances existing at the time it was 
passed"); id., at 298 (refusing to attribute pointless purpose to Congress in 
the absence of facts to the contrary); United States v. Natitmal City Lines, 
337 U. S. 78, 80-81 (1949) (rejecting Government's argument that Con-
gress had no desire to change law when enacting legislation). 
•See, e. g., Stone v. (}raham, 449 U. S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curiam); 
Ccwnmitteefor Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 792-793 (1973) 
("A proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment 
Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward reli-
gion''); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 109 (1968); Abington School 
District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 215-222 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 
U. S. 421, 430 (1961) ("Neither the fact that the prayer may be denomina-
tionally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students 
is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment 
Clause"); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S 203, 211-212 (1948); 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 18 (1947). 
11 As this Court stated in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430-431 (1962): 
.: 
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subject, one of the questions that we must ask is ''whether 
the Government intends to convey a message of endorsement 
or disapproval of religion." 52 The well-supported concurrent I 
findings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals-that 
§ 16-1-20.1 was intended to convey a message of State-ap-
proval of prayer activities in the public schools-make it un-
necessary, and indeed inappropraite, to evaluate the practi-
cal significance of the addition of the words "or voluntary 
prayer" to the statute. Keeping in mind, as we must, "both 
"The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not de-
pend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated 
by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those 
laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or not." 
Moroever, this Court has noted that "[w]hen the power, prestige and finan-
cial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the 
indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the pre-
vailing officially approved religion is plain." Id., at 431. This comment 
has special force in the public-school context where attendance is manda-
tory. Justice Frankfurter acknowledged this reality in McCollum v. 
Board of EducatUm., 333 U. S. 203, 227 (1948) (concurring opinion): 
"That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint, it does 
not eliminate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to 
conscience and outside the school's domain. The law of imitation operates, 
and non-conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children." 
See also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 290 (1963) 
(BRENNAN, J., concurring); cf. Marsh. v. Chambers,- U.S.-, 3336 
(1983) (distinguishing between adults not susceptible to "religious indoctri-
nation" and children subject to "peer pressure"). Further, this Court has 
observed: 
"That [Boards of Education] are educating the young for citizenship is rea-
son for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, 
if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to dis-
count important principles of our government as mere platitudes." Board 
of EducatUm. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943). 
•Lynch. v. Donnelly,-- U.S.-,- (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., con-
curring) ("The purpose prong of the Lemon test requires that a govern-
ment activity have a secular purpose. . . . The proper inquiry under the 
prupsoe prong of the Lemon test ... is whether the government intends to 
convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion"). 
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the fundamental place held by the Establishment Clause in 
our constitutional scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in 
which Establishment Clause values can be eroded," 58 we con-
clude that§ 16-1-20.1 violates the First Amendment. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affinned. 
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JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
At an early stage of this litigation, the constitutionality of 
three Alabama statutes was questioned: (1) § 16-1-20, en-
acted in 1978, which authorized a one-minute period of silence 
in all public schools "for meditation"; 1 (2) § 16-1-20.1, en-
acted in 1981, which authorized a period of silence "for medi-
tation or voluntary prayer"; 2 and (3) § 16-1-20.2, enacted in 
' Alabama Code § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) reads as follows: 
"At the commencement of the first class each day in the first through the 
sixth grades in all public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which 
each such class is held shall announce that a period of silence, not to exceed 
one minute in duration, shall be observed for meditation, and during any 
such period silence shall be maintained and no activities engaged in." 
Appellees have abandoned any claim that § 16-1-20 is unconstitutional. 
See Brief for Appellees 2. 
2 Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) provides: 
"At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all 
public schools the teacher in charge of the room in which each class is held 
may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration 
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1982, which authorized teachers to lead "willing students" in 
a prescribed prayer to "Almighty God o o • the Creator and 
Supreme Judge of the world." 3 
At the preliminary-injunction stage of this case, the Dis-
trict Court distinguished § 16-1-20 from the other two stat-
utes. It then held that there was "nothing wrong" with 
§ 16-1-20,4 but that § 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 were both 
invalid because the sole purpose of both was "an effort on the 
part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activ-
ity."5 After the trial on the merits, the District Court did 
not change its interpretation of these two statutes, but held 
that they were constitutional because, in its opinion, Ala-
bama has the power to establish a state religion if it chooses 
to do so.6 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's ini-
tial interpretation of the purpose of both §§ 16-1-20.1 and 
16-1-20.2, and held them both unconstitutional. 7 We have 
shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such 
period no other activities shall be engaged in." 
8 Alabama Code § 16-1-2002 (Supp. 1984) provides: 
"From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any public educational in-
stitution within the state of Alabama, recognizing that the Lord God is one, 
at the beginning of any homeroom or any class, may pray, may lead willing 
students in prayer, or may lead the willing students in the following prayer 
to God: 
"Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge You as the 
Creator and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your justice, Your truth, 
and Your peace abound this day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the 
counsels of our government, in the sanctity of our homes and in the class-
rooms of our schools in the name of our Lord. Amen." 
4 The court stated that it did not find any potential infirmity in § 16-1-20 
because "it is a statute which prescribes nothing more than a child in school 
shall have the right to meditate in silence and there is nothing wrong with a 
little meditation and quietness." Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 
(SD Ala. 1982). 
5 Ibid. 
8 Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 554 F. 
Supp. 1104, 1128 (SD Ala. 1983). 
7 Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535-1536 (CA111983). 
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already affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding with respect 
to § 16-1-20.2.8 Moreover, appellees have not questioned 
the holding that § 16-1-20 is valid. 9 Thus, the narrow ques-
tion for decision is whether § 16-1-20.1, which authorizes a 
period of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer," is a 
law respecting the establishment of religion within the mean-
ing of the First Amendment. 10 
I 
Appellee Ishmael Jaffree is a resident of Mobile County, 
Alabama. On May 28, 1982, he filed a complaint on behalf of 
three of his minor children; two of them were second-grade 
students and the third was then in kindergarten. The com-
plaint named members of the Mobile County School Board, 
various school officials, and the minor plaintiffs' three teach-
ers as defendants. 11 The complaint alleged that the appellees 
brought the action "seeking principally a declaratory judg-
ment and an injunction restraining the Defendants and each 
of them from maintaining or allowing the maintenance of reg-
ular religious prayer services or other forms of religious ob-
servances in the Mobile County Public Schools in violation of 
the First Amendment as made applicable to states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion." 12 The complaint further alleged that two of the chil-
dren had been subjected to various acts of religious indoctri-
nation "from the beginning of the school year in September, 
1981"; 13 that the defendant teachers had "on a daily basis" led 
their classes in saying certain prayers in unison; 14 that the 
8 Wallace v. Jaffree , 466 u. s. - (1984). 
9 See n. 1, supra. 
10 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, of course, has 
long been held applicable to the States. Everson v. Board of Education, 
330 u. s. 1, 15-16 (1947). 
11 App. 4-7. 
12 I d., at 4. 
18 I d., at 7. 
" Ibid. 
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minor children were exposed to ostracism from their peer 
group class members if they did not participate; 16 and that 
Ishmael J affree had repeatedly but unsuccessfully requested 
that the devotional services be stopped. The original com-
plaint made no reference to any Alabama statute. 
On June 4, 1982, appellees filed an amended complaint 
seeking class certification, 16 and on June 30, 1982, they filed 
a second amended complaint naming the Governor of Ala-
bama and various State officials as additional defendants. In 
that amendment the appellees challenged the constitution-
ality of three Alabama statutes: §§ 16-1-20, 16-1-20.1, and 
16-1-20.2. 17 
On August 2, 1982, the District Court held an evidentiary 
hearing on appellees' motion for a preliminary injunction. 
At that hearing, State Senator Donald G. Holmes testified 
that he was the "prime sponsor" of the bill that was enacted 
in 1981 as § 16-1-20.1. 18 He explained that the bill was an 
"effort to return voluntary prayer to our public schools ... it 
is a beginning and a step in the right direction." 19 Apart 
from the purpose to return voluntary prayer to public school, 
Senator Holmes unequivocally testified that he had "no other 
purpose in mind." 20 A week after the hearing, the District 
Court entered a preliminary injunction. 21 The court held 
that appellees were likely to prevail on the merits because 
the enactment of§§ 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 did not reflect a 
clearly secular purpose. 22 
16 /d., at 8-9. 
18 /d., at 17. 
17 /d., at 21. See nn. 1, 2, and 3, supra. 
18 /d., at 47-49. 
19 /d., at 50. 
20 /d., at 52. 
21 Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (SD Ala. 1982). 
22 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). Insofar as 
relevant to the issue now before us, the District Court explained: 
"The injury to plaintiffs from the possible establishment of a religion by 
the State of Alabama contrary to the proscription of the establishment 
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In November 1982, the District Court held a four-day trial 
on the merits. The evidence related primarily to the 
1981-1982 academic year-the year after the enactment of 
§ 16-1-20.1 and prior to the enactment of § 16-1-20.2. The 
District Court found that during that academic year each of 
the minor plaintiffs' teachers had led classes in prayer activi-
ties, even after being informed of appellees' objections to 
these activities. 23 
In its lengthy conclusions of law, the District Court re-
viewed a number of opinions of this Court interpreting the 
clause outweighs any indirect harm which may occur to defendants as a re-
sult of an injunction. Granting an injunction will merely maintain the 
status quo existing prior to the enactment of the statutes. 
"The purpose of Senate Bill8 [§ 16-1-20.2] as evidenced by its preamble, 
is to provide for a prayer that may be given in public schools. Senator 
Holmes testified that his purpose in sponsoring§ 16-1-20.1 was to return 
voluntary prayer to the public schools. He intended to provide children 
the opportunity of sharing in their spiritual heritage of Alabama and of this 
country. See Alabama Senate Journal 921 (1981). The Fifth Circuit has 
explained that 'prayer is a primary religious activity in itself. . . . ' Karen 
B. v. Treen, 653 F. 2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1981). The state may not employ 
a religious means in its public schools. Abington School District v. 
Schempp, [374 U. S. 203, 224] (1963). Since these statutes do not reflect a 
clearly secular purpose, no consideration of the remaining two-parts of the 
Lemon test is necessary. 
"The enactment of Senate Bill 8 [§ 16-1-20.2] and § 16-1-20-.1 is an ef-
fort on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity. 
Even though these statutes are permissive in form, it is nevertheless state 
involvement respecting an establishment of religion. Engle v. Vitale, [370 
U. S. 421, 430] (1962). Thus, binding precedent which this Court is under 
a duty to follow indicates the substantial likelihood plaintiffs will prevail on 
the merits." 544 F. Supp., at 730-732. 
28 The District Court wrote: 
"Defendant Boyd, as early as September 16, 1981, led her class at E. R. 
Dickson in singing the following phrase: 
"'God is great, God is good,' 
" 'Let us thank him for our food, 
"'bow our heads we all are fed, 
" 'Give us Lord our daily bread. 
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Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and then em-
barked gn a fresh examination of the question whether the 
First Amendment imposes any barrier to the establishment 
of an official religion by the State of Alabama. After review-
ing at length what it perceived to be newly discovered his-
torical evidence, the District Court concluded that "the 
establishment clause of the first amendment to the United 
States Constitution does not prohibit the state from estab-
lishing a religion." 24 In a separate opinion, the District 
Court dismissed appellees' challenge to the three Alabama 
statutes because of a failure to state any claim for which relief 
could be granted. The court's dismissal of this challenge was 
"'Amen!' 
"The recitation of this phrase continued on a daily basis throughout the 
1981-82 school year. 
"Defendant Pixie Alexander has led her class at Craighead in reciting 
the following phrase: 
"'God is great, God is good, 
"'Let us thank him for our food.' 
"Further, defendant Pixie Alexander had her class recite the following, 
which is known as the Lord's Prayer: 
"'Our Father, which are in heaven, hallowed be Thy name. Thy king-
dom come. Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day 
our daily bread and forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors. And 
lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil for thine is the kingdom 
and the power and the glory forever. Amen.' 
"The recitation of these phrases continued on a daily basis throughout the 
1981-82 school year. 
"Ms. Green admitted that she frequently leads her class in singing the 
following song: 
"'For health and strength and daily food, we praise Thy name, Oh Lord.' 
"This activity continued throughout the school year, despite the fact that · 
Ms. Green had knowledge that plaintiff did not want his child exposed to 
the above-mentioned song.'' Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of 
Mobile County, 554 F. Supp., at 1107-1108. 
?A I d., at 1128. 
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also based on its conclusion that the Establishment Clause 
did not bar the States from establishing a religion. 25 
The Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases; not sur-
prisingly, it reversed. The Court of Appeals noted that this 
26 Jaffree v. James, 554 F. Supp. 1130, 1132 (SD Ala. 1983). The Dis-
trict Court's opinion was announced on January 14, 1983. On February 
11, 1983, JusTICE POWELL, in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Elev-
enth Circuit, entered a stay which in effect prevented the District Court 
from dissolving the preliminary injunction that had been entered in August 
1982. JusTICE POWELL accurately summarized the prior proceedings: 
"The situation, quite briefly, is as follows: Beginning in the fall of 1981, 
teachers in the minor applicants' schools conducted prayers in their regular 
classes, including group recitations of the Lord's Prayer. At the time, an 
Alabama statute provided for a one-minute period of silence 'for meditation 
or voluntary prayer' at the commencement of each day's classes in the pub-
lic elementary schools. Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1982). In 1982, 
Alabama enacted a statute permitting public school teachers to lead their 
classes in prayer. 1982 Ala. Acts 735. 
"Applicants, objecting to prayer in the public schools, filed suit to enjoin 
the activities. They later amended their complaint to challenge the appli-
cable state statutes. After a hearing, the District Court granted a pre-
liminary injunction. Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (1982). It recog-
nized that it was bound by the decisions of this Court, id., at 731, and that 
under those decisions it was 'obligated to enjoin the enforcement' of the 
statutes, id., at 733. 
"In its subsequent decision on the merits, however, the District Court 
reached a different conclusion. Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners 
of Mobile County, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (1983). It again recognized that the 
prayers at issue, given in public school classes and led by teachers, were 
violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as that 
Clause had been construed by this Court. The District Court neverthe-
less ruled 'that the United States Supreme Court has erred.' I d., at 1128. 
It therefore dismissed the complaint and dissolved the injunction. 
"There can be little doubt that the District Court was correct in finding 
that conducting prayers as part of a school program is unconstitutional 
under this Court's decisions. In Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962), the 
Court held that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made 
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits a State 
from authorizing prayer in the public schools. The following Term, in 
Murray v. Curlett, decided with Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 
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Court had considered and had rejected the historical argu-
ments that the District Court found persuasive, and that the 
District Court had misapplied the doctrine of stare decisis. 26 
The Court of Appeals then held that the teachers' religious 
activities violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. 27 With respect to§ 16-1-20.1 and§ 16-1-20.2, 
the Court of Appeals stated that "both statutes advance and 
encourage religious activities." 28 The Court of Appeals then 
quoted with approval the District Court's finding that § 16-
1-20.1, and § 16-1-20.2, were efforts "'to encourage a reli-
gious activity. Even though these statutes are permissive in 
U. S. 203 (1963), the Court explicitly invalidated a school district's rule 
providing for the reading of the Lord's Prayer as part of a school's opening 
exercises, despite the fact that participation in those exercises was 
voluntary. 
"Unless and until this Court reconsiders the foregoing decisions, they 
appear to control this case. In my view, the District Court was obligated 
to follow them." Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile 
County, 459 U. S. 1314, 1314-1316 (1983). 
211 The Court of Appeals wrote: 
"The stare decisis doctrine and its exceptions do not apply where a lower 
court is compelled to apply the precedent of a higher court. See 20 Am. 
Jur. 2d Courts § 183 (1965). · 
"Federal district courts and circuit courts are bound to adhere to the con-
trolling decisions of the Supreme Court. Hutto v. Davis, [454 U. S. 370, 
375] (1982) . . . . Justice Rehnquist emphasized the importance of 
precedent when he observed that 'unless we wish anarchy to prevail within 
the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by 
the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those 
courts may think it to be.' Davis, [ 454 U. S. at 375]. See Also, Thurston 
Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., [460 U. S. 533, 535] (1983) (the 
Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, recently stated: 'Needless to say, 
only this Court may overrule one of its precedents')." Jaffree v. Wallace, 
705 F. 2d, at 1532. 
Z7 ld., at 1533-1534. This Court has denied a petition for a writ of 
certiorari that presented the question whether the Establishment Clause 
prohibited the teachers' religious prayer activities. Board of School Com-
missioners of Mobile County, Alabama v. Jaffree, 466 U. S. -- (1984). 
28 705 F. 2d, at 1535. 
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fonn, it is nevertheless state involvement respecting an 
establishment of religion."' 29 Thus, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that both statutes were "specifically the type 
which the Supreme Court addressed in Engle [v. Vitale, 370 
u. s. 421 (1962)]." 30 
A suggestion for rehearing en bane was denied over the 
dissent of four judges who expressed the opinion that the full 
court should reconsider the panel decision insofar as it held 
§ 16-1-20.1 unconstitutional. 31 When this Court noted prob-
able jurisdiction, it limited argument to the question that 
those four judges thought worthy of reconsideration. The 
judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the other 
issues presented by the appeals was affinned. Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 466 U.S.- (1984). 
II 
Our unanimous affirmance of the Court of Appeals' judg-
211 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. After noting that the invalidity of § 16-1-20.2 was aggravated 
by "the existence of a government composed prayer,'' and that the propo-
nents of the legislation admitted that that section "amounts to the estab-
lishment of a state religion,'' the court added this comment on§ 16-1-20.1: 
"The objective of the meditation or prayer statute (Ala. Code § 16-1-
20.1) was also the advancement of religion. This fact was recognized by 
the district court at the hearing for preliminary relief where it was estab-
lished that the intent of the statute was to return prayer to the public 
schools. James, 544 F. Supp. at 731. The existence of this fact and the 
inclusion of prayer obviously involves the state in religious activities. 
Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161 (MD Tenn. 1982). This demon-
strates a lack of secular legislative purpose on the part of the Alabama 
Legislature. Additionally, the statute has the primary effect of advancing 
religion. We do not imply that simple meditation or silence is barred from 
the public schools; we hold that the state cannot participate in the advance-
ment of religious activities through any guise, including teacher-led medi-
tation. It is not the activity itself that concerns us; it is the purpose of the 
activity that we shall scrutinize. Thus, the existence of these elements 
require that we also hold section 16-1-20.1 in violation of the establishment 
clause." Id., at 1535-1536. 
31 Jaffree v. Wallace, 713 F. 2d 614 (CA111983) (per curiam). 
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ment concerning § 16-1-20.2 makes it unnecessary to com-
ment at length on the District Court's remarkable conclusion 
that the Federal Constitution imposes no obstacle to Ala-
bama's establishment of a state religion. Before analyzing 
the precise issue that is presented to us, it is nevertheless ap-
propriate to recall how firmly embedded in our constitutional 
jurisprudence is the proposition that the several States have 
no greater power to restrain the individual freedoms pro-
tected by the First Amendment than does the Congress of 
the United States. 
As is plain from its text, the First Amendment was 
adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the 
individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express 
himself in accordance with the dictates of his own con-
science.32 Until the Fourteenth Amendment was added to 
the Constitution, the First Amendment's restraints on the 
exercise of federal power simply did not apply to the States. 33 
But when the Constitution was amended to prohibit any 
State from depriving any person of liberty without due proc-
ess of law, that Amendment imposed the same substantive 
limitations on the States' power to legislate that the First 
Amendment had always imposed on the Congress' power. 
This Court has confirmed and endorsed this elementary prop-
osition of law time and time again. 34 
112 The First Amendment provides: 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 
88 See Permoli v. Municipality No.1 of the City of New Orleans, 3 How. 
589, 609 (1845). 
34 See, e. g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (right to 
refuse endorsement of an offensive state motto); Terminiello v. Chicago, 
' 337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949) (right to free speech); Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637-638 (1943) (right to refuse to participate in a 
ceremony that offends one's conscience); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U. S. 296, 303 (1940) (right to proselytize one's religious faith); Hague v. 
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Writing for a unanimous Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940), Justice Roberts explained: 
" .. . We hold that the statute, as construed and ap-
plied to the appellants, deprives them of their liberty 
without due process of law in contravention of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The fundamental concept of lib-
erty embodied in that Amendment embraces the liber-
ties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First 
Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has 
rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as 
Congress to enact such laws. The constitutional inhi-
bition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double 
aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law 
of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form 
of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to ad-
here to such religious organization or form of worship as 
the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. 
On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the 
chosen form of religion." 
Cantwell, of course, is but one case in which the Court has 
identified the individual's freedom of conscience as the cen-
tral liberty that unifies the various clauses in the First 
CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 519 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.) (right to assemble 
peaceably); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 707 (1931) 
(right to publish an unpopular newspaper); Whitney v. California, 274 
U. S. 357, 373 (Brandeis, J. , concurring) (right to advocate the cause of 
communism); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (right to express an unpopular opinion); cf. Abington School 
District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 215, n. 7 (1963), where the Court ap-
provingly quoted Board of Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 253 (1872), 
which stated: 
"The great bulk of human affairs and human interests is left by any free 
government to individual enterprise and individual action. Religion is 
eminently one of these interests, lying outside the true and legitimate 
province of government." 
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Amendment. 35 Enlarging on this theme, THE CHIEF Jus-
TICE recently wrote: 
"We begin with the proposition that the right of free-
dom of thought protected by the First Amendment 
against state action includes both the right to speak 
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. See 
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 633-634 
(1943); id., at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring). A system 
which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, 
and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomi-
tant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right 
to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are com-
plementary components of the broader concept of 'indi-
vidual freedom of mind.' I d., at 637. 
"The Court in Barnette, supra, was faced with a state 
statute which required public school students to partici-
pate in daily public ceremonies by honoring the flag both 
with words and traditional salute gestures. In overrul-
ing its prior decision in Minersville District v. Gobitis, 
310 U. S. 586 (1940), the Court held that 'a ceremony so 
touching matters of opinion and political attitude may 
[not] be imposed upon the individual by official authority 
86 For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 164 (1944), 
the Court wrote: 
"If by this position appellant seeks for freedom of conscience a broader 
protection than for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted that any of the 
great liberties insured by the First Article can be given higher place than 
the others. All have preferred position in our basic scheme. Schneider v. 
State, 308 U. S. 147; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296. All are in-
terwoven there together. Differences there are, in them and in the modes 
appropriate for their exercise. But they have unity in the charter's prime 
place because they have unity in their human sources and functionings." 
See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 269 (1981) (stating that reli-
gious worship and discussion "are forms of speech and association pro-
tected by the First Amendment"). 
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under powers committed to any political organization 
under our Constitution.' 319 U. S., at 636. Compel-
ling the affirmative act of a flag salute involved a more 
serious infringement upon personal liberties than the 
passive act of carrying the state motto on a license plate, 
but the difference is essentially one of degree. Here, as 
in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which 
forces an individual, as part of his daily life-indeed con-
stantly while his automobile is in public view-to be an 
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideologi-
cal point of view he finds unacceptable. In doing so, the 
State 'invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it 
is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitu-
tion to reserve from all official control.' I d., at 642." 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714-715 (1977). 
Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from 
speaking are complimentary components of a broader concept 
of individual freedom of mind, so also the individual's free-
dom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his right to 
refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority. 
At one time it was thought that this right merely proscribed 
the preference of one Christian sect over another, but would 
not require equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the 
atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Mo-
hammedism or Judaism. 36 But when the underlying princi-
31 Thus Joseph Story wrote: 
"Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and of the 
amendment to it, now under consideration [First Amendment], the gen-
eral, if not the universal sentiment in America was, that christianity ought 
to receive encouragement from the state, so far as was not incompatible 
with the private rights of conscience, and the freedom of religious worship. 
An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to 
hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, 
if not universal indignation." 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion of the United States § 1874, p. 593 (1851) (footnote omitted). 
In the same volume, Story continued: 
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ple has been examined in the crucible of litigation, the Court 
has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of 
conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the 
right to select any religious faith or none at all. 37 This con-
clusion derives support not only from the interest in respect-
ing the individual's freedom of conscience, but also from the 
conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the 
"The real object of the amendment was, not to countenance, much less to 
advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating chris-
tianity; lYut to exclude all rivalry among christian sects, and to prevent any 
national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to a hierarchy the 
exclusive patronage of the national government. It thus cut off the means 
of religious persecution, (the vice and pest of former ages,) and of the 
subversion of the rights of conscience in matters of religion, which had 
been trampled upon almost from the days of the Apostles to the present 
age .... " ld., § 1877, at 594 (emphasis supplied). 
37 Thus, in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S., at 15, the Court 
stated: 
"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at 
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. 
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one 
religion over another." 
ld., at 18 (the First Amendment ''requires the state to be a neutral in its 
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers"); Abington 
School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 216 ("this Court has rejected un-
equivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only gov-
ernmental preference of one religion over another"); id., at 226 ("The place 
of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a long tradi-
tion of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel of the 
individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter ex-
perience that it is not within the power of the government to invade that 
citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or 
retard. In the relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly 
committed to a position of neutrality"); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, 
495 (1961) ("We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Fed-
eral Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess a belief or 
disbelief in any religion.' Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose 
requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither 
can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against 
those religions founded on different beliefs"). 
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product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful, 38 and 
from recognition of the fact that the political interest in fore-
stalling intolerance extends beyond intolerance among Chris-
tian sects-or even intolerance among "religions"-to encom-
pass intolerance of the disbeliever and the uncertain. 39 As 
88 In his "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 
1785," James Madison wrote, in part: 
"1. Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, 'that Re-
ligion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the [Manner of dis-
charging it, can be directed only by reason and] conviction, not by force or 
violence.' The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction 
and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it 
as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is 
unalienable; because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence 
contemplated by their own minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men: 
It is unalienable also; because what is here a right towards men, is a duty 
towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator 
such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him .... 
We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is 
abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly 
exempt from its cognizance. 
"3. Because, it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our lib-
erties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of citizens, and 
one of [the] noblest characteristics of the late Revolution. The freemen of 
America did not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exer-
cise, and entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the conse-
quences in the principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the 
principle. We revere this lesson too much, soon to forget it. Who does 
not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclu-
sion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular 
sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?" The Complete Madison 
299-301 (S. Padover ed. 1953). 
See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 435 (1962) ("It is neither sacri-
legious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this coun-
try should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers 
and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to 
those the people choose to look for religious guidance"). 
• As the Barnette opinion explained, it is the teaching of history, rather 
than any appraisal of the quality of a State's motive, that supports this 
duty to respect basic freedoms: 
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Justice Jackson eloquently stated in Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943): 
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional con-
stellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein." 
The State of Alabama, no less than the Congress of the 
United States, must respect that basic truth. 
III 
When the Court has been called upon to construe the 
breadth of the Establishment Clause, it has examined the 
criteria developed over a period of many years. Thus, in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971), we 
wrote: 
"Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end 
thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many good 
as well as by evil men. Nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon but 
at other times and places the ends have been racial or territorial security, 
support of a dynasty or regime, and particular plans for saving souls. As 
first and moderate methods to attain unity have failed, those bent on its 
accomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity. As govern-
mental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more bit-
ter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper division of our people 
could proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary to 
choose what doctrine and whose program public educational officials shall 
compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate futility of such attempts to 
compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive 
to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, 
as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to 
Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian 
enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find them-
selves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion 
achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard." 319 U. S., at 640-641. 
See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S., at 431 ("a union of government and 
religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion"). 
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"Every analysis in this area must begin with consider-
ation of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court 
over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned 
from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary 
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits re-
ligion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 243 
(1968); finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.' Walz [ v. Tax 
Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970)]." 
It is the first of these three criteria that is most plainly impli-
cated by this case. As the District Court correctly recog-
nized, no consideration of the second or third criteria is nec-
essary if a statute does not have a clearly secular purpose. 40 
For even though a statute that is motivated in part by a reli-
gious purpose may satisfy the first criterion, see, e. g., Ab-
ington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 296-303 
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring), the First Amendment re-
quires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely moti-
vated by a purpose to advance religion. 41 
In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask 
"whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or dis-
approve of religion." 42 In this case, the answer to that 
40 See supra, n. 22. 
<~See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. -, - (1984); id., at -
(O'CONNOR, J. , concurring); id., at- (BRENNAN, J., joined by MAR-
SHALL, BLACKMUN and STEVENS, JJ., dissenting); Mueller v. Allen, 463 
U. S. 388, --- (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S., at 271; Stone 
v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam); Wolman v. Walter, 
433 u. s. 229, 236 (1977). 
42 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S., at - (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) 
("The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual 
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks 
whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under 
review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An af-
firmative answer to either question should render the challenged practice 
invalid"). 
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question is dispositive. For the record not only provides us 
with an unambiguous affirmative answer, but it also reveals 
that the enactment of § 16-1-20.1 was not motivated by any 
clearly secular purpose-indeed, the statute had no secular 
purpose. 
IV 
The sponsor of the bill that became § 16-1-20.1, Senator 
Donald Holmes, inserted into the legislative record-appar-
ently without dissent-a statement indicating that the legis-
lation was an "effort to return voluntary prayer" to the public 
schools. 43 Later Senator Holmes confirmed this purpose be-
fore the District Court. In response to the question whether 
he had any purpose for the legislation other than returning 
voluntary prayer to public schools, he stated, "No, I did not 
have no other purpose in mind." 44 The State did not present 
48 The statement indicated, in pertinent part: 
"Gentlemen, by passage of this bill by the Alabama Legislature our chil-
dren in this state will have the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heri-
tage of this state and this country. The United States as well as the State 
of Alabama was founded by people who believe in God. I believe this effort 
to return voluntary prayer to our public schools for its return to us to the 
original position of the writers of the Constitution, this local philosophies 
and beliefs hundreds of Alabamians have urged my continuous support for 
permitting school prayer. Since coming to the Alabama Senate I have 
worked hard on this legislation to accomplish the return of voluntary 
prayer in our public schools and return to the basic moral fiber." App. 50 
(emphasis added). 
"!d., at 52. The District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that 
the purpose of§ 16-1-20.1 was "an effort on the part of the State of Ala-
bama to encourage a religious activity." Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp., 
at 732; Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d, at 1535. The evidence presented to 
the District Court elaborated on t~e express admission of the Governor of 
Alabama (then Fob James) that the enactment of§ 16-1-20.1 was intended 
to "clarify [the State's] intent to have prayer as part of the daily classroom 
activity," compare Second Amended Complaint ~ 32(d) (App. 24-25) with 
Governor's Answer to § 32(d) (App. 40); and that the "expressed legislative 
purpose in enacting Section 16-1-20.1 (1981) was to 'return voluntary 
prayer to public schools,"' compare Second Amended Complaint ~~ 32(b) 
and (c) (App. 24) with Governor's Answer to ~~ 32(b) and (c) (App. 40). 
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evidence of any secular purpose. 45 
The unrebutted evidence of legislative intent contained in 
the legislative record and in the testimony of the sponsor of 
§ 16-1-20.1 is confirmed by a consideration of the relationship 
between this statute and the two other measures that were 
considered in this case. The District Court found that the 
1981 statute and its 1982 sequel had a common, nonsecular 
purpose. The wholly religious character of the later enact-
ment is plainly evident from its text. When the differences 
46 Appellant Governor George C. Wallace now argues that§ 16-1-20.1 "is 
best understood as a permissible accommodation of religion" and that 
viewed even in terms of the Lemon test, the "statute conforms to accept-
able constitutional criteria." Brief for Appellant Wallace 5; see also 
Brief for Appellants Smith et al. 39 (§ 16-1-20.1 "accommodates the free 
exercise of the religious beliefs and free exercise of speech and belief of 
those affected"), id., at 47. These arguments seem to be based on the 
theory that the free exercise of religion of some of the State's citizens was 
burdened before the statute was enacted. The United States, appearing 
as amicus curiae in support of the appellants, candidly acknowledges that 
''it is unlikely that in most contexts a strong Free Exercise claim could be 
made that time for personal prayer must be set aside during the school 
day." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10. There is no basis for 
the suggestion that § 16-1-20.1 ''is a means for accommodating the reli-
gious and meditative needs of students without in any way diminishing the 
school's own neutrality or secular atmosphere." !d., at 11. In this case, 
it is undisputed that at the time of the enactment of§ 16-1-20.1 there was 
no governmental practice impeding students from silently praying for one 
minute at the beginning of each school day; thus, there was no need to "ac-
commodate" or to exempt individuals from any general governmental re-
quirement because of the dictates of our cases interpreting the Free Exer-
cise Clause. See, e. g., Thomas v. Review Board, Indiana Employment 
Security Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 
(1963); see also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 226 
(''While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action 
to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a 
majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs"). 
What was missing in the appellants' eyes at time of the enactment of 
§ 16-1-20.1-and therefore what is precisely the aspect that makes the 
statute unconstitutional-was the State's endorsement and promotion of 
religion and a particular religious practice. 
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between § 16-1-20.1 and its 1978 predecessor, § 16-1-20, are 
examined, it is equally clear that the 1981 statute has the 
same wholly religious character. 
There are only three textual differences between § 16-
1-20.1 and § 16-1-20: (1) the earlier statute applies only to 
grades one through six, whereas § 16-1-20.1 applies to all 
grades; (2) the earlier statute uses the word "shall" whereas 
§ 16-1-20.1 uses the word "may''; (3) the earlier statute refers 
only to "meditation" whereas § 16-1-20.1 refers to "medita-
tion or voluntary prayer." The first difference is of no rele-
vance in this litigation because the minor appellees were in 
kindergarten or second grade during the 1981-1982 academic 
year. The second difference would also have no impact on 
this litigation because the mandatory language of § 16-1-20 
continued to apply to grades one through six. 46 Thus, the 
only significant textual difference is the addition of the words 
"or voluntary prayer." 
The legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools 
is, of course, quite different from merely protecting every 
student's right to engage in voluntary prayer during an ap-
propriate moment of silence during the school day. The 1978 
statute already protected that right, containing nothing that 
prevented any student from engaging in voluntary prayer 
during a silent minute of meditation. 47 Appellants have not 
identified any secular purpose that was not fully served by 
§ 16-1-20 before the enactment of§ 16-1-20.1. Thus, only 
two conclusions are consistent with the text of § 16-1-20.1: 
(1) the statute was enacted to convey a message of State en-
dorsement and promotion of prayer; or (2) the statute was 
enacted for no purpose. No one suggests that the statute 
was nothing but a meaningless or irrational act. 46 
441 See n. 1, supra. 
'
7 Indeed, for some persons meditation itself may be a form of prayer. 
B. Larson, Larson's Book of Cults 62-65 (1982); C. Whittier, Silent Prayer 
and Meditation in World Religions 1-7 (Cong. Research Service 1982). 
48 If the conclusion that the statute had no purpose were tenable, it 
would remain true that no purpose is not a secular purpose. But such a 
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We must, therefore, conclude that the Alabama Legisla-
ture intended to change existing law 49 and that it was moti-
vated by the same purpose that the Governor's Answer to 
the Second Amended Complaint expressly admitted; that the 
statement inserted in the legislative history revealed; and 
that Senator's Holmes testimony frankly described. The 
Legislature enacted § 16-1-20.1 despite the existence of 
§ 16-1-20 for the sole purpose of expressing the State's 
endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the begin-
ning of each school day. The addition of "or voluntary 
prayer" indicates that the State intended to characterize 
prayer as a favored practice. Such an endorsement is not 
consistent with the established principle that the Govern-
ment must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward 
religion. 50 
The importance of that principle does not permit us to treat 
this as an inconsequential case involving nothing more than a 
few words of symbolic speech on behalf of the political major-
conclusion is inconsistent with the common-sense presumption that stat-
utes are usually enacted to change existing law. Appellants do not even 
suggest that the State had no purpose in enacting§ 16-1-20.1. 
48 United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U. S. 290, 297 (1951) (a 
"statute cannot be divorced from the circumstances existing at the time it 
was passed"); id., at 298 (refusing to attribute pointless purpose to Con-
gress in the absence of facts to the contrary); United States v. National 
City Lines, Inc., 337 U. S. 78, 80-81 (1949) (rejecting Government's argu-
ment that Congress had no desire to change law when enacting legislation). 
50 See, e. g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S., at 42 (per curiam); Committee 
for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 792-793 (1973) ("A proper 
respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels 
the State to pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward religion"); Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 109 (1968); Abington School District v. Schempp, 
374 U. S., at 215-222; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S., at 430 ("Neither the fact 
that the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its ob-
servance on the part of the students is voluntary can serve to free it from 
the limitations of the Establishment Clause"); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. 
Board of Education, 333 U.S 203, 211-212 (1948); Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U. S., at 18. 
' 
' 
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ity. 51 For whenever the State itself speaks on a religious 
subject, one of the questions that we must ask is "whether 
the Government intends to convey a message of endorsement 
or disapproval of religion." 52 The well-supported concurrent 
findings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals-that 
§ 16-1-20.1 was intended to convey a message of State-ap-
proval of prayer activities in the public schools-make it un-
necessary, and indeed inappropriate, to evaluate the practi-
51 As this Court stated in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S., at 430: 
"The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not de-
pend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated 
by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those 
laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not." 
Moroever, this Court has noted that "[ w ]hen the power, prestige and finan-
cial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the 
indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the pre-
vailing officially approved religion is plain." I d., at 431. This comment 
has special force in the public-school context where attendance is manda-
tory. Justice Frankfurter acknowledged this reality in McCollum v. 
Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 227 (1948) (concurring opinion): 
"That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint, it does 
not eliminate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to 
conscience and outside the school's domain. The law of imitation operates, 
and non-conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children." 
See also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 290 (BREN-
NAN, J., concurring); cf. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 792 (1983) 
(distinguishing between adults not susceptible to "religious indoctrination" 
and children subject to "peer pressure"). Further, this Court has 
observed: 
"That [Boards of Education] are educating the young for citizenship is rea-
son for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, 
if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to dis-
count important principles of our government as mere platitudes." Board 
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S., at 637. 
52 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S., at-- (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) 
("The purpose prong of the Lemon test requires that a government activity 
have a secular purpose. . . . The proper inquiry under the purpose prong 
of Lemon ... is whether the government intends to convey a message of 
endorsement or disapproval of religion"). 
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cal significance of the addition of the words "or voluntary 
prayer" to the statute. Keeping in mind, as we must, "both 
the fundamental place held by the Establishment Clause in 
our constitutional scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in 
which Establishment Clause values can be eroded," 53 we con-
clude that § 16-1-20.1 violates the First Amendment. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
MJd., at-. 
